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Kurzfassung (Deutsch)
Mit dem Wachstum der Komplexita¨t von Softwaresystemen geht ein Wachstum an
aufgedeckten Sicherheitslu¨cken und Fehlern in den Softwaresystemen einher. Einmal
ausgenutzt, erlauben es diese Schwachstellen einem Angreifer, bo¨sartige Programme zu
installieren, wie etwa Malware oder Spyware, die einzelne Aktionen eines Benutzers,
Passwo¨rter, Kreditkarteninformationen, Gebote in Auktionen oder andere sensitive
Daten abho¨ren, speichern und weiter verteilen ko¨nnen. Dieses Problem wird weiterhin
dadurch verschlimmert, dass eine einzige Schwachstelle in einer einzelnen Anwendung
einen Kontrollverlust u¨ber das ganze System bewirken kann. Folglich ist es fu¨r Benutzer
sehr schwer festzustellen, ob das Softwaresystem ihres Computers vertrauenswu¨rdig ist
oder nicht. Dieses Wissen ist jedoch notwendig, um Benutzern mehr Sicherheit und
damit mehr Vertrauen in den Umgang mit ihrem Softwaresystem zu geben.
In dieser Dissertation werden fu¨r diese Problematik Konzepte und Mechanismen
entwickelt, um verifizierbare Nachweise zu erstellen, ob sich ein System in einem be-
stimmten Zustand befindet. Die zugrunde liegende Idee der Arbeit besteht darin, nach-
zuweisen, ob ein System qua Konstruktion bzw. Konfiguration festgelegte Eigenschaften
besitzt, so dass im Vertrauen auf die Gu¨ltigkeit dieser Eigenschaften eine Interaktion
mit einem System vertrauenswu¨rdig abgewickelt werden kann. Besitzt ein System die
spezifizierten Eigenschaften, so kann dies erkannt und eine Interaktion mit dem System
rechtzeitig abgebrochen werden. Um diese Anforderungen umzusetzen, werden in dieser
Dissertation Konzepte und Mechanismen entwickelt, die auf drei Bausteinen beruhen.
Erst die Kombination aller drei Bausteine ermo¨glicht den sicheren Vertrauensaufbau in
ein System.
Der erste Baustein beinhaltet sichere Attestationsprotokolle. Diese Attestations-
protokolle bedienen sich kryptographischer Maßnahmen und ermo¨glichen es, den Sys-
temzustand eines Softwaresystems vertrauenswu¨rdig zu u¨bermitteln. Als Attestations-
technik werden die Mechanismen eines Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) eingesetzt,
um die Authentizita¨t der Eigenschaften eines Systems zu gewa¨hrleisten. In dem Kon-
text dieses Bausteins wird aufgezeigt, welche Anforderungen an Attestationsprotokolle
gestellt werden und wie sich sichere Attestationsprotokolle realisieren lassen. Dazu
werden mehrere sichere Attestationsprotokolle entwickelt, die unterschiedliche Eigen-
schaften erfu¨llen und damit in unterschiedlichen Szenarien eingesetzt werden ko¨nnen.
Die entworfenen Protokolle werden bezu¨glich ihrer Sicherheit sowohl formal als auch
informell verifiziert.
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Der zweite Baustein ist eine attestationsunterstu¨tzende Systemarchitektur, in die
sich die Attestationsprotokolle einbetten lassen. Die Systemarchitektur zeichnet sich
durch einzelne voneinander isolierte Bereiche aus und ist in der Lage, mittels At-
testationsprotokollen ihre Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit zu belegen. Zur Umsetzung dieses
Konzeptes werden Virtualisierungstechnologien benutzt, um inha¨rente Probleme der
zugrunde liegenden Attestationstechnik zu lo¨sen. Dieses Vorgehen ermo¨glicht die Kon-
struktion von isolierten, vertrauenswu¨rdigen Ausfu¨hrungsumgebungen, die gegenu¨ber
einer Kompromittierung durch Malware robust sind und daher fu¨r sensitive Transak-
tionen genutzt werden ko¨nnen.
Bei dem dritten Baustein handelt es sich um eine sichere Transaktionssoftware,
die es ermo¨glicht, vertrauenswu¨rdige Transaktionen in verteilten Systemen zu ta¨tigen.
Hierzu wird anhand des Beispiels E-Commerce eine Software entwickelt, die sich einer
geeigneten Kombination von SmartCard-basierter Authentifikation des Nutzers und
einer TPM-basierten Attestation der Softwarekomponenten bedient. Diese Transaktion-
ssoftware nutzt dazu die ersten beiden Bausteine und ist somit robust gegenu¨ber Infek-
tionen durch Malware. Weiterhin implementiert die Transaktionssoftware die vorgestell-
ten Konzepte und Protokolle und ist daher in der Lage, ihre Vertrauenswu¨rdigkeit
sowohl gegenu¨ber dem Nutzer als auch einer entfernten Plattform zu belegen.
Abstract (English)
As the complexity of current software systems increases, we see a correlative increase
in the number of discovered vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, once exploited, allow
an attacker to surreptitiously install subversive programs, such as malware and spy-
ware, that can eavesdrop, record and distribute a user’s actions, passwords, credit card
information, bids in auctions or other sensitive data. Exacerbating this problem is the
fact that a single vulnerability in a single application can result in the loss of control
of the entire system. As a result, it is difficult for users to ascertain if their computer’s
software system can be trusted or not. However, such assurances are necessary if users
are to become more comfortable in using their software systems.
To alleviate this challenge, we develop concepts and methods to create verifiable
proofs with which decisions can be made as to whether a particular system is trusted.
For this purpose, the solution proposed in this thesis is based on three main building
blocks. Only the combination of all these three building blocks enable overcoming the
presented challenges.
The first building block comprises secure attestation protocols. Attestation proto-
cols use cryptographic mechanisms and enable to securely deliver integrity information
of the system configuration of a particular (remote) platform. To ensure that the
delivered integrity information are authentic, the mechanisms provided by a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) are used. In the context of these building blocks, we show
which challenges need to be solved in designing secure attestation protocols. We propose
a number of different attestation protocols that are adapted to different scenarios and
enable establishing trust in a remote entity’s platform configuration. We also evaluate
our proposed protocols in terms of security and performance. To this end, we formally
analyzed our proposed protocols using a model checker and implemented all protocols
to gain performance data.
The second building block is a security architecture for non resource-constrained
computer systems. This security architecture is based on virtualization techniques and
is adapted to efficiently use attestation techniques. It provides an isolated security
environment where confidential data can be processed. We also give details about our
performed implementation.
The third building block is a secure transaction software that facilitates making se-
cure transactions in distributed systems. The transaction software uses the mechanisms
of the first two building blocks and is, thus, resistant against infection from malware.
In addition, it implements the proposed concepts and protocols of the first two building
iii
blocks. Hence, it is able to prove its own trust level to a remote platform and to the
user of the secure transaction software.
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Chapter 1
Overview
This chapter serves as an overview. We will give a motivation for the topic and formulate
the problem statements of the thesis. In this context, we will show why we need
attestation techniques for trust establishment and why typical operating systems are
not appropriate for supporting these techniques. Moreover, we will shortly summarize
the main contribution of this thesis. This chapter additionally gives a short outline of
how the thesis is organized.
1.1 Motivation
Current software systems are increasingly used for online transactions. Scenarios where
this is done include e-commerce, online banking, or e-business. In such transactions, the
software systems are often entrusted with sensitive data, such as personal or financial
information. Sensitive data has a very high protection level and unauthorized access to
this data must be prevented. One mechanism to protect sensitive data while they are
sent over a communication channel is to protect them through the use of cryptographic
protocols. However, cryptographic protocols can only secure communication channels
and are basically overstrained if an attack is performed at the end of the communication
channel, where confidential data is often available in plaintext.
One component that is responsible for protecting sensitive data at the endpoint of a
communication channel is the operating system, which provides basic protection mech-
anisms. These protection mechanisms do not only include establishing cryptographic
channels, but also ensure that only authorized processes are allowed to access particular
data. For this purpose, the operating system provides for each process an own virtual
address space. The virtual address space is transformed using a Memory Management
Unit into an address which points to the actual physical location in memory. Unless
the operating systems marks a specific area of the address space as shared, a process
can only access its own allocated address space and no address space which is allocated
by another process.
However, operating systems are very complex and not very reliable. It has been
shown that an operating system contains between six and 16 bugs per 1,000 lines of
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executable code [15]. A conservative estimate of six bugs per 1,000 lines of code indi-
cates that Windows XP, with a code size of around 50 million lines of code [166], has
approximately 300.000 bugs. It should also be noted that typically about 70 percent
of the operating system consist of device drivers [167]. These device drivers have error
rates that are three to seven times higher than ordinary code [35]. If these errors can be
exploited by an attacker, a security vulnerability emerges that may allow an attacker to
violate the integrity of the operating system [100]. Since the operating system typically
runs in the highest CPU privilege level, an exploited vulnerability can allow an attacker
to gain control of the entire system. The attacker is then able to surreptitiously install
subversive programs, such as malware and spyware, that can eavesdrop, record and
distribute a users’ action, passwords, credit card information, bids in auctions or other
sensitive data. Exacerbating this problematic exploitation, a single vulnerability in a
single application can result in the loss of control of the entire system.
One solution for overcoming this vulnerability is using attestation techniques as
defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [179]. These techniques can be used to
detect a trusted and malware free platform if a Trusted Computing-enhanced operating
system would be available. To enable a platform to attest to its platform configuration,
a measurement agent of a Trusted Computing-enhanced operating system measures
every code fragment before execution and stores the resulting values in a protected
and shielded location of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). These values can then be
transferred to a remote entity (or a particular user) in order to prove that a specific
platform behaves as specified, i.e., it is trusted. However, these mechanisms cannot be
realized in currently available operating systems, mainly due to the enormous system
complexity and the fact that all components need to be trusted even if this component
has no impact on the target application.
Virtualization techniques [69] provide a mechanism for adapting a compartmental-
ization to operating systems. The main idea of these techniques is to use a hypervisor
or virtual machine monitor, which establishes several strong isolated execution environ-
ments, that cannot influence one another. A fault or a vulnerability in one environment
cannot inflict damage to other environments. It has already been formally shown by
Madnick and Donovan [105] that this approach provides substantially better software
security and reliability. However, these techniques on their own are no panacea, since
they do not provide assurances that a component, e.g, the hypervisor, behaves as spec-
ified. A faulty hypervisor could, for example, inspect every instruction issued by a
virtual machine and undermine the protection architecture. To make matters worse,
an adversary could foist a hypervisor on a user’s platform [93] without any notice by
the user. This attack vector can also exploit characteristics of virtualization-supporting
hardware [60, 135], showing that it is expected that future malware generation use these
vectors. This would induce a completely new malware attack model causing future gen-
erations of malware to be even more harder to detect than current malware generations.
These properties show that virtualization and attestation techniques depend on each
other and only both together are a strong foundation for secure systems.
In this thesis, we will show how an appropriate combination of attestation tech-
niques and virtualization technologies can significantly enhance system security. Using
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virtualization and attestation, a user can be confident that his platform can be trusted
and that his platform has not been compromised by malicious software components.
In addition, isolated compartments can be constructed that are immune from infec-
tion by other software components and that allow for the construction of robust and
self-protecting systems that can hardly be compromised by an adversary.
1.2 Problem Statement
Below, we identify the main challenges that need to be solved in order to use attestation
techniques in distributed systems in general, and operating systems in particular.
Secure and Efficient Attestation Channels Measuring system components using
the Trusted Platform Module and transferring the obtained measurements to a remote
entity is a tedious task and provides several challenges [70, 164, 156, 160]. These
challenges include determing how to establish a secure channel between the verifying
entity and the prover [164], how to secure this channel and how to efficiently realize it
so as to satisfy scalability issues [160]. If this attestation channel is not established in a
secure manner, an attacker might be able to relay the attestation challenge to another
host and then masquerade his host as being in a conforming state [164].
Attestation techniques can be used to ensure the trust level of a remote entity before
transferring confidential data to it. However, in many scenarios, e.g., e-commerce, it
is important to provide the user of a particular platform with assurances that his own
platform has not been tampered with and is in a trusted state. Since a successful
attestation could have also been simulated [158], it is important to provide mechanisms
for determining how the trust can be guaranteed in a way that the user is convinced
that his platform is trusted.
Attestation Complexity Currently available operating systems are not appropriate
for supporting attestation techniques [156]. This is due to the enormous system com-
plexity of open and basically non resource-constrained operating system environments
and the fact that the process of attestation is basically inefficient [156, 20, 137, 87, 83].
In addition, due to the type of measurement process, not all software components that
influence the runtime behavior of an operating system are measured. As a consequence,
new operating system environments are required that enable reducing the attestation
complexity and are capable of being equipped with means for utilizing attestation tech-
niques.
Privacy Issues The TCG-defined attestation process requires transferring an addi-
tional log with which the whole platform configuration is validated. However, transfer-
ring this information to a remote platform raises severe privacy concerns [137, 156, 159].
The remote platform is able to discover the full platform configuration, including all
running processes, by simply examining the received response. Since this is not, in any
case, a desirable feature, privacy-preserving mechanisms are necessary in order to be
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able to make a statement about the trust level of a platform without revealing the exact
configuration.
1.3 Contribution
This thesis explores the presented challenges, shows how attestation techniques can be
applied, and shows that there is no silver bullet solution that solves all challenges. De-
pending on the scenario, the mechanisms to establish a secure attestation channel vary.
This thesis also argues that applying attestation in open and non resource-constrained
computer systems requires a system based on virtualization, thus allowing the estab-
lishment of several isolated execution environments. We show how such a security
architecture can be realized and show that an appropriate combination of attestation
and virtualization technologies can significantly enhance system security. Our proposed
architecture is adapted to open and distributed non resource-constrained computer sys-
tems and provides a means for establishing trust in distributed systems. We will also
present an example application for trusted online transactions, which enables purchasing
goods on-line and utilizes attestation in combination with virtualization technologies.
In short, the major contributions of this thesis are threefold:
(1) Derivation of secure attestation protocols that enable establishing secure attestation
channels and satisfy different requirements. The attestation protocols have been
formally verified to ensure their correctness. These protocols form the first building
block for leveraging attestation techniques in distributed systems.
(2) Concepts and design of a security architecture that enables constructing isolated
compartments and supports attestation in order to establish trust in a remote
entity’s system configuration. The security architecture has also been implemented
and the attestation protocols were integrated to show that our approach is feasible.
The security architecture is the second building block for leveraging attestation
techniques.
(3) A secure transaction software that utilizes attestation and runs on top of the pro-
posed security architecture. This application has also been implemented and makes
the derived trust visible to the user. The secure transaction software forms the last
building block of our solution.
In the framework of the research done in this thesis, the following papers have been
published:
1. Claudia Eckert, Omid Tafreschi, and Frederic Stumpf. On Controlled Sharing of
Virtual Goods. In 7th International Workshop for Technical, Economic and Legal
Aspects of Business Models for Virtual Goods, Nancy, France, September 22, 2009
2. Frederic Stumpf, Benjamin Weyl, Christian Meves, and Marko Wolf. A Se-
curity Architecture for Multifunctional ECUs in Vehicles. In 25. VDI/VW-
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Gemeinschaftstagung: Automotive Security, Ingolstadt, Germany, October 19 -
20, 2009
3. Stefan Katzenbeisser, Klaus Kursawe, and Frederic Stumpf. Revocation of TPM
Keys. In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Trusted Comput-
ing (TRUST 2009), Oxford, UK, April 6-8, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pp. 120-132, Springer-Verlag
4. Christian Schneider, Frederic Stumpf, and Claudia Eckert. Enhancing Control
of Service Compositions in Service-Oriented Architectures. In Proceedings of the
Third International Workshop on Advances in Information Security (WAIS 2009),
Fukuoka, Japan, March 16-19, pp. 953-959, IEEE Computer Society,
5. Frederic Stumpf, Andreas Fuchs, Stefan Katzenbeisser, and Claudia Eckert. Im-
proving the Scalability of Platform Attestation. In Proceedings of the Third ACM
Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing (ACM STC’08), Fairfax, VA, USA, Oct
31, 2008, ACM Press
6. Frederic Stumpf and Claudia Eckert. Enhancing Trusted Platform Modules with
Hardware-Based Virtualization Techniques. In Proceedings of the Second Interna-
tional Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies
(SECURWARE 2008), Cap Esterel, France, August 25-31, 2008, pp. 1-9, IEEE
Computer Society, [Best Paper Award]
7. Frederic Stumpf, Claudia Eckert, and Shane Balfe. Towards Secure E-Commerce
Based on Virtualization and Attestation Techniques. In Proceedings of the Third
International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2008),
Barcelona, Spain, March 4 - 7, 2008, pp. 376-382, IEEE Computer Society
8. Frederic Stumpf, Lars Fischer, and Claudia Eckert. Trust, Security and Privacy
in VANETs - A Multilayered Security Architecture for C2C-Communication. In
23. VDI/VW-Gemeinschaftstagung: Automotive Security, Wolfsburg, Germany,
November 27 - 28, 2007, pp. 55-70, VDI-Verlag
9. Frederic Stumpf, Patrick Ro¨der, and Claudia Eckert. An Architecture providing
Virtualization-Based Protection Mechanisms against Insider Attacks. In Pro-
ceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Information Security Applications
(WISA 2007), Jeju Island, Korea, August 27 - 29, 2007, Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, Vol.4867, pp. 142-156, Springer-Verlag
10. Frederic Stumpf, Markus Sacher, Alexander Roßnagel, and Claudia Eckert. The
creation of Qualified Signatures with Trusted Platform Modules. Digital Evidence
Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2007, pp. 81 - 88, Pario Communications Limited
11. Frederic Stumpf, Michael Benz, Martin Hermanowski, and Claudia Eckert. An
Approach to a Trustworthy System Architecture Using Virtualization. In Proceed-
ings of the 4th International Conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
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(ATC 2007), Hong Kong, China, July 11-13, 2007, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Vol.4158, pp. 191-202, Springer-Verlag
12. Christoph Krauß, Frederic Stumpf, and Claudia Eckert. Detecting Node Com-
promise in Hybrid Wireless Sensor Networks Using Attestation Techniques. Pro-
ceedings of the Fourth European Workshop on Security and Privacy in Ad hoc
and Sensor Networks (ESAS 2007), Cambridge, UK, July 2007, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Vol.4572, pp. 203-217, Springer-Verlag
13. Christel Kumbruck, Markus Sacher, und Frederic Stumpf. Vertrauen(skapseln)
beim Online-Einkauf. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit (DuD), Mai, 2007, Vieweg-
Verlag
14. Frederic Stumpf, Markus Sacher, Alexander Roßnagel, und Claudia Eckert. Erzeu-
gung elektronischer Signaturen mittels Trusted Platform Module. Datenschutz
und Datensicherheit (DuD), Mai, 2007, Vieweg-Verlag
15. Frederic Stumpf, Omid Tafreschi, Patrick Ro¨der, and Claudia Eckert. A robust
Integrity Reporting Protocol for Remote Attestation. Second Workshop on Ad-
vances in Trusted Computing (WATC ’06 Fall), Tokyo, Japan, December, 2006
16. Patrick Ro¨der, Frederic Stumpf, Ralf Grewe, and Claudia Eckert. Hades - Hard-
ware Assisted Document Security. Second Workshop on Advances in Trusted
Computing (WATC ’06 Fall), Tokyo, Japan, December, 2006
1.4 Outline of this Thesis
This thesis consists of five parts: an introduction (Part 1), three main parts (Part 2 -
4) and a summary (Part 5).
Part 1. Introduction This introduction provides an overview and motivation of
the thesis and gives a broad overview of Trusted Computing and virtualization, two
techniques that we use heavily. In this section, we formulate the problem statements
of the thesis and show why there is a need for applying attestation techniques for trust
establishment.
Part 2. Attestation Protocols The second part of the thesis addresses the issue
how to realize secure attestation. In this context, we especially look at the challenges
that need to be solved in designing secure attestation protocols. We propose a number
of different attestation protocols that are adapted to different scenarios and enable
establishing trust in a remote entity’s platform configuration. We also evaluate our
proposed protocols in terms of security and performance. To this end, we formally
analyzed our proposed protocols using a model checker and implemented all protocols.
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Part 3. Attestation-supporting Security Architecture Part three presents a
security architecture for non-constrained computer systems. This security architecture
is based on virtualization-techniques and is adapted to efficiently use attestation tech-
niques. It provides an isolated security environment where confidential data can be
processed. We also present implementation details about how we implemented our pro-
posal in a proof-of-concept prototype. In this section, we also address the issue of how
to virtualize TPMs so that they can be used in security architectures that are based
on virtualization. Our proposed security architecture can be used as a foundation for
constructing next-generation secure operating systems that rely on Trusted Computing
technology.
Part 4. Transaction Software The fourth part presents a secure transaction soft-
ware that runs on the security architecture introduced in Part 3. The transaction
software implements the attestation protocols proposed in Part 2 and also acts as an
interface for the user. It enables establishing secure attestation channels with a remote
entity and is able to provide the user with assurances that his own platform is trusted.
This section also reflects on whether the TPM of a TPM-enhanced platform can be
used as a secure signature creation device to provide non-repudiation of concluded
agreements.
Part 5. Summary The last part concludes this thesis by summarizing its major
contributions.
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Chapter 2
Background
This section gives a brief overview of Trusted Computing and virtualization that is
important for understanding the approach presented in this thesis. In addition, we will
shortly look at the main formal approaches of protocol analysis.
2.1 Trusted Computing
The core component of Trusted Computing is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
[179]. The TPM can be viewed as functionally equivalent to a high-end smart card
that is soldered to the motherboard of a platform. The TPM serves as a root of trust
within the platform and provides a means of trust establishment using transitive trust.
For this purpose, a chain of trust, up to and including the end user applications, is
generated with the TPM as trust anchor.
The TPM provides a number of functionalities that include:
• Protected Capabilities: The TPM provides a set of exclusive commands with access
to protected and shielded locations. These locations provide an area where it is
secure to operate on sensitive data. The following TPM functionalities fall into
this category:
– random number generation,
– registers for recording platform state,
– secure volatile and non-volatile memory,
– a SHA-1 hashing engine,
– asymmetric key generation, encryption and digital signature capabilities.
To reduce the amount of non-volatile memory required inside the TPM, it acts
as an access control device for externally stored keys rather than storing all keys
itself. Only the storage root key (SRK ) remains permanently in the TPM and
is used to encrypt all other externally stored keys. This strategy offers the same
security level as if all keys were stored internally.
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This design choice allows to reduce the production costs of a TPM, but introduces
the problem that the TPM is not able to reliably destroy externally stored keys
once they get compromised. Thus, if an attacker once acquires access rights to a
TPM-maintained key and an encrypted version of that key, he can always access
that key through the TPM hardware [91].
• Integrity Measurement and Storing : Integrity measurement is the process of ob-
taining metrics of platform characteristics that describe the integrity of a plat-
form. These metrics, or measurements, are held in protected shielded locations,
known as Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). The measurement made by
the TPM is written to a specific PCR by combining a hash of a measured software
component with the previous value of the PCR. The following function is used to
calculate the value for platform configuration register N , where SHA1 refers to
the cryptographic hash function used by the TPM and || denotes a concatenation:
Extend(PCRN , value) = SHA1(PCRN ||value). (2.1)
In order to establish trust in a computer system, a Trusted Computing enhanced
system measures and stores the boot sequence of a platform. When turning on
a computer, the Core Root of Trust Measurement (CRTM), which resides in the
BIOS, is the first component to be executed. The CRTM then measures itself and
the BIOS, and then hands over control to the next software component in the boot
chain. This process continues for every component involved in the boot sequence
of a platform. After execution of the boot sequence, a trusted operating system
responsible for measuring each software component before execution. In addition,
the trusted operating system records each execution of a software component and
generates an entry in the stored measurement log (SML). This SML is maintained
by the trusted operating system and enables a later verification of the hash values
stored inside the PCRs.
• Attestation is the complete process of vouching for the accuracy of information.
To attest an entity to its software, i.e., to declare an entity as trusted, the process
requires three main mechanisms:
– Integrity Measurement is the process of obtaining the metrics of platform
characteristics, i.e., the software’s integrity. The obtained metrics are then
stored in PCRs. This process can also be understood as a mechanism that
exactly identifies which software components are actually running on a spe-
cific platform.
– Integrity Reporting is the process of attesting to the content of integrity
storage (i.e., PCRs). This process includes delivering the content of integrity
storage to a remote entity. To ensure authenticity and freshness of these
values, they can be signed with an attestation identity key (AIK ), which is
held in a shielded location of the TPM.
2.2. CPU PRIVILEGE LEVELS 13
Ring 1 
Ring 0
Operating System
Ring 3
Applications
Ring 2 
Figure 2.1: CPU privilege levels of the x86 architecture
– Decision Making is the process of deciding whether a platform configuration
is to be trusted or not. To this end, a verifier processes the received SML
and decides based on the PCRs and on reference values, whether a particular
platform is trusted or not.
The TPM additionally offers a number of different signing keys. Another important
key is the Endorsement Key (EK ), which is generated by the module manufacturer and
injected into the TPM. The EK uniquely identifies the TPM and can be used to prove
the authenticity of the TPM. In addition, the EK is required to obtain an Attestation
Identity Key (AIK ). An AIK is generated on a TPM and certified by a trusted third
party, typically called a Privacy-CA, or signed via a Direct Anonymous Attestation
protocol [23]. With the obtained (proof) certificate, a remote platform can compare
the signed values to reference values, in order to check whether or not the platform is
in a trusted state.
The TPM also offers a concept called sealing, which allows a data block to be bound
to a specific platform configuration. A sealed message is created by selecting a range of
platform configuration registers, a non-migratable key (i.e., a special type of encryption
key that cannot be exported and transferred to another TPM), and the data block that
should be sealed. The TPM is then able to decrypt and transfer the sealed data block,
only if its current platform configuration matches the platform configuration from the
time when the sealing was executed. Sealing provides the assurance that protected
messages are only recoverable when the platform is in a known system state.
2.2 CPU Privilege Levels
The x86 architecture provides a basic protection concept with which access to certain
resources can be restricted and controlled. This protection concept is realized by a
2-bit privilege level; each level is often referred to as ring. These levels are arranged
in a hierarchy from most privileged (ring 0) to least privileged (ring 3). The privilege
level determines whether a software component running in one of the rings is allowed
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to directly execute privileged instructions, that control basic CPU functionality. Ad-
ditionally, it controls the accessibility of address-space based on the page tables of the
processor. Most x86-software, including operating systems such as Windows and Linux,
use only the privilege levels 0 and 3. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
2.3 Virtualization
Virtualization introduces a hypervisor called a virtual machine monitor (VMM) [69].
The VMM allows the execution of several different VMs, all having different operating
systems, on a single host entity. This hypervisor is responsible for providing an abstract
interface for the hardware and for partitioning the underlying hardware resources. The
underlying resources are then available to the VMs through the VMM, which maintains
full control of the resources given to the VM.
The main contribution of this technology is the provision by the VMM of strong
isolation between virtual machines. The realization of the processor’s ring concept
differs depending on the virtualization method [180]. However, common ground for all
virtualization methods is that the VMM runs in the highest ring level, typically ring 0,
and is, therefore, able to isolate different compartments.
Virtualization can be divided into two main categories [132]: Paravirtualization and
Full Virtualization. The level of abstraction provided by Paravirtualization is different
from the level of abstraction provided by the underlying hardware.
In a paravirtualized environment, costly, non-efficiently virtualizable instructions are
substituted with efficiently virtualizable instructions. For this, the operating systems
running in a paravirtualized environment are modified and non-efficiently virtualizable
instructions are substituted. In contrast, full virtualization emulates these costly non-
virtualizable commands, through binary translation [155, 165]. For this purpose, the
VMM, rather than the VM, has to catch, isolate and interpret these instructions and
then return control to the VM afterwards. Therefore, the operating system running in
a virtual machine does not have to be modified, but can be directly executed. Binary
translation is normally linked with an extensive performance overhead, compared to
the fast and efficient Paravirtualization approach.
Since the x86-processor architecture is not efficiently virtualizable [129], Intel and
AMD have introduced Virtualization Technology support in their processor architec-
ture. In the context of this thesis, the Intel VT-X/I architecture [180, 37, 52] is of
special interest, since the approach presented in this thesis uses functionalities provided
by this architecture. The Intel VT-X/I architecture augments the x86-processor archi-
tecture with two new forms of CPU operation, namely VMX root operation, in which
the VMM runs, and VMX non-root operation, in which the guest-systems run. Both
operation support the privilege set of the x86 architecture. The VMM is then typically
run in ring 0 of the VMX root mode and the guest system is run in ring 0 of the VMX
non-root mode. The processor additionally provides a special purpose structure called
virtual machine control structure (VMCS). In this structure, state information of the
virtual machine are stored in and loaded into the processor if a state transition is per-
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formed. A state transition to a VM is called vmentry and the transition back to the
VMM is called vmexit.
2.4 Formal Verification of Protocols
Formal verification methods are used to prove that a security protocol is correct and
behaves as specified. These techniques are more reliable than informal arguments about
the correctness of a protocol. The purpose of this section is to give a very short overview
of some approaches that enable protocol verification. Further information about formal
verification can, for instance, be found in [22] and [109].
Basically, formal verification methods can be divided into methods based on theorem
proving and methods based on model checking. We will shortly describe these two
methods in the next two sections.
2.4.1 Theorem Proving
Formal verification methods that are based on theorem proving consider all possible
protocol behaviours and allow checking that the protocol satisifies a set of correctness
conditions. One advantage of theorem proving is that these methods are more suitable
to prove a protocol correct while the major disadvantage is that attacks on the pro-
tocols cannot be found. Classical examples of approaches that are based on theorem
proving are the BAN logic [27], the GNY logic [71], and Isabelle/HOL [116]. However,
theorem prover often suffers from the fact that they require hand written proofs and
often the idealization of a protocol. Even worse, is that many examples exist in the lit-
erature, where a protocol was proven correct using theorem proving and, nevertheless,
a security vulnerability has later been found. One example is the Needham-Schroeder
protocol where the security property (that the delivered nonces are not accessible by
an adversary) can be proven correct [27]. However, it has been shown that this security
property is not satisfied and a security vulnerability emerges [104, 115].
2.4.2 Model Checking
Methods that utilize model checking techniques consider a large, but finite, number of
possible protocol behaviours, and allow checking that they satisfy a set of correctness
conditions. Methods based on model checking often construct a complete state space
of the protocol’s behaviour. An exhaustive search is then performed on this state space
in order to find a path in the state space that yields in a state where the correctness
conditions are violated. In contrast to theorem proving methods, model checking is
more appropriate for finding attacks on protocols, while they are rather useless for
proving the correctness of a protocol. One interesting property of model checking
methods is that they can provide an attack trace when a protocol does not satisfy a
correctness condition. However, in contrast to theorem proving methods, they do not
yield a symbolic proof which gives insight why a protocol is correct. Example model
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checkers are FDR, Murφ [47], SHVT [74], and AVISPA [182]. The latter one is used
throughout this thesis to verify the correctness of the developed protocols.
2.4.3 Comparison of selected tools for protocol analysis
In Figure 2.2 we give a short overview of different tools for protocol analysis. We only
present some selected and well-known tools and integrate them into their respective
category. However, we do not give information about how useful a tool is in providing
assurances about protocol security. This is very difficult to answer and clearly out of
the scope of this thesis.
Tool Type Used Language
FDR [104] Model checker CASPER
Murφ [47] Model checker Special
Brutus [36] Model checker Special
SHVT [74] Model checker APA
AVISPA [182] Model checker HLSPL
Isabelle [116] Theorem proving HOL
BAN [27] Theorem proving Special
GNY [71] Theorem proving Special
Figure 2.2: Summary of selected tools for protocol analysis
2.5 Notation and Definitions
In this section, we provide the notations and definitions used in this thesis. We will
first introduce the cryptographic notation, followed by the definitions.
2.5.1 Cryptographic Notation
In the remainder of this thesis we use the following notation. E(m, e) denotes the en-
cryption of data m using an encryption function E and encryption key e. Encrypted data
m that is encrypted with the key e is denoted with {m}e. The decryption of {m}e using
a decryption function D and the decryption key d is denoted with D({m}e, d). If the
decryption key d is equal to the encryption key e we speak of symmetric cryptography.
If the decryption key d is not equal to e, we speak of asymmetric cryptography.
A symmetric key that is shared between the entities A and B is denoted with KAB.
When a key is shared between entities, both entities possess the same key to decrypt or
encrypt data. The private part of an asymmetric key of entity A is denoted with K−1A
and the public part is denoted with KA.
The application of a cryptographic hash function h to data m is denoted with h(m).
A one-way hash chain [98] is a sequence of hash values of some fixed length l generated
by a hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l by applying the hash function h successively to
a seed value c0 so that cv+1 = h(cv), with v = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
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In the remainder of this thesis, we use the popular Alice-and-Bob specification style
[108]. A signed message m that is signed with the key K−1A is denoted as {m}K−1A .
Before a message is signed, the hash of the message is computed and the signature is
computed on this hash value. To verify a signature, both the signed message and the
plaintext of the message before the hash function is applied are required. A message of
this type is shown in Figure 2.3.
A → B : m, {m}K−1A
Figure 2.3: A transferred signed message including transmittal of the message in plain-
text
However, we will not explicitly state that besides transferring a signed message from
one entity to another entity, the message is also delivered in plaintext. A protocol of
this type is shown in Figure 2.4. In the context of this thesis, the following protocols are
thus interchangeable and we will, for simplicity reasosons, exclusively use the notation
shown in Figure 2.4.
A → B : {m}K−1A
Figure 2.4: A transferred signed message
2.5.2 Definitions
We denote a specific state of a client configuration as platform configuration. The
platform (i.e., attesting system) that delivers its integrity to another platform using
platform attestation is also referred to as prover, since it wants to prove to a verifier
that he is in a trusted system configuration.
The terms trust and trustworthy have a wide spectrum of meanings. Both terms
are often used interchangeably. However, to make the meaning of these terms exact,
we provide the following definitions, which are derived from [153]:
• Trust level: The extent to which someone who relies on a system can be confident
that the system meets its specifications, i.e., that the system does what it claims
to do and does not perform unwanted functions.
• Trusted: The term trusted describes a system that operates as expected, accord-
ing to design and policy.
• Trustworthy: A system is trustworthy if it is trusted and the trust can also be
guaranteed in some convincing way, such as through a formal analysis or a code
review.
In the sequel of this thesis, we only use the term trusted since it describes exactly the
characteristics of a platform we are considering.
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Part II
Attestation Protocols
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Chapter 3
Secure Attestation
In this chapter, we show that in order to enable a system to validate the platform
integrity of a remote system, a secure attestation channel is required. A secure attesta-
tion channel ensures authenticity of platform integrity measurements and establishes a
cryptographic channel to the source of platform integrity measurements. This chapter
contains material previously published in: A Robust Integrity Reporting Protocol for
Remote Attestation [164] and Hades - Hardware Assisted Document Security [130].
3.1 Introduction
The increasing complexity of IT-systems is a major factor for the growing number
of system vulnerabilities. Once a vulnerability is exploitable, malware can use the
vulnerability to infect the system, which can result in a system crash, or that a virus or
worm spreads over the system and makes sensitive data public. If a software system has
been infected by malware, it is also a serious threat to other non-compromised software
systems since it could infect other systems while they communicate with each other.
One promising approach to detect a compromised system is to use attestation proto-
cols as specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [179]. This approach enables
to ensure that a system has not been compromised before the communication starts.
One important mechanism for realizing attestation protocols is to securely report the
integrity of a specific system. This mechanism can be applied in many scenarios and
different applications trying to ensure a malware free communication. These scenarios
include Enterprise Security [141], E-Commerce [158] or Information Rights Management
[137]. Besides counteracting the typical threats posed by malware with attestation pro-
tocols, these protocols can also be used to ensure that a specific software application is
in a specific pre-defined state. This approach is particular important in the context of
Information Rights Management to ensure an untampered and non-manipulated client
software.
However, designing attestation protocols that enable secure integrity reporting is a
tedious task, since a number of challenges must be solved. In this chapter, we present
these challenges and extract requirements that must be satisfied in order to solve the
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presented challenges. If all our extracted requirements are satisfied, a secure attesta-
tion channel can be established which ensures authenticity of integrity measurements
and authenticity of the attestation channel. One important requirement is that these
protocols must implement a mechanism that secures the protocols against masquerad-
ing attacks1 [133], where an attacker masquerades his platform configuration as being
trusted. These attacks are characterized through the fact that an integrity challenge
is relayed to another platform that has a trusted platform configuration. The trusted
platform answers the challenge, which is transferred back to the requester.
This chapter is organized as follows. We will first present in Section 3.9 other
work that is related to the protocols proposed in this chapter. We will then present
a classification of attestation techniques in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we explain the
integrity reporting protocol as proposed by the TCG [173] and highlight a critical attack
on this protocol. In Section 3.4 the underlying attack is evaluated and the reasons why
the attack works are explained. Section 3.5 shows that this type of attack can easily
be avoided by integrating a key-establishment into the protocol and thus establishing
a secure attestation channel. We will then perform a security analysis of our proposed
protocol in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7 we will show how a secure attestation channel
can be enhanced and integrated inside the TLS-protocol, ensuring integrity reporting
and mutual-authentication. The security of our proposed enhanced TLS-protocol is
then analyzed in Section 3.8. Finally, we conclude in Section 3.10.
3.2 Classification of Attestation Techniques
In this section, we compare different attestation techniques and perform a classification.
We classify existing approaches based on the underlying attestation concept. Based on
this classification, we show how the relevant approaches realize attestation techniques.
3.2.1 TPM-Based Binary Attestation
Many attestation protocols (e.g., [164, 152, 103, 137]) are based on the TPM’s ability of
obtaining measurements of platform characteristics that describe the integrity of a plat-
form. These approaches are mainly developed for non-resource constrained computer
systems and require each communication partner to perform public key cryptography.
The complete system configuration, as denoted in the PCRs of the attesting entity,
must be transmitted to the verifying entity. The verifying entity explicitly evaluates
the trust level of the attested entity by comparing the received SML and PCR values
with given reference values. Since the verifying entity receives the current platform
configuration directly, we refer to this as explicit attestation. The exact mechanisms
of performing an explicit attestation can vary and do not necessarily require using the
TPM Quote command.
The sealing concept of the TPM enables another means of attestation without di-
rectly transferring the platform configuration (PCR values and SML). We refer to this
1These attacks are in [70] referred to as relay attacks.
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as implicit attestation. These approaches are based on the sealing functionality of the
TPM. Sealing provides a means to bind data to a certain platform configuration. The
TPM releases, i.e., decrypts, this data only if the current platform configuration is
identical to the initial configuration. Publications that include some sort of implicit
attestation include [96] and [159]. This approach is able to minimize the amount of
transmitted data and does not necessarily require public key cryptography on resource
constrained systems. How this can be achieved is discussed in Chapter 6.
The disadvantage of this approach is that software updates change the values inside
the PCRs. Since this results in inaccessible sealed data, this approach is not applicable
in non-resource constrained computer systems, where the software configuration often
changes through legitimate system updates.
Attestation techniques that are based on the TPM-based binary attestation require
some sort of measurement architecture. This architecture is responsible for measuring
every software component before execution using the TPM Extend command, which
includs the measurements into the platform configuration registers.
Examples for such an architecture are the Integrity Measurement Architecture
(IMA) developed by IBM [142] or the Bear/Enforcer project [106]. IMA provides an
extension to the Linux-Kernel that performs this task and the Bear/Enforcer project
includes a TPM-enabled Linux Security Module (LSM) to compare hash values of ap-
plications with reference values.
3.2.2 Software-Based Attestation
The main disadvantage of the TPM-based binary attestation is that the platform con-
figuration only reflects the initial load-time configuration. Therefore, memory modi-
fications during the runtime, e.g., buffer-overflows, cannot be detected. To overcome
this shortcoming, an attestation software may measure randomly selected parts of the
memory and report the obtained measurements to a remote party. In this case, the at-
testation software forms the trust anchor which must be protected against tampering.
In [150, 149, 147], approaches that are based on measuring the execution time of an
attestation routine are introduced. A verifier specifies randomly chosen memory regions
and transfers these randomly chosen regions as challenges to the prover. Based on these
challenges, the prover uses his own attestation process to calculate the corresponding
hash values of his own memory. The computed value is then transferred back to the
verifier who can compare it to trusted system states. Malware which is loaded into the
memory would result in a modified memory which can be detected by the verifier. The
main idea of these approaches is that the attestation routine of the prover cannot be
optimized further, i.e., the execution time cannot be made faster, which prevents an
adversary from injecting malicious code without detection. For example, it would be
necessary for an adversary who injected malicious code into the memory to also modify
the attestation routine so that the attestation routine does not measure the injected
malicious code. However, modifying the attestation routine, e.g., by adding additional
if-statements that jump to an alternative memory region if a malware infected memory
reagion is measured, would result in an increased execution time of the attestation
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routine and can, thus, be detected. One disadvantage of this approach is that the
success of this scheme relies critically on the optimality of the attestation routine and
on minimal time fluctuations of the expected responses.
However, in many scenarios (e.g., wireless sensor networks or distributed systems
with external influences) time intervals for responses can vary. In these cases the attes-
tation would fail, even though a component is in a trusted system state. In scenarios
where attestation along multiple hops is required or external interferences prevent an
exact time measurement, timing-based software attestation techniques are not applica-
ble.
Other works that try to adapt software-based attestation include [114] and [30].
However, the main disadvantage of these approaches are that they are highly vulnerable
to masquerading attacks, as we will see in Section 3.3.3.
3.2.3 Property-Based Attestation and Semantic Attestation
In contrast to the TPM-based binary attestation, a number of proposals have been
made which focus on semantic attestation based on attesting the behavior of software
components (e.g., [75, 139, 31]). The idea behind these approaches is that a platform
should not depend on specific software configurations, but on properties that a platform
offers. A webrowser of two different vendors would, thus, have the same properties.
However, the authors do not specify how a property exactly looks and how a property
is generated. In addition, semantic attestation also requires a TCG-enhanced boot
process to ensure that a small operating system kernel applies mechanisms that enforce
the semantic attestation.
3.3 Masquerading Attacks on Attestation protocols
In the following section, we will mainly focus on TPM-based binary attestation. These
techniques can be used to provide assurances that a remote platform or the own platform
is in a particular state. This especially becomes relevant in systems for Information
Rights Management, where a client enforces a certain policy to prohibit unauthorized
use, copy or redistribution of intellectual property [125].
In this context, the policy enforcement mechanism is executed on the client-side,
so an attacker can deactivate this mechanism by modifying the local client software.
To avoid these kinds of attacks, one may attest the status of the client platform using
remote attestation before sending sensitive data to the client. Thus, the sender has a
confirmation about the trust level of the platform in question.
However, as we will see in the following, the protocols specified by the TCG have
a vulnerability which allows an attacker to masquerade an untrusted platform config-
uration as trusted. An attacker who controls one malicious and one honest client may
bypass the remote attestation by spoofing his malicious client to be the honest one.
The attacker simply relays all attestation queries and sends them to the client which is
in a trusted system state. The honest client sends the answer back, which must only
be transferred back to the requester.
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3.3.1 Integrity Reporting Protocols
In this section, we discuss an integrity reporting protocol proposed by [142] that is
consistent to the process of remote attestation as specified in [177]. We will show that
the protocol is vulnerable to a masquerading attack with the result that the attacker
is able to masquerade his own platform configuration. Protocol 3.3.2 illustrates the
remote attestation of B against A and provides the background information on integrity
reporting protocols.
Protocol 3.3.2: Integrity reporting protocol proposed by Sailer et al. [142]
SUMMARY: B answers the attestation challenge of platform A
RESULT: Integrity reporting
1. System setup.
A must acquire (and validate) the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate
Cert(AIK, KAIK)
2. Protocol messages.
A → B : Na (1)
A ← B : SML, Cert(AIK, KAIK), {Na, PCR}K−1AIK (2)
3. Protocol actions.
(a) A chooses a non-predictable nonce Na and delivers it to B (1).
(b) B loads the AIK from the protected storage of the TPM by using the storage
root key (SRK ). In the next step, B performs a TPM Quote command, which
is used to sign the selected PCRs and the provided nonce with the private
key K−1AIK . Additionally, the prover retrieves the stored measurement log
(SML).
(c) B sends in message (2) the response consisting of the signed Quote, signed
nonce and the SML to A. B also delivers the AIK credential
(Cert(AIK, KAIK)) which consists of the AIK that was signed by a Privacy-
CA.
(d) A validates if the AIK credential was signed by a trusted Privacy-CA thus
belonging to a genuine TPM. A also verifies whether Cert(AIK, KAIK) is
still valid by checking the certificate revocation list of the trusted issuing
party. This step was also thought to detect masquerading attacks by com-
paring the unique identification of B with the system identification given
in Cert(AIK, KAIK). Nevertheless, this verification does not discover mas-
querading attacks as we will see in the next section.
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(e) Finally, A verifies the signature of the {Na, PCR}K−1AIK and checks the fresh-
ness of Na. Based on the received stored measurement log and the PCR
values, A processes the SML and re-computes the received PCR values. If
the computed values match the signed aggregate, the SML is considered valid
and untampered. A now only verifies if the delivered integrity reporting val-
ues match given reference values, thus A can decide if the remote party is in
a trusted system state.
Protocol 3.3.2 is based on a challenge-response authentication involving the TPM.
This process ensures freshness and authenticity of integrity information and prevents
that old integrity information or non-authentic integrity information are replayed in
a new protocol run. This requirement is necessary to reach the protection goal of
authenticity and integrity of delivered data over an attestation channel. We summarize
this in the following requirement for a secure attestation channel:
Requirement 1: Attestation techniques must always ensure freshness and authenticity
of integrity information.
All attestation protocols that are consistent with the TCG-defined integrity report-
ing satisfy Requirement 1. They are resistant against replay attacks and ensure au-
thenticity of integrity information. However, satisfying Requirement 1 is not sufficient
to enable secure integrity reporting, since Requirement 1 does not require a mechanism
to detect or prevent masquerading attacks. In the context of attestation, masquerading
attacks are a special form of attack and cannot be prevented with classical approaches
that ensure the authenticity of a message. We will discuss why this is critical in the
following section.
3.3.3 Masquerading Attacks on Attestation Protocols
In this section, we present a masquerading attack on Protocol 3.3.2. This shows that
an attestation protocol which only satisfies Requirement 1 cannot be used for secure
integrity reporting. The attacker considered here has two platforms under his control.
One platform runs a trusted operating system with the client software that enforces a
certain policy, e.g., an IRM-client. This platform (C ) runs the original client software
and is therefore untampered. C is also equipped with a genuine TPM that supports
the policy enforcement of the IRM-client. The attacker is also in control of one mali-
cious client platform (M ), where he wants to gain control of protected digital content.
We refer to this client as malicious client, since its enforcement mechanism has been
tampered with and it is not conform to the original client software. We require for our
attack that C answers the request from M, i.e., C is not configured to answer only
requests from A. This is a necessary requirement for the success of the attack and is
discussed in detail in Section 3.4.
3.3. MASQUERADING ATTACKS ON ATTESTATION PROTOCOLS 27
In our attack, the attacker bypasses the remote attestation of M, by using the
platform configuration of the honest client to attest his malicious client running on M.
For the sake of simplicity, we only show the transferred messages, since the actions
taken by A and B are analogous to the full protocol shown in Protocol 3.3.2. The
attack presented here is some special type of the Grandmaster Chess Problem or Mafia
Fraud, which has already been discussed in the literature [21, 49, 3].
A → M : Na (1)
M → C : Na (2)
M ← C : SML, Cert(AIK, KAIK), {Na, PCR}K−1AIK (3)
A ← M : SML, Cert(AIK, KAIK), {Na, PCR}K−1AIK (4)
Figure 3.1: Masquerading attack on the integrity reporting protocol
Figure 3.1 depicts the attack against the integrity reporting protocol. The challeng-
ing party A wants to securely validate the integrity of the attesting malicious system
M using Protocol 3.3.2. The malicious system M itself transfers all messages from A
to the honest client C. As a result, the integrity information is still authentic while the
authenticity of the attestation channel is violated.
This masquarading attack is also relevant in software-based attestation protocols.
All proposals [146, 150, 149, 147, 114, 30] are vulnerable to this attack. In order
to present this described attacks, some proposals (e.g., [146] and [150]) assume that
they have an authenticated and monitored communication channel, which inhibits the
presented attack. However, we believe that this assumption is too restrictive since it
only makes software-based approaches applicable in a very small set of scenarios.
3.3.4 Attestation over Secure Channels
Transferring the SML in plain-text (and thus the whole platform configuration) to a re-
mote party raises severe privacy concerns. The remote party and every party that is able
to eavesdrop on the communication channel is able to discover the full platform configu-
ration, including all running processes, by simply examining the SML. This information
could be used to collect extensive information about one platform. It was therefore in-
tended to integrate integrity reporting protocols inside another cryptographic channel,
and refrain from performing an explicit attestation over insecure channels [176]. This
requirement is necessary to reach the protection goal of confidentiality of the attestation
channel and is summarized in Requirement 2:
Requirement 2: The explicit attestation must be performed over secure channels.
However, even if the protocol specified by the TCG is integrated into a TLS channel,
the protocol is not robust against the relay attack shown in Figure 3.1. To show that the
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above discussed attack cannot be prevented if another cryptographic channel is used,
we integrate the IRP in the TLS-protocol after a symmetric key has been established.
Figure 3.2 shows the simplified attack on a TLS-secured integrity reporting. The
figure shows the challenger (platform A) that wants to attest the client (M ) before
protected data is transferred and M obtains access to a particular service offered by
A. Platform A and platform M first establish a mutually authenticated TLS channel.
After establishing this secure channel, A delivers the attestation challenge to platform
M. M receives the attestation challenge, establishes a secure channel with platform C
and masks the received attestation challenge of A as fresh attestation challenge for plat-
form C. C computes the attestation response message using its TPM and delivers the
response to platform M. M receives the response and answers the attestation challenge
of platform M. Thus, the platform of M is authenticated on the basis of the provided
information through platform C.
Figure 3.2: Masquerading attack on the TLS-secured remote attestation
To further analyze why this attack is successful even if a secure cryptographic chan-
nel is used, we look at the TLS-protocol in detail and analyze which messages are
involved in establishing the TLS channel. To enable mutual authentication of both
entities, we use the RSA DHE TLS-mode. We abstract the TLS-protocol in order to not
provide unnecessary details and to reduce the complexity of the protocol. The presented
abstracted version of the TLS-protocol is an enhanced version of the one presented in
[117]. Protocol 3.3.5 shows the protocol steps. Here A acts as server, M is both client
and server, and B is the prover.
Protocol 3.3.5: Integrating TLS and IRP
SUMMARY: M answers the attestation challenge with the help of platform B
RESULT: Mutual authentication, key establishment, relayed integrity reporting
1. Notation.
Sid denotes the TLS security parameters and the protocol ID
Cert(X, KX) is the public key certificate of X
Px denotes the cryptographic engines which are supported by X
DHX denotes the public Diffie-Helman key of entity X
KAM denotes the negoitated key between A and M
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KCM denotes the negoitated key between C and M
2. System setup.
A must acquire (and validate) the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate
Cert(AIK, KAIK).
All entities must possess the certificate of the certification authority, in order to
validate the received certificates.
3. Protocol messages.
A ← M : M, Nm, Sid, Pm (client hello) (1)
A → M : A, Na, Sid, Pa (server hello) (2)
A → M : Cert(A, KA) (server certificate) (3)
A → M : DHA, {DHA, Na, Nm}K−1A (server key exchange) (4)
A ← M : Cert(M, KM ) (client certificate) (5)
A ← M : DHM (client key exchange) (6)
A ← M : {DHA, DHM , Na, Nm}K−1M (certificate verify) (7)
A → M : {Finished}KAM (client finished) (8)
A ← M : {Finished}KAM (server finished) (9)
A → M : {Ni}KAM (attestation challenge) (10)
C → M : C, Nb, Sid, Pb (client hello) (11)
C ← M : M, Nm, Sid, Pm (server hello) (12)
C ← M : Cert(M, KM ) (server certificate) (13)
C ← M : DHM , {DHM , Nb, Nm}K−1M (server key exchange) (14)
C → M : Cert(C, KC) (client certificate) (15)
C → M : DHC (client key exchange) (16)
C → M : {DHM , DHB, Nm, Nb}K−1C (certificate verify) (17)
C → M : {Finished}KCM (client finished) (18)
C ← M : {Finished}KCM (server finished) (19)
C ← M : {Ni}KCM (attestation challenge) (20)
C → M : {Cert(AIK, KAIK), SML,
{PCR, Ni}K−1AIK}KCM
(attestation reply) (21)
A ← M : {Cert(AIK, KAIK), SML,
{PCR, Ni}K−1AIK}KAM
(attestation reply) (22)
In the first nine steps, a secure TLS channel is established between A and M. Both
A and M are in possession of certificates to authenticate themselves. They use the TLS-
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mode DHE RSA and both generate and exchange ephemeral Diffie-Helman keys DHM and
DHA (steps 4-7), which are used to compute the pre-master-secret. The negotiated pre-
master secret is then combined with the exchanged nonces Nb and Na and converted into
the master-secret (Cf. [45] or [54] for more details). The negotiated shared key KBM
is then derived from the master-secret. The TLS-protocol finishes with transmitting
Finished messages. Finished messages comprise all messages that both parties have
been delivered or received until now in the whole protocol run. These messages ensure
that the key exchange and authentication process of the preceding steps were successful
and that no man-in-the-middle has altered the transferred messages.
After the TLS-protocol run, A delivers the attestation challenge message to M which
consists of the nonce Ni (step 10). M takes then the position as server and another
TLS channel is established between M and C (steps 11-19). The computed shared key
KBM is then used to masquerade the nonce Ni as a fresh attestation challenge and
delivers it to C. C will answer with the attestation reply message, which is decrypted
by M and then delivered to A, re-encrypted with key KAM .
3.3.6 Analysis of the Attack
Protocol 3.3.5 shows that the attack is still possible even if a secure channel is used.
M can successful masquerade his own platform configuration, as the message (22) gives
no evidence that this message was generated on the specific machine that is under
control of M. This uncertainty is caused by the independency of the private key that
corresponds to Cert(M, KM ) (message 5) and the private key that corresponds to
Cert(AIK, KAIK). Both certificates are issued by independent certification authorities.
One authority is responsible for issuing certificates for a certain user or a machine and
the other is responsible for issuing AIK certificates. Exacerbating this problem is the
fact that an AIK is specific for a TPM and thus clearly identifies a unique machine. But
in contrast to that, the TLS certificate is not necessarily specific for a certain machine.
To overcome that problem Goldman et al. [70] introduce a platform property certifi-
cate that links an AIK certificate to a TLS certificate. Unfortunately, that approach is
not able to prevent an attack if M and C collaborate. In that case, the TLS certificate
and the corresponding private keys of C are transferred to M, i.e., M is later authenti-
cated on the basis of Cert(C, KC). Since standard TLS applications, e.g., web browsers,
support exporting the keys by the platform owner, this attack is a very realistic attack;
the attacker can transfer the certificates and the private keys to the non-conformant
host. It should also be noted that even if other devices that do not support exporting
private keys, such as smart cards, are being used for establishing the TLS channel this
attack cannot be detected. This is caused by the fact that if an attacker is the legitimate
owner of the device, he can use it twice to authenticate himself and thus establish two
different secret channels.
The shortcoming of the integrity reporting protocol is caused by the restricted usage
possibilities of AIK s. According to [179] the AIK s can exclusively be used for proving
the authenticity of a platform. This means that AIK s can neither be directly used to
establish secure channels nor to authenticate communication partners. Therefore, the
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challenger cannot be sure whether the received message belongs to the attesting system.
He only knows that he received a message from a genuine TPM. Additionally, the
possession of multiple AIK s is possible, the only requirement is that the corresponding
certificate must be certified by a trusted Privacy-CA or via DAA thus belonging to a
valid Endorsement Key. As a consequence, the challenging party cannot map AIK s to
users and thus to a specific cryptographic session.
Even if the server is in possession of Cert(AIK, KAIK) and forbids the creation of
new AIKs, masquerading attacks cannot be prevented, because the attesting system M
pretends that it is in possession of the corresponding K−1AIK by using the integrity values
with a valid signature from platform B (Step 6 in Figure 3.2). The challenging system
A is therefore not able to detect this attack in step 7 (Figure 3.1), since the attesting
system delivers all information that identifies it as platform B. After the platform is
authorized, the malicious platform is assumed to be trusted.
3.4 Evaluation of Possible Solutions
In this section, we present some approaches that change the overall system architecture
to alleviate the problem. However, we show for each of these solutions why they fail to
prevent the described attack.
3.4.1 Verifying Attestation Challenges
Since the attacker cannot modify the software on the honest platform, the honest plat-
form may decide which attestation challenge (represented by a nonce) it will answer and
which it will reject. For this purpose, the challenger could sign the attestation challenge
and the prover validates the signature using a pre-installed certificate before he answers
the challenge. In this case, the server’s certificate must be included in the integrity
measurement of the client software to detect a manipulation on that certificate.
However, any arbitrary software component that is able to answer attestation chal-
lenges can respond to the malicious challenge. Thus, an attacker can still use such a
software to circumvent the verification of the challenge of the client software. Never-
theless, the verifying party detects that this software component is listed in the SML,
where the correct software is also listed. On the downside, the SML does not tell which
software issued the answer to the attestation challenge. The attacker can either use a
software supplied by himself to answer the attestation challenge or he can misuse an
existing application that serves a legitimate purpose. In the latter case, the issuing soft-
ware appears to be trusted, because its software vendor might offer valid SML-reference
values.
Regardless of which client software responds to the attestation challenge, the only
requirement is that the nonce, which was sent from the server-application (platform A)
is used for the attestation. Hence, bugs or design flaws that cause that any arbitrary
attestation challenge are answered, affect other trusted client software. One approach
is to forbid the installation of other client software components. However, this leads to
high restrictions which can hardly be accepted in open environments.
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3.4.2 Using Shared Secrets
One method may be to exchange a shared secret key between server and client, which
is generated in the TPM. This shared secret key must be marked as a non-migratable
key and the public part must be transferred to the server. This key is used to securely
exchange a key for the upcoming communication. However, this public key must be
transferred through a protected second channel, otherwise the server is not sure that
the key belongs to the correct communication partner.
3.4.3 Using AIK as Session Key
Another method is to use the public part of the AIK as encryption key to exchange the
shared key for the upcoming communication. In this case, the upcoming traffic cannot
be decrypted by the attacker, since he does not have the private portion of the AIK,
which is stored in the protected storage of the TPM. This approach is for example
proposed in [97] to ensure that transferred data is directly bound to a specific AIK.
However, actual TPMs do not allow to decrypt data using the private part of the AIK.
This is due to the specification that clearly forbids using the AIK as encryption key
([179], pp. 57).
3.4.4 Using Network Monitors
One alternative solution to achieve a binding between the platform that issues the
measurements and the challenger is to use a network monitoring agent [34]. This agent
monitors all incoming and outgoing network connections and integrates a measurement
of the network events into the PCRs. Thus, the challenger can determine if the network
address of the platform that provided the measurements is equal to the network address
of the challenger. At first glance, this approach seems to be very elegant, however, it
suffers from the fact that it is not usable if the system is behind a router that uses
network address translation (NAT). In addition, an attacker can easily modify his own
network address, since network addresses do not provide any means of authenticity. It
is, thus, very likely that the attacker is able to spoof the network address and is able
to impersonate the address of the platform that provided the measurements.
3.4.5 Conclusion
To summarize this section, all discussed solutions are not able to prevent the described
attacks. As a result, new approaches are required that prevent the masquerading attack.
3.5 Secure Attestation Channels
In this section, we show how a secure attestation channel can be established. A se-
cure attestation channel ensures authenticity of platform integrity measurements and
establishes a cryptographic channel to the source of platform integrity measurements.
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3.5.1 Preventing Masquerading Attacks
The attack presented in Protocol 3.3.3 has similarities to the Mafia Fraud or the Chess
Grandmaster Problem on identification protocols and some solutions have already been
proposed in the literature [21, 49, 3]. These solutions try to detect whether a potential
adversary is trying to impersonate as an authentic entity and either rely on exact time
measurements [21] or on using more than one communication channel [3]. However,
the goals in the context of preventing Mafia Fraud on identification protocols are not
identical to the goals in preventing masquerading attacks on integrity reporting. In the
latter case it is sufficient that a potential malicious host, who is relaying messages and
placed between server and the collaborative host, is excluded from the following commu-
nication flow. In the context of integrity reporting, it is sufficient, that the endpoint of
the communication is extended to the TPM. For this purpose, a cryptographic channel
must be established, that ensures that the upcoming communication is bound to the
currently attested system and is, thus, authentic. Thus, in order to achieve authenticity
of the attestation channel, a third requirement must be satisfied. We summarize this
in the following Requirement 3:
Requirement 3: Attestation protocols must integrate a key-establishment component
that ensures that the established attestation channel is authentic.
To protect the integrity reporting protocol against masquerading attacks, we en-
hance it with a key agreement protocol. The modified integrity reporting protocol
is shown in Protocol 3.5.2 with the extension to use Diffie-Hellman parameters. The
depicted protocol only shows the transferred messages, since the TPM operations are
analogue to Protocol 3.3.2. We implement this key establishment by injecting addition-
ally information necessary to negotiate a key into the AIK signed attestation challenge.
The specification of the TPM Quote command allows us to include additional data
and to sign it with the AIK. Thereby, it is possible to use the challenge-response mes-
sages for the key-exchange. One possibility is to adopt the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
exchange protocol [46] and to integrate it into the integrity reporting protocol. Al-
ternatively, RSA [128] can be used and generate the corresponding keys inside the
TPM. Subsequently, these keys are used to exchange a shared session key which is used
to encrypt the upcoming communication. Since the TPM does only support internal
symmetric encryption, the CPU must be used for that purpose. The main difference
between both approaches is that the DH parameters must be generated by the CPU
whilst the RSA keys are generated by the TPM. Both approaches are equivalent in
terms of security, since they both offer a secure way to exchange a key. Computing the
RSA key with the TPM offers no advantage compared to computing the DH parame-
ters with the CPU, since the shared communication key must be passed to the CPU
anyway. In both cases the required random numbers can be computed by the secure
random number generator of the TPM.
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Protocol 3.5.2: Robust Integrity Reporting Protocol
SUMMARY: B answers the attestation challenge of platform A
RESULT: Key establishment with key confirmation: integrity reporting
1. Notation.
KAB denotes the negotiated key between A and B
2. System setup.
A must possess the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate Cert(AIK, KAIK)
3. Protocol messages.
A → B : Na, ga mod p, g, p (1)
A ← B : Cert(AIK, KAIK), SML, {Na, PCR, gb mod p}K−1AIK (2)
A → B : {Nb}KAB (3)
A ← B : Nb (4)
4. Protocol actions.
(a) Precomputation by A. A selects an appropriate prime p and generator g of
Z∗p (2 ≤ g ≤ p− 2).
(b) A chooses a random secret a, 2 ≤ a ≤ p− 2, and computes ga mod p.
(c) Attestation challenge. A sends message (1) to B.
(d) B also chooses a random secret b, 2 ≤ b ≤ p− 2, and computes gb mod p.
(e) B computes the attestation response message by signing the own public
key, Na and a set of PCRs using an AIK.
(f) Attestation response. B delivers the signed message together with the
SML and the AIK credential to A (2). Finally, B computesKAB = (ga)b mod
p.
(g) A verifies whether the delivered credentials are authentic and verifies if all
signatures are valid. Finally, A verifies whether the platform configuration
of A is trusted using the SML.
(h) A also receives gb mod p and computes KAB = (gb)a mod p.
(i) A sends an encrypted nonce in message (3) to B.
(j) B decrypts the nonce with KAB and delivers message (4) to A.
The major enhancement is that the prover generates gb mod p and includes gb mod p
into its signed attestation response. The public key of platform B is generated using
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the client’s CPU and injected together with the supplied nonce Na as external data into
the TPM Quote operation. Since the TPM Quote command only allows to include 160bits
of external data, the package must be reduced to fit the 160bit length by applying
SHA1. The public key is also transmitted to the challenger in plaintext to enable the
challenger to validate the AIK signed message. Because B is running a trusted OS
with a trusted platform configuration the secret part of the key is not accessible to a
potential malicious client. Finally, both parties compute the shared session key KAB
and verify its integrity through a second challenge-response protocol.
3.5.3 Alternative Solution
The TPM specification also provides another means to verify that a specific key is bound
to a platform configuration. This process requires the use of the TPM CertifyKey op-
eration to prove that a specific key is held in a trusted TPM and bound to a specific
platform configuration. This asymmetric key is then used to exchange a shared sym-
metric key between both parties. This approach also establishes a second cryptographic
channel and ensures that the TPM is the endpoint of the communication. In Chapter 5
we will discuss the detailed protocol and show how integrity reporting can be achieved
with this process.
This approach also prevents the attack shown in Protocol 3.3.3, however our pro-
posed solution has a better performance. That is caused by the fact, that each time
the platform configuration changes, a new TPM key needs to be generated, which is
bound to the current platform configuration. This approach is therefore inflexible in
particular if the platform configuration changes often over time. Since the generation of
a new TPM bound key takes up to 100 seconds [138], this approach is not practicable
in every scenario. In addition, this approach would require a new mechanism which is
able to reliably detect when the platform configuration changes and a new key needs
to be generated. However, it is unclear how such a mechanism could be realized.
3.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we will first perform an informal security analysis of our presented
protocol by looking at typical attacks on cryptographic protocols. We will then perform
a formal analysis using the AVISPA protocol prover [182].
3.6.1 Informal Security Analysis
This section discusses the presented attestation protocol by looking at typical potential
attacks. This includes a man-in-the-middle attack and a version roll back attack.
Man-in-the-Middle Attack
The presented protocol prevents an attacker from spoofing his malicious software con-
figuration since all following messages are encrypted with the computed session key. It
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is impossible for M to perform some sort of man-in-the-middle attack and to establish
two different cryptographic sessions between the prover and the challenger. This is
caused by the fact that he is not able to modify the attestation response (message 2) of
B. Remember that his software is in a compromised state and his TPM would provide
malicious platform configurations to A. As a consequence, the malicious host has no
access to the private part of the generated session key which is stored on platform C.
The generated symmetric session key KAB has to be used to encrypt all following data,
which can only be decrypted on the machine which possesses the session key. This
session key cannot be transferred to the malicious host by the platform owner, since the
key is protected by the operating system under normal runtime conditions. Changing
these runtime conditions would lead to a non-conformant system state which would
have been detected in the attestation phase.
It may be possible for the malicious client M to substitute ga mod p with his own
public key gm mod p and transferring this key to B. Since M cannot modify the response
from B, A generates the shared session key KAB which is later used for the encryption.
The second challenge-response authentication detects this substitution since neither M
nor B are in possession of the correct KAB and are therefore not able to encrypt the
delivered nonce Nb. It may also be possible that B modifies the common generator g,
or the common group p. However, the substitution of ga mod p and the modification of
g or p do not lead to a security problem, since in both cases the attacker would not be
able to perform the second challenge-response authentication.
Version Rollback Attack
The presented protocol is not compatible with a verifier that expects the insecure ex-
isting remote attestation defined by the TCG. This attack was misleadingly classified
in [68] as a man-in-the-middle attack. However, this classification is insufficient, since
the attack requires that one entity executes the insecure integrity reporting protocol
specified by the TCG in [173].
In this attack scenario, three different parties, a verifier, a prover and an adversary,
are involved. The adversary tries to relay the attestation challenge of the verifier to the
prover, in order to masquerade a trusted system configuration. The verifier and the ad-
versary run an authentication enhanced attestation protocol (e.g., Protocol 3.5.2), while
the prover runs the TCG-defined attestation protocol. This attack can be classified as
a version rollback attack, in which the adversary masks his public key together with
the nonce provided by the verifier as new nonce for the prover. The prover does not
verify the syntax of the attestation challenge. He directly signs the masqueraded nonce
including public key and delivers the computed signature to the adversary. The adver-
sary simply forwards the obtained message and both adversary and verifier compute the
shared key based on the exchanged public keys. However, since the protocol’s software
integrity of the prover is also reflected in the platform configuration, the verifier will
determine the platform configuration as not being trusted. The version rollback attack
is therefore only a theoretical attack and fails, since it is not possible to successfully
masquerade a trusted system configuration.
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3.6.2 Formal Security Analysis
To formally analyze the proposed protocol, we use the AVISPA protocol prover [182].
AVISPA provides a High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [10, 33] for
describing security protocols and specifying their intended security properties. Proto-
cols specified in HLPSL are then translated into an Intermediate Format (IF). This
intermediate format can then directly be used as input for different model checkers
supplied by AVISPA (see the AVISPA website for more details2).
AVISPA is a powerful tool to formally analyze cryptographic protocols. However,
all tools which can be used to formally analyze cryptographic protocols have in common
that they only implement the Dolev-Yao attacker model and are, thus, not capable of
detecting special types of insider attacks. Insider attacks are a very powerful attack
type, since these attackers can also create authentic messages. The relay attack pre-
sented in this chapter is some type of inside attack since the adversary controls a second
machine including the private TPM key. Therefore, present cryptographic protocol an-
alyzers cannot detect protocol weaknesses against inside attackers. However, since our
proposed protocols also include an authentication phase and a key-establishment, it is
verifiable whether both authentication phase and key-establishment are secure against
Dolev-Yao attackers [50].
In the following, we present the different roles specified in HLPSL of our attestation
protocol. We will first present the challenging entity (Alice), followed by the prover
(Bob), the attacker model and the intended security properties.
State Transitions
For specifying the challenger, we will first look at a fragment of the challenger’s role.
In this fragment, the variables and the challenger’s knowledge are specified.
role challenger (A, B: agent,
Ka, Ks: public_key,
H: function,
G: text,
SND, RCV: channel (dy))
played_by A def=
local State : nat,
Na, Nb: text,
X:text,
AIK: public_key,
PCR:text,
SK:message,
KEr:message
2www.avispa-project.org
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The prover’s role is specified analogously.
role attestor(A, B: agent,
AIK: public_key,
Ks : public_key,
H: function,
G: text,
SND, RCV: channel (dy))
played_by B def=
The protocol flow is specified through state transitions. The initial state is set to
state 0 and the challenger generates a random nonce (Na) and the secret part of his
Diffie-Helman key X’. HLPSL provides for this process the new() command. The chal-
lenger then puts on his SND line the generated nonce Na’ and the public Diffie-Helman
key. The exponentiation to compute a public Diffie-Helman key is specified in HLPSL
through the function exp(G,X’), which stands for GX
′
mod n. After the package is put
on the SND line, the challenger’s state is set to 2.
init State := 0
transition
0. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
State’:= 2 /\ Na’ := new()
/\ X’ := new()
/\ SND(Na’.exp(G,X’))
The prover receives the sent package in state one and generates his own secret part of
his Diffie-Helman key by assigning Y’:=new(). He also obtains the current PCR values,
which is abstracted, since HLPSL does not provide any means of directly modeling
TPMs. The generated public key is then hashed together with the nonce and the
PCRs and signed with the AIK. After sending the attestation response, the prover also
computes the secret key SK and witnesses the challenger that he is able to compute a
valid signature on the challenge.
init State := 1
transition
1. State = 1 /\ RCV(Na’.KEi’) =|>
State’:= 3 /\ Y’ :=new()
/\ PCR’ :=new()
/\ SND({B.AIK}_inv(Ks).{Na’.exp(G,Y’).PCR’}_inv(AIK))
/\ SK’ := H(exp(KEi,Y’))
/\ witness(B,A,challenger_attestor_na,Na’)
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The challenger receives the attestation response in state 2 and computes the shared
secret SK’. He then generates a new nonce Nb’, encrypts the nonce and delivers the
encrypted package to the prover.
2. State = 2 /\ RCV({B.AIK’}_inv(Ks).{Na.KEr’.PCR}_inv(aik)) =|>
State’:= 4 /\ SK’:=H(exp(KEr’,X))
/\ Nb’ := new()
/\ SND({Nb’}_SK’)
The prover receives the encrypted package, decrypts the nonce with the negotiated
key SK’ and sends the decrypted nonce Nb’ to the challenger. Sending this nonce in
plaintext does not result in a security problem since this message only acknowledges
correct receipt of the previous message.
3. State = 3 /\ RCV({Nb’}_SK) =|>
State’:= 5 /\ SND(Nb’)
/\ witness(B,A,sk1,SK)
/\ witness(B,A,challenger_attestor_nb,Nb’)
The challenger receives the answer in state 4 and checks whether the specified security
properties are satisfied.
4. State = 4 /\ RCV(Nb’) =|>
State’:= 6 /\ secret(SK,sk1,{A,B})
/\ request(A,B,challenger_attestor_na,Na)
/\ request(A,B,challenger_attestor_nb,Nb’)
/\ request(A,B,sk1,SK)
Intruder Model and Environment
We use the Dolev-Yao intruder model [50] to model the attacker and the environment.
In this intruder model the attacker is a legitimate user of the network and has full
control over all messages that are sent over the network. The attacker can therefore
intercept, analyze or modify messages, as well as compose new messages and send the
messages to whoever he wants. The channels are named SA, RA, SB, RB, which
stands for send/receive Alice and send/receive Bob respectively. To abstract from the
negotiation of a common generator g and a common group p, we assume that these
are global parameters. These parameters are modeled with the variable G and are also
known to a potential attacker.
role session(A, B: agent, Ka, AIK, Ks: public_key, H: function, G: text)
def=
local SA, RA, SB, RB: channel (dy)
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composition
challenger(A,B,Ka,Ks,H,G,SA,RA)
/\ attestor (A,B,AIK,Ks,H,G,SB,RB)
end role
The environment role contains the global constants as well as a composition of sessions
that the intruder is able to play as legitimate user.
role environment() def=
const a, b : agent,
aik, ka, ks, ki : public_key,
h : function,
g: text,
na, nb, challenger_attestor_nb,
attestor_challenger_na, sec_a_SK, sk1,nb1 : protocol_id
intruder_knowledge = {a, b, aik, ka, ks, ki, inv(ki),
{i.ki}_(inv(ks)),g,h}
composition
session(a,b,ka,aik,ks,h,g)
/\ session(a,i,ka,ki,ks,h,g)
/\ session(i,b,ki,aik,ks,h,g)
end role
The following code fragment defines the security properties of our proposed protocol.
The goal of the protocol is to authenticate Bob and to establish a secret key between
both entities. The intruder should not be able to learn the secret key SK ; furthermore
he should not be able to perform a valid authentication.
goal
authentication_on alice_bob_na
authentication_on alice_bob_nb
authentication_on Kab
secrecy_of Kab
To specify the different security goals, we added in the respective state transitions
the necessary events. These events are specified using the witness, request and
secret structure (see [10], pp. 28 for more details). In our case, we use the witness
and request for specifying the following security goals:
• A authenticates a genuine and authentic TPM on the value Na. This holds since
only an authentic TPM is able to sign Na with a corresponding non-migratable
key (AIK or special purpose key).
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• A authenticates the TPM of B on the value KAB. This holds since given the
first statement, only the owner of the TPM possesses the corresponding private
Diffie-Helman key. As a consequence, only A is able to compute the secret key
based on the provided public key.
• A authenticates the TPM of B on the value Nb. This holds since given the second
statement, only B can decrypt Nb and send it back to A.
• A and B share the key KAB, which is confidential and is kept secret.
It should be noted that we do not directly authenticate B to A. A only determines
whether she is currently communicating with the platform that has provided authentic
measurements and that this channel is authentic.
For specifying authentication goals, AVISPA provides the witness and request com-
mands and for specifying the secrecy goal, it provides the secret command. We again
refer to the AVISPA technical documentation [10] for further information on these
commands and security goals. Here, we will only exemplary discuss how we specified
authentication on Na.
For this purpose, the prover witnesses in state 1 the challenger that he answered his
challenge.
/\ witness(B,A,challenger_attestor_na,Na’)
This statement can be understood as follows: Agent B declares that he wants Agent A
agreeing on the value Na’. The counterpart of this statement is required in state 4 and
stated as:
/\ request(A,B,alice_bob_na,Na)
This statement is read as follows: Agent A accepts the value Na and now relies on the
guarantee that agent B exists and agrees with her on this value.
Results
After specifying the protocol, we analyzed the model with the model checkers provided
by AVISPA. We found no attack trace; thus the protocol analyzer reports that all
security properties are satisfied and Protocol 3.5.2 is secure against Dolev-Yao attackers.
Protecting the Stored Measurement Log
To further enhance the security of our proposed protocol, we move transmitting the
privacy-related SML into an cryptographically protected message. This has the advan-
tage that the protocol must not necessarily be integrated into another cryptographic
channel to satisfy Requirement 2. Our protocol then satisfies an additional security
requirement (the secrecy of the SML). However, in that case, the challenger can only
validate the platform configuration of B after receiving the last message. We also
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modify messages (2), (3) and (4) of our protocol to provide complete confidentiality of
all messages sent over the channel. This modification is comparable to the Finished
messages as they are used in the TLS-protocol to detect potential tampering on the
exchanged messages. The resulting protocol flow is shown in Protocol 3.6.3. We do not
present the detailed protocol actions since they are rather similar to Protocol 3.5.2. The
protocol was also modeled in AVISPA to formally analyze its security properties. Be-
sides the security properties of Protocol 3.5.2, we analyzed whether the SML is always
confidential and always protected by cryptographic measures. This security property is
summarized through the following goal:
• A and B share the Stored Measurement Log (SML), which is privacy related and
is confidential.
Protocol 3.6.3: Enhanced Robust Integrity Reporting Protocol
SUMMARY: B answers the attestation challenge of platform A
RESULT: Key establishment with key confirmation: confidential integrity reporting
1. Notation.
KAB denotes the negotiated key between A and B.
2. System setup.
A must possess the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate Cert(AIK, KAIK).
3. Protocol messages.
A → B : Na, ga mod p, g, p (1)
A ← B : Cert(AIK, KAIK), {Na, PCR, gb mod p}K−1AIK (2)
A → B : {Nb, ga mod p}KAB (3)
A ← B : {Nb, Na, SML, gb mod p}KAB (4)
Results
After modeling the protocol and analyzing it with AVISPA, we found no attack trace;
thus, the protocol analyzer reports that the enhanced version of the protocol satisfies
all security properties and is secure against Dolev-Yao attackers. We also implemented
both our proposed protocols (Protocol 3.5.2 and Protocol 3.6.3) and run performance
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measurements on the computational overhead introduced through the additional cryp-
tographic operations. The additional cryptographic operations increase the time for
answering one attestation request by 0.70% compared to Protocol 3.3.2. We will present
our detailed measurement results in Chapter 4 where we also discuss how we performed
these measurements.
Protocol 3.6.3 does not only provide a means of establishing an authentic attestation
channel, but also to establishes a cryptographic session key. Thus, it is not necessarily
required to integrate the attestation protocol inside another cryptographic channel. We
will discuss this property in the following section.
3.7 Attestation as TLS extension
We have shown that in order to prevent relay attacks against integrity reporting pro-
tocols, a second cryptographic channel needs to be established to ensure that the com-
munication after the remote attestation is authentic, i.e., the challenger communicates
with the system that provided the measurement values. In addition, according to Re-
quirement 2, it is required that the attestation must not be performed over unprotected
channels, since otherwise an adversary could eavesdrop on the communication channel
and, thus, discover sensitive information about the platform configuration. Further-
more, for authenticating a particular entity it is necessary to use additional measures,
e.g, TLS, that also establish an own cryptographic channel. However, one cryptographic
attestation channel inside another cryptographic channel for authenticating a particu-
lar entity, clearly increases the complexity and one might argue whether this overhead
is justifiable. We therefore propose to directly couple the attestation channel with the
TLS-protocol. This approach enables extending the cryptographic channel to the TPM,
thus, ensuring that the endpoint of the communication is the TPM. This combined pro-
cess allows to authenticate a particular entity and to report the platform configuration
in one step.
In the following, we will show how the TLS-protocol can be combined with our pro-
posed robust integrity reporting protocol. We refer to the resulting protocol as Trusted-
TLS, since it offers a secure way of performing integrity reporting without the need of
establishing a second cryptographic channel. To ensure that the Trusted-TLS-protocol
is applicable with mutual authentication as well as with one-way authentication, we
propose two different protocols. Both proposed protocols were designed under the re-
quirement that the existing TLS specification should be adapted as slightly as possible.
The protocols cannot be directly combined with each other, since both entities must
agree on the same protocol version. This is necessary since otherwise version rollback
attacks would be basically possible.
3.7.1 Trusted-TLS with Anonymous User
The enhanced robust integrity reporting protocol uses similar mechanisms as the TLS-
protocol. To combine both protocols, the certificate verify message of the TLS hand-
shake protocol is created with the help of the TPM using the TPM Quote command.
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In that case, the server hello message serves as the attestation challenge message. To
ensure that no man-in-the-middle is relaying a message, thus, trying to masquerade his
platform configuration, the protocol finishes with the Finished messages. The resulting
Protocol is shown in Protocol 3.7.2.
Protocol 3.7.2: TLS with anonym User
SUMMARY: B answers the attestation challenge of A
RESULT: Secure integrity reporting: authentication of A: key establishment with
key confirmation
1. Notation.
Sid denotes the TLS security parameters and the protocol ID (Trusted DHE anon).
Px denotes the cryptographic engines which are supported by X
Cert(X, KX) is the public key certificate of X
DHX denotes the public Diffie-Helman key of entity X
KAB denotes the negotiated key between A and B
2. System setup.
A must acquire (and validate) the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate
Cert(AIK, KAIK). All entities must possess the certificate of the certification
authority in order to authenticate the received certificates
3. Protocol messages.
A ← B : B, Nb, Sid, Pb (client hello) (1)
A → B : A, Na, Sid, Pa (server hello) (2)
A → B : Cert(A, KA) (server certificate) (3)
A → B : DHA, {DHA, Na, Nb, PCR}K−1A (server key exchange) (4)
A ← B : Cert(AIK, KAIK) (client certificate) (5)
A ← B : DHB (client key exchange) (6)
A ← B : {DHA, DHB, Na, Nm}K−1AIK (certificate verify) (7)
A → B : {Finished}KAB (client finished) (8)
A ← B : {Finished}KAB (server finished) (9)
A ← B : {SML}KAB (attestation reply) (10)
4. Protocol actions.
(a) A and B exchange randomly generated nonces Na, Nb and the supported
cryptographic engines as well as protocol IDs including the protocol version.
The protocol version should include the information that the
Trusted DHE anon protocol is used.
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(b) A delivers the server certificate (3) to B.
(c) DH-Key generation by A. A selects an appropriate prime p and generator g
of Z∗p (2 ≤ g ≤ p− 2).
(d) A chooses a random secret a, 2 ≤ a ≤ p − 2, and computes ga mod p. The
public parts of the Diffie-Helman key are denoted as DHA.
(e) A signs DHA and transfers the message in step (4) to B.
(f) DH-Key generation by B. B chooses a random secret b, 2 ≤ a ≤ p − 2, and
computes gb mod p. The public parts of the Diffie-Helman key are denoted
as DHB.
(g) B signs all transferred messages with the AIK of the TPM and delivers
the signature to A. For this purpose, the size of the transferred messages
are shortened to match the 160-bit external data field of the TPM Quote
command.
(h) B and A compute the master secret based on the attestation challenge and
the exchanged nonces and obtain KAB. B and A then exchange the Finished
messages in step (8) and (9).
(i) Finally, B transfers the Stores Measurement Log to A using the currently
negotiated key.
3.7.3 Trusted-TLS with User Authentication
The TLS-protocol can also be used to mutually authenticate both entities. In that
case, both entities need to possess a valid certificate and a corresponding private key
that has been issued by a certification authority that is trusted for both entities. The
TLS-specification dictates that the proof-of-knowledge of some secret authentication
data is achieved by the certificate verify message. Since the certificate verify message
is already used for the attestation reply message, a second certificate verify must be
sent, which provides a proof-of-knowledge of a specific secret, i.e., the authentication
data for authenticating a specific user. It is also possible to create a double signature
with the AIK and another user specific key. This approach is implementation specific
and provides no additional security, as we will see in the security analysis section. The
resulting protocol for mutual authentication and integrity reporting is shown in Protocol
3.7.4. The modified messages compared to Protocol 3.7.2 are the messages (4’), (5’),
(7’) and (8’). They are marked with a ’ in the following.
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Protocol 3.7.4: TLS with user authentication
SUMMARY: B answers the attestation challenge of A
RESULT: Integrity reporting: mutual authentication: key establishment with
key confirmation
1. Notation.
Sid denotes the TLS security parameters and the protocol ID (Trusted DHE RSA).
Px denotes the cryptographic engines which are supported by X
Cert(X, KX) is the public key certificate of X
DHX denotes the public Diffie-Helman key of entity X
KAB denotes the negotiated key between A and B
2. System setup.
A must acquire (and validate) the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate
Cert(AIK, KAIK). All entities must possess the certificate of the certification
authority in order to authenticate the received certificates
3. Protocol messages.
A ← B : B, Nb, Sid, Pb (client hello) (1)
A → B : A, Na, Sid, Pa (server hello) (2)
A → B : Cert(A, KA) (server certificate) (3)
A → B : DHA, {DHA, Na, Nb}K−1A (server key exchange) (4’)
A ← B : Cert(AIK, KAIK), Cert(B, KB) (client certificate) (5’)
A ← B : DHB (client key exchange) (6)
A ← B : {DHA, DHB, Na, Nb, PCR}K−1AIK (certificate verify) (7’)
A ← B : {DHA, DHB, Na, Nb}K−1B (certificate verify) (8’)
A → B : {Finished}KAB (client finished) (9)
A ← B : {Finished}KAB (server finished) (10)
A ← B : {SML}KAB (attestation reply) (11)
4. Protocol actions.
(a) A and B exchange randomly generated nonces Na, Nb and the supported
cryptographic engines as well as protocol IDs including the protocol version.
The protocol version should include the information that the
Trusted DHE RSA protocol is used.
(b) A delivers the server certificate (3) to B.
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(c) DH-Key generation by A. A selects an appropriate prime p and generator g
of Z∗p (2 ≤ g ≤ p− 2).
(d) A chooses a random secret a, 2 ≤ a ≤ p − 2, and computes ga mod p. The
public parts of the Diffie-Helman key are denoted as DHA.
(e) A signs DHA and transfers the message in step (4’) to B.
(f) B delivers its certificates in message (5’) to A.
(g) DH-Key generation by B. B chooses a random secret b, 2 ≤ a ≤ p − 2, and
computes gb mod p. The public parts of the Diffie-Helman key are denoted
as DHB.
(h) B signs all transferred messages with the AIK of the TPM and delivers the
signature to A (7’). For this purpose, the size of the transferred messages
are shortened to match the 160-bit external data field of the TPM Quote
command.
(i) To additionally provide user-authentication B signs all transferred messages
besides the PCR with a user specific key K−1B . This key is independent to
the AIK and can be held in the protected storage of the TPM, e.g., as a
Subject Key Attestation Evidence (SKAE) [169] or a key stored on a smart
card. The signed message is transferred to A (8’).
(j) B and A compute the master-secret based on the attestation challenge and
the exchanged nonces and obtain KAB. B and A then exchange the Finished
messages in step (9) and (10).
(k) Finally, B transfers the Stores Measurement Log to A using the currently
negotiated key (11).
3.8 Security Analysis
In this section, we will first discuss the security of our proposed TLS extension. We will
then provide a formal security analysis of our proposed extension. For this purpose, we
again use the AVISPA protocol prover [182].
3.8.1 Informal Security Analysis
The security of the TLS-protocol has extensively been analyzed in the literature (e.g.,
[117, 184, 64]). Thus, we will only informally discuss whether our proposed protocol is
secure against the attack shown in Section 3.3.3.
If an attacker tries to masquerade his own platform configuration with the help of
a second platform, it is required that the attacker relays the challenge represented by
the server hello message to the second platform. This challenge is then signed together
with the public DH-key of the second platform with the AIK. Since in that case, the
public DH-key is part of the certificate verify message, the challenger will compute his
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pre-master-secret based on this public DH-key. If the attacker, who is situated in the
middle of the communication, modifies parts of the transferred public DH-parameter,
both platforms would compute different Finished messages. This prevents the challenger
from successfully validating the SML. The validation of the trust level of the platform
configuration therefore fails.
Version rollback attacks on protocols of this type are possible as already discussed in
Section 3.6.1. These attacks are characterized by the fact that an attacker tries to mask
his public key together with the nonce provided by the verifier as new nonce for the
prover. However, since the protocol’s software integrity of the prover is also reflected
in the platform configuration, the verifier will determine the platform configuration as
not being trusted.
3.8.2 Formal Security Analysis
To formally analyze the proposed protocol, we again use the AVISPA protocol prover
[182]. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, AVISPA is a model checker and not a theorem
prover. Thus, we cannot provide a formal proof that the protocol is correct.
In the following we restrict us to only analyze Protocol 3.7.4. Protocol 3.7.2 can
be modeled analogously. Each involved entity (i.e., prover and challenger), is modeled
as a finite state machine and each transition from one state to another requires the
receipt of a message and the sending of a reply message. Figure 3.3 shows the modeled
finite state machine. For the sake of understanding, we divided in Figure 3.3 each
state of client and server in two independent states Si and S′i with i ∈ {0, . . . , 5}. The
transition to state Si requires the receipt of a message and the transition from S′i to
Si+1 requires sending of a message. The transition from state Si to S′i is characterized
by the computation overhead in order to compute and create the transmitted messages.
In each state, the respective messages as specified in the protocols are transferred, e.g.,
the server receives in state S1 message (1) of Protocol 3.7.4 and creates and delivers
messages (2), (3) and (4) in state S′1 to the client. The complete AVISPA source of
Protocol 3.7.4 is presented in Section A.2 of the appendix.
We again use the Dolev-Yao intruder model [50] to model the attacker and the
environment. To abstract from the negotiation of a common generator g and a common
group Z∗p, we assume that these are global parameters known to all parties in the
environment. However, this is not a security restriction since these messages can be
transferred in plain-text without loss of security (see [45]).
We use AVISPA to verify the following security goals:
• A authenticates a genuine and authentic TPM on the value Na. This holds since
only an authentic TPM is able to sign Na with a corresponding non-migratable
key (AIK or special purpose key).
• A authenticates the TPM of B on the value KAB. This holds since given the
first statement, only the owner of the platform of B possesses the corresponding
private Diffie-Helman key. As a consequence, only A is able to compute the secret
key based on the provided public key.
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Figure 3.3: State machine of Client (platform B) and Server (platform A).
• A authenticates the TPM of B on the Finished messages. This holds since given
the second statement, only B can encrypt the Finished messages and send it back
to B.
• A authenticates B on the value Na. This holds since only B is able to sign Na
using his own private key.
• B authenticates A on the value Nb. This holds since only A is able to sign Nb
using his own private key.
• A and B share the key KAB, which is confidential and is kept secret.
• A and B share the Stored Measurement Log (SML), which is privacy related and
is kept secret.
Results After modeling the protocol, we analyzed the model with the different model
checkers [16] provided by AVISPA. We found no attack trace; thus, the protocol analyzer
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reports that all security properties are satisfied and Protocol 3.7.4 is secure against
Dolev-Yao attackers.
3.9 Related Work
Since the specifications of the TCG are still in progress, many open issues exist. There
is a large number of work focusing on the concepts of Trusted Computing. Sailer et
al. [142] presented a comprehensive prototype based on Trusted Computing technolo-
gies. In particular, the authors comes up with an architecture for integrity measure-
ment, which contains an integrity reporting protocol that is consistent to the TCG-
specification. We enhance this integrity reporting protocol in this chapter in order to
make it resistant against masquerading attacks.
Balfe et al. [11] propose the integration of key exchange protocols into Direct Anony-
mous Attestation (DAA) [23] in P2P networks. However, the objectives of the integra-
tion of key exchange protocols are different to our proposal, since [11] aims at building
stable identities in P2P networks. Additionally, the presented approach does not feature
integrity reporting and cannot be directly applied to remote attestation.
Another related work is [70] which aims at building secure tunnels between end-
points. But this approach adds a new platform property certificate, which links the
AIK to the TLS certificate. This platform property certificate can be a self-signed cer-
tificate and is then measured by the TPM and included in the SML. In contrast to that,
our approach focuses on client attestation and does not need a modified way of how the
measurements for the platform property certificate are made, since we directly bind the
cryptographic channel to the AIK. In addition to that, the proposal by Goldman et al.
is still vulnerable to the masquerading attack presented in this chapter.
Lo¨hr et al. [103] present key components for scalable oﬄine attestation. The ap-
proach is based on the TPM’s ability to generate a non-migratable key which is bound
to a specific platform configuration. The TPM bound key-pair is then certified and
the certificate is integrated together with the SML inside an attestation token. The
attestation token consists of all necessary information to make a statement whether a
specific platform is trusted. It is public and can thus be shared amongst other entities.
The solution proposed by Lo¨hr et al. [103] is resistant against the masquerading attack
presented in this chapter. However, our solution proposed in this chapter has a better
performance compared since our solution does not require a new TPM bound key-pair
to be generated each time the platform configuration changes.
Gasmi et al. [68] and Unger et al. [181] propose to include integrity information into
secure channel establishment. For this purpose, they enhance the TLS-protocol with
Subject Key Attestation Evidence (SKAE) certificates [169] that additionally carry in-
tegrity information. These approaches have similarities to our proposed TLS-extension.
However, since they are based on the TPM’s ability of binding a key to a specific plat-
form configuration, they do not have a very good performance. That is caused by the
fact, that each time the platform configuration changes, a new TPM key needs to be
generated, which is bound to the current platform configuration. This approach has
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therefore a smaller flexibility in particular if the platform configuration changes often
over time. In addition, this approach would require a new mechanism which is able
to reliably detect when the platform configuration changes and a new key needs to be
generated. However, it is unclear how such a mechanism could be realized.
The TCG is also working on an own TLS-extension [176]. However, the specification
for this extension has not been published yet and it can only be speculated how the
exact security mechanisms are realized.
3.10 Summary
In this chapter, we analyzed the TCG-defined integrity reporting and extracted three
requirements which must be satisfied in order to ensure secure attestation channels. We
have shown in this chapter that the TCG-defined integrity reporting does not satisfy
all requirements and is, thus, vulnerable to a masquerading attack. This does not only
apply for the TCG-defined integrity reporting, but also to other approaches that provide
integrity reporting and do not satisfy our extracted requirements. In the context of the
TCG-defined integrity reporting, the problem evolved because the AIK does not reveal
whether the attesting system is the one which really provides the measured values. This
shortcoming is relevant in any scenario where remote attestation is used to guarantee
the trust level of a system configuration. To address this issue, we have presented
a robust protocol which prevents masquerading attacks. For that purpose, we added
an authentication scheme into an integrity reporting protocol. The resulting protocol
guarantees that the communication after the remote attestation is authentic, i.e., the
challenger communicates with the system that provided the measurement values. Since
this key agreement scheme increases the complexity, we also showed how the TLS-
protocol can be extended in order to enable integrity reporting. This proposed protocol
enables mutual authentication of two entities as well as attesting one entity to its
platform configuration.
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Chapter 4
Scalable Attestation
This chapter shows how the scalability of platform attestation can be improved. In this
context, we propose three protocols that enable fast and secure integrity reporting for
servers that have to handle many attestation requests. We implemented all of our proto-
cols and compared them in terms of security and performance. Our proposed protocols
enable a highly frequented entity to timely answer incoming attestation requests. Most
of the material presented in this chapter has been previously published in: Improving
the Scalability of Platform Attestation [160].
4.1 Introduction
The process of remote attestation and the requirements of protocols that support se-
cure integrity reporting have been investigated in Chapter 3 and the literature (e.g.,
[152, 31, 164, 137, 103, 68]). In this context, all proposed solutions require the TPM
to perform one expensive asymmetric cryptographic operation for each entity that is
requesting integrity information. One reason for the high complexity is that, according
to Requirement 1, a verifying entity has to ensure freshness of the integrity information,
which is achieved by a challenge-response authentication involving the TPM. However,
since the TPM is very limited in its computation power, the computation of one asym-
metric operation takes between one and three seconds [138]. This causes the process of
remote attestation to scale very poorly, which is particularly problematic if an entity
is highly frequented and distributes integrity measurements to many clients (such as
a server from which all clients request integrity information before they start using a
particular service).
In this chapter, we present protocols that allow to overcome the performance bot-
tleneck of a TPM, so that an entity is able to frequently report its integrity to many
clients. To this end, we propose three different protocols that utilize different mecha-
nisms of the TPM: the first protocol extends the most widely used platform attestation
by bundling a number of attestation requests and answering them with one TPM oper-
ation; the second protocol requires a Trusted Third Party and utilizes hash-chains; and
the third protocol realizes integrity reporting using time synchronized tick-stamps. Our
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developed protocols do not require new Trusted Computing technology or modifications
to the TPM specification. We have implemented all of our proposed protocols and have
run simulations on currently available hardware TPMs. The simulations clearly indi-
cate that the developed protocols are able to overcome the performance bottleneck of
a TPM and can thus be used in environments where an entity is heavily exposed to
integrity reporting queries.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we review
related work, showing that all existing protocols scale poorly and thus cannot be used
in highly frequented environments. Section 4.3 presents the assumptions and notations
for our work. In Section 4.4 we present our protocols which enable a highly frequented
entity to report its integrity. In Section 4.5 we analyze the security of our proposed
solutions and in Section 7.7.2 we evaluate the protocols by looking at performance
issues. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.7.
4.2 Evaluation of Existing Proposals
In this section, we analyze all known proposals and verify whether they can be used in
highly frequented environments. We will show for each proposal that it scales poorly.
Lo¨hr et al. [103] present key components for scalable oﬄine attestation. In this
context, they introduce an attestation token that consists of all necessary information
to make a statement whether a specific platform is trusted. This attestation token is
public and can thus be shared amongst other entities. However, to verify that a specific
platform configuration is trusted and to obtain a proof that a specific attestation token
belongs to a specific platform, expensive TPM operations are required. This concept is
therefore not applicable in scenarios where frequent integrity verification is needed. As
already briefly introduced in the introduction, this especially becomes problematic if a
server wants to report its integrity to multiple clients.
Gasmi et al. [68] propose to include integrity information into secure channel es-
tablishment. For this purpose, they enhance the TLS-protocol with SKAE certificates
[169] that additionally carry integrity information. However, their approach requires the
computation of multiple expensive asymmetric cryptographic operations on the TPM
on both endpoints. This again limits the usefulness in highly frequented environments
due to massive performance degradations.
Shi et al. [152] address the time-of-use and time-of-attestation discrepancy of the
TPM-based binary attestation. This discrepancy emerges because a software compo-
nent is measured before execution and not directly before attestation. To overcome
this problem, the authors propose to only attest to a small piece of sensitive code and
thus measure a particular piece of code immediately before execution. However, the
work requires that for every established communication channel, two TPM Seal, one
TPM Unseal and one TPM Sign operation are computed on the TPM, thus rendering the
approach inapplicable in a client-server scenario.
Another approach to overcoming the bottleneck of a TPM is to use virtual TPMs
[20]. A virtual TPM is a software TPM that only uses the underlying hardware TPM
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for certain operations. This approach significantly increases the performance of the
attestation process, since the CPU is used to calculate the attestation related operations.
On the downside, because the TPM is implemented in software, this approach does
not offer the same security as a hardware TPM. In particular, a software TPM does
not provide functions such as active shields or active security sensors for preventing
unauthorized access.
Another proposal [157] considers extending a TPM with hardware-based virtualiza-
tion techniques and attaching the TPM to a faster bus or integrating it directly into the
CPU. Since the TPM possesses much more computation power in this approach, per-
formance degradation in the attestation process does not occur. However, the approach
requires modifications of the TPM architecture.
Our work uses the TPM-based binary attestation which requires a trusted OS that
performs measurements of all executed code, i.e., binary attestation. In contrast, [75]
and [139] focus on semantic attestation based on attesting the behavior of software
components. However, semantic attestation also requires a TCG-enhanced boot process
to ensure that a small operating system kernel applies mechanisms that enforce the
semantic attestation. To this end, a partially TPM-based binary attestation is required
so that time degradations of the attestation process also apply to approaches based on
semantic attestation.
Other related work, such as [31, 164, 137] additionally require that the communica-
tion perform expensive TPM operation during the execution of the attestation protocol.
4.3 Assumptions and Notations
In the following, we call the entity who wants to attest to the contents of its platform
configuration the server and we call the entities that require an attestation the clients.
The server is also referred to as prover, since he wants to prove to the verifier (a client)
that he is in a trusted system configuration.
We assume that a trusted operating system, that is either based on a virtual machine
monitor [67, 20, 156] or on a microkernel [68, 137, 101], performs integrity measurements
on running software. In addition, this trusted operating system protects negoitated
session keys against unauthorized extractions during normal runtime conditions. The
architecture of one such trusted operating systems is also presented in Chapter 7 of this
thesis. However, specifying and presenting the operating system environment is beyond
the scope of this chapter.
We use the following notation: Cx denotes a client with x ∈ {1, . . . , n} and S denotes
a server; Nax and Nbx are random number nonces that are used to verify freshness and
to detect impersonation. We denote a set of platform configuration registers as PCR
and the Stored Measurement Log as SML.
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4.4 Scalable Solutions
This section first highlights the shortcomings of the integrity reporting mechanisms as
defined by the TCG [173]. We will then show how attestation can be used in highly
frequented scenarios. In this context, we will present three different solutions that
overcome the performance bottleneck of a TPM.
1 - 3 sec.
1 - 3 sec.
1 - 3 sec.
Figure 4.1: Delay of simultaneously arriving attestation requests
Figure 4.1 shows the delays that occur when multiple attestation requests arrive
simultaneously at one server. Each attestation request includes one nonce that is gen-
erated by the challenger, to ensure freshness of the attestation reply. Every request
can not be answered until the TPM has performed the TPM Quote command, which
signs a number of platform configuration registers and the nonce of the requester with
an Attestation Identity Key (AIK). While the TPM performs internal computation,
it is locked and does not accept any other request from the software stack. Thus,
attestation requests are non-parallelizable. Incoming attestation requests are delayed
until the TPM is able to process a new TPM Quote command. We have implemented
the integrity reporting protocol specified by the TCG and performed measurements on
currently available TPMs (see Section 7.7.2). Our simulations on different hardware
TPMs showed that a single TPM Quote operation takes about one second, which verify
the results presented in [138] stating that the time required for computing one TPM Sign
operation is between one and three seconds.
Figure 4.1 points out that even if a small number of clients require an attestation,
massive delays will occur due to the sequential operation of the TPM. This fact can
also result in denial of service attacks since a client may not receive a valid attestation
response from the server in the expected period of time. As a result, this shortcoming
could be exploited by an adversary to prevent waiting clients from successfully commu-
nicating with the server.
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That is not only the case when the TPM Quote command is used, but also when
integrity reporting is realized implicitly through other TPM-operations, e.g., through
sealing [96] or binding [103, 137]. We also ran simulations of an attestation protocol
that utilizes TPM CertifyKey combined with TPM Unbind as proposed by Lo¨hr et al.
[103] and Sadeghi et al. [137]. These protocols enable platform attestation by seal-
ing a non-migratable TPM key to a set of platform configuration registers. However,
the time for computing one TPM Unbind operation (around one second1) is comparable
to computing one TPM Quote operation. These results clearly indicate that comput-
ing asymmetric cryptography on a TPM is very expensive, making currently proposed
attestation protocols hardly applicable in highly frequented scenarios.
4.4.1 Multiple-Hash Attestation
The Multiple-Hash Attestation protocol extends the integrity reporting defined by the
TCG by bundling a number of attestation requests and answering them with one
TPM Quote operation. For this purpose, we utilize the properties of a collision resis-
tant hash function. In particular, we map a number of incoming attestation requests
to a single request whose nonce is computed as a hash of all nonces of the arriving
attestation requests. Before the nonces are passed to the TPM, they are also added
to a NonceList that describes which nonces were hashed to produce the target nonce.
The prover then transmits the output of the TPM Quote command together with the
NonceList and the SML to all entities that issued an attestation request. It should be
noted that the TPM simply signs all PCRs and not only a set of the PCRs. Since the
TPM simply concatenates all PCR values and then creates a signature on all values, the
receiving clients can also easily verify the values of a subsequent set of the PCRs (Com-
pare Chapter 5.1 for additional information on this issue). Before accepting the proof,
the verifier checks whether his nonce is part of the NonceList transmitted alongside
the TPM Quote output. This approach satisfies Requirement 1 of a secure attestation
channel and provides a proof for the freshness of integrity information.
To prevent masquerading attacks on the authenticity of the platform configuration
[164] and to satisfy Requirement 3 of a secure attestation channel, it is necessary to
integrate an authentication process in the attestation protocol. This authentication
process is realized (similar to Section 3.6) by adding a key-establishment in order to
ensure that the channel of attestation is authentic. The negotiated key can then be used
as an encryption key for all subsequent messages sent between server and client. This
mechanism also guarantees an end-to-end communication and keeps the attestation
channel from becoming compromised by another application that could take over the
attestation channel after the attestation has succeeded. Requirement 2 of a secure
attestation channel is satisfied by delivering the SML in the established cryptographic
channel. Protocol 4.4.2 shows the resulting protocol flow.
1All measurements were performed on a TPM ST Microelectronics ST19WP18-TPM-C and an Atmel
TPM 1.2
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Protocol 4.4.2: Multiple-Hash Attestation
SUMMARY: S answers the attestation challenge of Cx
RESULT: Integrity reporting: key establishment with key confirmation
1. System setup.
Cx must acquire (and validate) the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate
Cert(AIK, KAIK)
2. Protocol messages.
Cx → S : Nax, gcx mod p (1)
Cx ← S : Cert(AIK, KAIK), NonceList,
gs mod p, {HashedNonceList,PCR}K−1AIK
(2)
Cx → S : {Nbx, gcx mod p}KSCx (3)
Cx ← S : {Nax, Nbx, SML, gs mod p}KSCx (4)
3. Protocol actions.
(a) Precomputation by S. S selects an appropriate prime p and generator g of
Z∗p (2 ≤ g ≤ p − 2). S chooses a random secret s, 2 ≤ s ≤ p − 2, and
computes gs mod p. S transmits p and g to all Cx.
(b) Precomputation by Cx. Cx chooses a random secret cx, 2 ≤ cx ≤ p− 2, and
computes gcx mod p.
(c) Attestation challenge. Cx, x = 1, . . . , n, choose a non-predictable nonce Nax
and transmit message (1) to S.
(d) S adds Na1, . . ., Nan to the NonceList and computes:
NonceList = Na1 ||Na2 || . . . ||Nan (4.1)
HashedNonceList = h(h(Na1, gs mod p) ||
h(Na2, gs mod p) || . . . ||h(Nan, gs mod p))
(4.2)
(e) S then computes the attestation response message by signing the Hashed-
NonceList and the PCRs using an AIK. S then transmits message (2) to
Cx.
(f) Key confirmation. Cx computes the shared session key by computingKSCx =
(gs)cx mod p. Cx then generates a second non-predictable nonce (Nbx) and
transfers message (3) to S :
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(g) S computes the shared session key by computing KSCx = (gcx)s mod p and
decrypts the received message with KSCx . S then transfers message (4) to
Cx.
(h) Cx verifies the signature of {HashedNonceList, PCR}K−1AIK and checks the
freshness of Nax, by recalculating HashedNonceList using the transmitted
NonceList. Based on the received SML and the PCR values Cx processes
the SML and re-computes the received PCR values. If the computed values
match the signed PCR values, the SML is valid and untampered. Finally,
Cx has to verify that the delivered integrity reporting values match the given
reference values; thus Cx can decide if S is in a trusted system state.
The above solution works well if several attestation requests arrive at once; if they
are slightly delayed, the Multiple-Hash Attestation Protocol can be optimized further.
For this purpose, we introduce a ring buffer with three different areas, each consisting of
one area for the NonceList and another area for the output of a TPM operation. Figure
4.2 depicts this tri-state ring buffer and shows how it is embedded in the attestation
protocol. This tri-state ring buffer holds all relevant data for three different threads
that are responsible for passing data from the verifier to the TPM and vice versa:
• Input thread: This thread collects challenge-requests and writes them to a Non-
ceList area of the ring buffer.
• Working thread: This thread computes the HashedNonceList from the NonceList
stored in one of the three areas of the buffer and executes the TPM Quote on the
HashedNonceList and the PCR. The result is then written back to the same area
of the buffer and the ring buffer is rotated.
• Output thread: This thread is responsible for reading the results of the TPM
operation from the buffer and for delivering the results to the corresponding clients
who requested attestation.
Figure 4.2: Tri-state ring buffer of the Multiple-Hash Attestation
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Each time a new attestation request arrives at the server, the input thread forks a
new process. This process adds the incoming nonce to the NonceList and remembers
the area of the ring buffer that is responsible for the process. The working thread runs
continuously; this thread is responsible for passing data to and receiving data from the
TPM. As soon as the working thread receives an answer from the TPM, the working
thread writes the results in the ring buffer and rotates the tri-state ring buffer. This
working thread then retrieves the new NonceList of the adjacent area, which he hashes
to create the HashedNonceList and passes to the TPM. While the working thread is
operating on the TPM, the processes that are responsible for answering the client’s
attestation-requests are waiting until the tri-state buffer has been rotated one round
and their data is ready. As soon as the requested data is present in the buffer, the
processes that are responsible for the attestation-request can deliver the attestation-
response, consisting of the signed HashedNonceList and PCR, to the requester.
This approach enables a very efficient realization of the Multiple-Hash Attestation.
Since the working thread that is responsible for the TPM is also responsible for the
ring buffer, a maximum utilization of the TPM can be achieved. Incoming attestation
requests must wait a maximum of two rotation steps of the ring buffer before the result
is available. Thus, in the worst case, the response is available after two signature
computations on the TPM have been performed.
4.4.3 Timestamped Hash-Chain Attestation
Another alternative to reduce the number of costly TPM operations, is to relinquish
the server from integrating every nonce of each client into the costly TPM operations.
This can be achieved by involving a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that is responsible for
issuing nonces for the attestation process. For this purpose, the TTP provides nonces,
signatures of these nonces and timestamps that state when the TTP generated the
nonces. We divide the time into intervals; each nonce together with the timestamp
is associated to a particular time interval. To ensure an attestation request arrives
at the server in a particular interval, the server uses the nonce which is valid in the
current interval and not a nonce provided by the client. The TTP and all clients need
to be loosely time-synchronized to enable the clients to verify the validity of the TTP
generated nonce for a certain interval.
A straightforward implementation of this idea results in a relatively high load at
the TTP. During i intervals, the TTP has to generate n ∗ i nonces and timestamps to
serve n servers. Since the intervals should be in the range of seconds, a TTP has to
generate new nonces very frequently. To relieve the TTP from generating a nonce for
each interval, we propose using hash-chains [98]. The TTP issues a nonce Na0 with
time-stamp only for the first time interval and the server uses the initial TTP-generated
nonce Na0 only for the first attestation query. After each interval the server performs
a hash-operation on the nonce by applying the hash function h successively to the
nonce of the previous interval in order to produce the nonce of the next interval, i.e.,
Nav+1 = h(Nav), with v = 0, 1, . . . , k.
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TTP
Figure 4.3: Protocol flow of the Timestamped Hash-Chain Attestation
Since the TTP issues a timestamp only for the first nonce, the verifying clients
cannot directly validate whether the received nonce is valid in the current interval. To
enable the clients to verify the validity of the nonce, the server has to provide a proof
that he applied the hash function the correct number of times. This ensures freshness of
integrity information and thus satisfies Requirement 1 of a secure attestation channel.
Since the attestation service of the server is part of the server’s platform configuration
and thus its state is included in the SML, the clients can verify that the attestation
service is in a trusted state. The proof is thus being made through validating the
platform configuration of the service.
Figure 4.3 depicts the Timestamped Hash-Chain Attestation. After each interval,
the server calculates a new hash-value with which the new attestation is performed.
The length of such an interval depends on how long it takes to create an attestation
token (which is TPM related). As a result, one interval cannot be smaller than it takes
to generate an attestation token. In Section 7.7.2, we present some evaluation results
of a representative TPM. On our used TPM hardware, one interval cannot be smaller
than approx. 1.4 seconds.
To enable the clients to validate the freshness of the platform configuration, the
server delivers an attestation token (τ) to the requester. This attestation token consists
of the TTP-signed seed nonce together with a timestamp, an AIK signed message with
the current interval count, the nonce of the current interval, the PCRs and the public
Diffie-Helman key of the server and the certificate of the AIK. We denote the initial
TPM-signed nonce as seed nonce since this initial nonce is generated by the TTP and
all further nonces are computed based on this nonce. The attestation token therefore
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consists of all information that is necessary to validate the freshness of the attestation
response:
τ = {Na0, time0}K−1TTP ,Cert(AIK, KAIK) (4.3)
{hv(Na0), v, PCR, gs mod p}K−1AIK .
The attestation token introduced here has similarities to the one introduced in [103].
However, the main difference is that a verifier can validate the platform configuration
without requiring the prover to perform expensive TPM operations. To verify that the
platform configuration of the server is trusted, the clients have to verify the validity
of all certificates, all signatures and the validity of the timestamp. Note that this
cost intensive validations must only be performed by the clients and not by the server.
Furthermore, the clients have to verify whether the received nonce is valid in the current
active interval. For this purpose, the following equation must hold: time0+v ·t ≤ now ≤
time0 + (v + 1) · t+ , where v represents the interval number, t the time length of the
interval, and time the point of time when the TTP generated the nonce. Moreover, now
denotes the current time of the verifier and  a certain error range. The time length of
the interval is part of the SML and thus represented by the platform configuration of the
server. The protocol again integrates an authentication process to ensure Requirement
3 of a secure attestation channel. Requirement 2 of a secure attestation channel is again
satisfied by delivering the SML in the established cryptographic channel. The resulting
protocol is shown in Protocol 4.4.4.
Protocol 4.4.4: Timestamped Hash-Chain Attestation
SUMMARY: S answers the attestation challenge of Cx
RESULT: Integrity reporting: key establishment with key confirmation
1. System setup.
Cx must acquire (and validate) the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate
Cert(AIK, KAIK)
2. Protocol messages.
TTP → S : {Na0, time0}K−1TTP (1)
Cx → S : gcx mod p (2)
Cx ← S : {Na0, time0}K−1TTP , {h
v(Na0), v, gs mod p, PCR}K−1AIK ,
Cert(AIK, KAIK)
(3)
Cx → S : {Nbx, gcx mod p}KSCx (4)
Cx ← S : {Nav, Nbx, SML, gs mod p}KSCx (5)
4.4. SCALABLE SOLUTIONS 63
3. Protocol actions.
(a) S chooses a TTP for providing the seed nonce and the TTP transfers message
(1) to S.
(b) Precomputation by S. S selects an appropriate prime p and generator g of
Z∗p (2 ≤ g ≤ p − 2). S chooses a random secret s, 2 ≤ s ≤ p − 2, and
computes gs mod p. S transmits p and g to all Cx.
(c) Precomputation by Cx. Cx chooses a random secret cx, 2 ≤ cx ≤ p− 2, and
computes gcx mod p.
(d) Attestation challenge. Cx, x = 1, . . . , n, deliver message (2) to S.
(e) Depending on the current interval v, S computes the current valid nonce
Nav by calculating:
Nav = h(Nav−1), with v = 1, . . . , k. (4.1)
(f) S computes the attestation response message by signing Nav, the current
interval v and the set of requested PCRs using an AIK thereby obtaining
{hv(Na0), v, gs mod p,PCR}K−1AIK .
(g) S transmits the attestation token τ in message (3) to Cx.
(h) Key confirmation. Cx computes the shared session key by computingKSCx =
(gs)cx mod p. Cx then generates a second non-predictable nonce (Nbx) and
transfers message (4) to S.
(i) S computes the shared session key by computing KSCx = (gcx)s mod p and
decrypts the received message with KSCx . S then transfers message (5) to
Cx.
(j) Cx verifies all signatures and checks the freshness of the Nav by checking
whether Equations (4.2) and (4.3) hold:
time0 + v · t ≤ now ≤ time0 + (v + 1) · t+ , (4.2)
hv(Na0)
?= Nav. (4.3)
(k) Finally, Cx verifies that the platform configuration of S is trusted based on
the SML and the PCRs.
4.4.5 Tickstamp Attestation
The tickstamp attestation uses the tick-counter of a TPM (a tick is in the time range
of milliseconds up to seconds). A TPM provides a mechanism to create a signature of
the current tick-counter value. The resulting data structure includes a signature of the
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current tick-counter value and the time interval after which the counter is periodically
incremented.
To use tick-counters during platform attestation, we utilize the concept that a TPM
enables the creation of non-migratable keys that are bound to the platform configura-
tion. Before a TPM performs platform attestation, a non-migratable key is generated
on the TPM and bound to a specific set of platform configuration registers. This key
is certified using an AIK, which gives a proof that the key is bound to a specific set of
platform configuration registers. The bound key is then used in periodic time intervals
to generate TickStampBlobs, which is only possible while the platform configuration has
not changed. A TickStampBlob consists of a complete TPM CURRENT TICKS structure
[168] and the resulting signature. It includes the current value of the tick-counter, a tick-
session identifier, and a signature of the data. To demonstrate to a remote party that
the platform configuration is to be trusted, an attestation token τ is computed. This
token comprises the latest TickStampBlob, which is the first part of the token shown in
Equation (4.4), as well as the certificate of the key used to generate the TickStampBlob:
τ = {currentTicks, gs mod p}K−1TS , (4.4)
Cert(TS, KTS), Cert(AIK, KAIK).
The trust level of the platform configuration can be evaluated based on the certificate
and the tick-count value inside the TickStampBlob. However, the token gives only an
assertion about the platform configuration in relation to the tick-counter on the platform
that wants to demonstrate its configuration. A synchronization of the tick-counter of
the challenger and the prover is thus needed.
In the following, we will discuss two means of achieving this synchronization. Most
implementations of the TPM specification initialize a tick-session after a reboot of the
system with the value zero. To uniquely identify a specific tick-session, the TPM also
adds a nonce to the tick-session. Since the nonce is also part of every TickStampBlob,
two different TickStampBlob structures can be uniquely related to their session.
Challenge-Response Synchronization The easiest way to perform synchroniza-
tion with the tick-session of the server is to deliver a nonce to the server which is
then signed with TPM TickStampBlob. The resulting signature includes the complete
TPM CURRENT TICKS structure [168], which gives an assertion about the actual tick-
counter value, the tick-rate and the identifying nonce of the current tick-session. Based
on this information, the verifier can check the freshness of the actual attestation token.
However, this concept requires one expensive sign operation on the TPM, which does
not scale. It is thus not applicable in highly frequented environments.
Time Synchronization using a TTP Another alternative is to involve a Trusted
Third Party in the synchronization protocol. This sync-TTP is responsible for associat-
ing a specific tick-session to a specific global time. For this purpose, the TTP generates
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and transfers a nonce to the server, directly after the tick-session on the server is ini-
tialized. This nonce is then signed with TPM TickStampBlob by the server TPM and
the result is delivered to the sync-TTP. The sync-TTP verifies the signatures and gen-
erates a synchronization token that includes the global time, the round-trip time and
the received result. This sync token is then returned to the server which adds the token
to all generated attestation tokens.
Based on the synchronization token, an association between the global time and
the beginning of a specific tick-session is made. A client only needs to synchronize
his time with the sync-TTP in order to make a statement about the freshness of the
received attestation token τ in Equation (4.4) and to satisfy Requirement 1 of a secure
attestation channel. The sync-TTP thus provides services similar to a generic NTP
server. It is also reasonable that a NTP server can be extended with the ability to
create synchronization tokens, since these protocol steps only require minimal additional
computations. Tickstamp Attestation with TTP-based time synchronization is shown
in Protocol 4.4.6. As the preceding protocol, Protocol 4.4.6 integrates an authentication
process to ensure Requirement 3 of a secure attestation channel. Requirement 2 is again
satisfied by delivering the SML in the established cryptographic channel.
Protocol 4.4.6: Tickstamp Attestation with synchronization token
SUMMARY: S answers the attestation challenge of Cx
RESULT: Integrity reporting: key establishment with key confirmation
1. System setup.
Cx must acquire (and validate) the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate
Cert(AIK, KAIK)
2. Protocol messages of the initialization phase.
TTP → S : Nt (I)
TTP ← S : {Nt, currentTicks}K−1TS ,Cert(TS, KTS),
Cert(AIK, KAIK)
(II)
TTP → S : {{Nt, currentTicks}K−1TS , Time}K−1TTP (III)
3. Protocol messages of the attestation phase.
C x → S : gcx mod p (1)
Cx ← S : Cert(TS, KTS),Cert(AIK, KAIK), τsync,
{currentTicks, gs mod p}K−1TS
(2)
Cx → S : {Nbx, gcx mod p}KSCx (3)
Cx ← S : {Nbx,SML, gs mod p}KSCx (4)
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4. Protocol actions of the initialization phase.
(a) S selects a TTP for providing a sync-token. The TTP transfers a nonce Nt
using message (I) to S.
(b) S creates a non-migratable TPM key (KTS) that is bound to a specific set of
platform configuration registers. S certifies KTS with K−1AIK . The resulting
structure is denoted as Cert(TS, KTS) and gives an assertion to which PCRs
KTS is bound. S then signs the actual tick-counter value with K−1TS and
delivers message (II) to the TTP.
(c) The TTP verifies the signature and creates a time stamp on the received
message and transfers the sync-token (τsync) in message (III) to S.
The server has now received a sync-token that can subsequently be used by the
clients to verify freshness of the attestation token. After completing this initial-
ization phase, the server is ready to answer attestation requests.
5. Protocol actions of the attestation phase.
(a) Precomputation and Pre-deployment by S. S selects an appropriate prime
p and generator g of Z∗p (2 ≤ g ≤ p − 2). S chooses a random secret
s, 2 ≤ s ≤ p− 2, and computes gs mod p. S transmits p and g to all Cx.
(b) Precomputation by Cx. Cx chooses a random secret cx, 2 ≤ cx ≤ p − 2,
and computes gcx mod p.
(c) Attestation challenge. Cx , x = 1, . . . , n, deliver message (1) to S.
(d) The server periodically signs the actual tick-counter value with K−1TS . The
resulting data structure is denoted as TickStampBlob.
(e) S transmits the synchronization token τsync = {{Nt,currentTicks}K−1TS ,
Time}K−1TTP and the attestation token τ in message (2) to Cx.
(f) Key confirmation. Cx computes the shared session key by computingKSCx =
(gs)cx mod p. Cx then generates a second non-predictable nonce (Nbx) and
transfers message (3) to S.
(g) S computes the shared session key by computing KSCx = (gcx)s mod p and
decrypts the received message with KSCx . S then transfers message (4) to
Cx.
(h) Finally, Cx verifies all signatures and checks whether the attestation token τ
is fresh using the synchronization token τsync. In addition, Cx verifies that
the platform configuration of S is trusted based on the SML and the PCRs.
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4.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we will discuss the security of our proposed protocols. Since all protocols
include an authentication step, we will first analyze whether this step is secure and
enables secure integrity reporting. We finally perform a formal verification using the
AVISPA protocol prover [182].
4.5.1 Security of the Authentication
This section first discusses the security of the authentication step by looking at potential
attacks, including man-in-the-middle and version rollback attacks.
Man-in-the-Middle attack
All presented protocols prevent an attacker from hiding his malicious software configura-
tion by performing a relay attack [164, 70], since all subsequent messages are encrypted
with the computed session key KSCx . It is not possible for an attacker to perform some
sort of man-in-the-middle attack and to establish two different cryptographic sessions
between the verifier and the challenger, as he is not able to modify the attestation
response of the prover. Since the session key KSCx is protected by the trusted oper-
ating system, (e.g., by storing it in a special purpose region of a security kernel or in
a special virtual machine) it is not possible to extract this key under normal run-time
conditions. Changing the trusted operating system environment to enable extraction of
this key would lead to a non-conformant system state which would have been detected
in the attestation phase.
Version rollback attack
In this attack scenario, three different parties, a verifier, a prover and an adversary,
are involved. The adversary tries to relay the attestation challenge of the verifier to
the prover, thus trying to masquerade a trusted system configuration. The verifier
and the adversary run an authentication enhanced attestation protocol (e.g., Protocol
4.4.2), while the prover runs the TCG-defined attestation protocol. This attack can
be classified as a version rollback attack, in which the adversary masks his public key
together with the nonce provided by the verifier as new nonce for the prover. The
prover does not verify the syntax of the attestation challenge. He directly signs the
masqueraded nonce including public key and delivers the computed signature to the
adversary. The adversary simply forwards the obtained message and both adversary and
verifier compute the shared key based on the exchanged public keys. However, since the
protocol’s software integrity of the prover is also reflected in the platform configuration,
the verifier will determine the platform configuration as not being trusted. The version
rollback attack is therefore only a theoretical attack and fails, since it is not possible to
successfully masquerade a trusted system configuration.
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4.5.2 Formal Security Analysis
In the following we restrict us to analysis of Protocol 4.4.2. All other protocols can be
handled analogously. Each involved entity (i.e., prover and verifier), is modelled as a
finite state machine and each transition from one state to another requires the receipt
of a message and the sending of a reply message. Thus, the verifier is modelled as a
state machine with three states and the prover is modelled as a state machine with two
states. In each state, the respective message as specified in the protocols are transferred,
e.g., the prover receives in its first state message (4) of Protocol 4.4.2 and creates and
delivers message (5) to the verifier.
We use the Dolev-Yao intruder model [50] to model the attacker and the environ-
ment. In this intruder model the attacker has full control over all messages that are sent
over the network. The attacker can therefore intercept, analyze or modify messages, as
well as compose new messages and send the messages to any party. To abstract from
the negotiation of a common generator g and a common group Z∗p, we assume that
these are global parameters known to all parties in the environment. However, this is
not a security restriction since these messages can transferred in plain-text without loss
of security (see [45]).
We use AVISPA to verify the following security goals:
• C x authenticates a genuine and authentic TPM on the value Nax. This holds since
only an authentic TPM is able to sign Nax with a corresponding non-migratable
key (AIK or special purpose key).
• C x authenticates the TPM of S on the value KSCx . This holds since given the
first statement, only the owner of the TPM possesses the corresponding private
Diffie-Helman key. As a consequence, only C x is able to compute the secret key
based on the provided public key.
• C x authenticates the TPM of S on the value Nbx. This holds since given the
second statement, only S can decrypt Nbx and send it back to C x.
• C x and S share the key KSCx , which is confidential and is kept secret.
• C x and S share the Stored Measurement Log (SML), which is privacy related and
is kept secret.
It should be noted that we do not directly authenticate S to C x. C x only determines
whether he is currently communicating with the platform that has provided authentic
measurements and that this channel is authentic.
After modelling the protocol, we analyzed the model with the model checker pro-
vided by AVISPA. We found no attack trace; thus the protocol analyzer reports that
all security properties are satisfied and Protocol 4.4.2 is secure.
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4.5.3 Security Considerations of the Multiple-Hash Attestation
The main difference between the existing TCG-defined integrity reporting and the
Multiple-Hash Attestation is that multiple nonces are hashed to one single nonce. The
security of this process relies on the property that the hash function, in our case SHA-1,
is collision resistant. If a collision resistant hash function is used, it is infeasible for an
adversary to find a collision that can be used to masquerade a trusted system configu-
ration.
4.5.4 Security Considerations of the
Timestamped Hash-Chain Attestation
A general problem in the process of platform attestation is that an unfresh platform
configuration can be replayed, leading to a non-trusted platform configuration being
masqueraded as trusted. To provide protection against this attack, Requirement 1 of a
secure attestation channel was formulated which must be satisfied. This is realized by
using randomly generated nonces combined with the challenge-response authentication
method. However, in the context of the Timestamped Hash-Chain Attestation, these
nonces are derived from one seed nonce by applying a hash function on this value. It
is therefore possible to generate nonces that are valid in the future. This property can
be exploited by an adversary by generating nonces that are valid in future intervals,
computing the attestation token in a trusted configuration, and replaying the computed
attestation token in the future after compromising the platform.
The risk that an adversary may perform such an attack can be minimized by pre-
venting an adversary’s ability to inject nonces corresponding to future time intervals.
That can be done, for example, by modifying the operating system so that it only allows
certain trusted processes to communicate with a TPM. These trusted processes should
only accept seed nonces with a valid signature that have been created by a TTP. Since
the configuration of the operating system is also part of the platform configuration, a
verifier can check whether the prover’s OS is in a trusted state and thus possesses a
mechanism to prevent attacks of this type.
4.5.5 Security Considerations of the Tickstamp Attestation
The security of the Tickstamp Attestation relies on the assurance that a specific non-
migratable TPM key, satisfying certain criteria, is used. This assurance is made using
a certificate generated through TPM CertifyKey. Lo¨hr et al. [103] verified that the
concept of binding a key to a specific set of platform configuration registers is secure
against man-in-the-middle attacks. We will thus only look at the differences between the
protocol proposed in [103] and our proposal. In contrast to Lo¨hr et al., we also integrate
a public Diffie-Helman key into the KTS signed message. Using KTS as a signing key at
a specific time is only possible if the platform configuration is in a known and trusted
state. The extraction of the Diffie-Helman key requires a modified system configuration
that causes the state of the platform to change. The TPM will then deny decryption of
the sealed key KTS . To further enhance security, the Diffie-Helman key should also be
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held in a special purpose region of a microkernel or virtual machine, as, for example,
proposed in [68]. It should also be noted that each time KTS is used, it is verified that
the actual platform configuration is consistent with the platform configuration KTS was
bound to.
4.6 Evaluation
In this section, we will first present the performance measurements of our implementa-
tion. We will then perform a comparison of our proposed protocols.
4.6.1 Performance Evaluation
The main goal of our proposal is to enhance the scalability of platform attestation. All
proposed protocols have been implemented in Java using the tpm4java framework2. The
advantage of this framework is that it is a very efficient implementation and we can talk
directly to the /dev/tpm device driver without requiring that another TPM software
stack be present in the system. A software stack in the background would additionally
need computation power and thus decrease performance. Our approach causes the time
degradation to depend only on the TPM. Further details on the implementation can be
found in [63].
We used this implementation to run performance measurements. We measured the
runtime of all protocols, excluding those for generating the Diffie-Helman keys and those
for generating a new TPM non-migratable key (KTS) required in Protocol 4.4.6. We
performed our measurements on a Core2Duo E6700 with 2.66GHz, 2GB RAM running
OpenSuSE 10.3 and an Atmel TPM 1.2. The results of our measurements are depicted
in Figure 4.4.
The results shown in Figure 4.4 were obtained by averaging over 100 independent
runs for each protocol. For each protocol, we measured the latencies when one attes-
tation challenge arrives, as well as when multiple (100) attestation challenges arrive
simultaneously. The latencies of the TCG-defined protocol [173] as well as Protocol
3.6.3 scale linearly. Therefore, the time for answering n simultaneously arriving attes-
tation request is approximately equal to n ∗ x, where x is the time for answering one
attestation.
The average column also depicts the time that is necessary to execute the key
confirmation phase once the TPM has delivered the integrity information; this time is
shown as the second summand in the column. Note that the TCG-defined IRP in Figure
4.4 does not has a second summand as the TCG-defined protocol does not require a
key-establishment.
The time to finish a Multiple-Hash Attestation varies roughly between 1 and 2
seconds, this variation is caused by the ring buffer. If the ring buffer has just been
rotated one step and new requests arrive, these requests have to wait until the TPM
has finished calculation and the buffer is rotated again. The Tickstamp-Attestation
2http://tpm4java.datenzone.de
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Protocol No. concurrent Req. Average (ms) Min (ms) Max (ms)
TCG-IRP [173]
1 852.47 842 879
n 852.47 · n
Protocol 3.6.3
1 863.75 + 3.4 860 881
n 869.75 · n + 3.4
Multiple-Hash Attestation
1 939.91 + 6.16 921 973
n (Best) 936.61 + 6.68 892 + 1
n (Worst) 1826.84 + 6.68 1826.84 + 20
Timestamped Attestation
Token generation time 1448.95 1422 1727
1 <1 + 6.36
n <1 + 6.36
Tickstamp Attestation
Token generation time 1456.58 1424 1686
1 <1 + 6.42
n <1 + 6.42
Figure 4.4: Measured latencies of selected Integrity Reporting Protocols
and the Timestamp-Attestation also consider the time that is needed to generate the
attestation token. As soon as the token has been generated, it can be used to attest
to the contents of the platform configuration registers. This token generation time
therefore indicates the length of the attestation interval in which this attestation token
is used. An attestation interval can, therefore, not be smaller than about 1.5 seconds.
The measurements show that all proposed protocols are independent of the number
of simultaneously arriving requests. They can therefore significantly reduce the time
required to answer simultaneously arriving attestation requests.
4.6.2 Comparison of the protocols
All proposed protocols enable a highly frequented server to timely answer all incoming
attestation requests. While the Multiple-Hash Attestation is the slowest and requires
roughly between one and two seconds to complete the attestation process, it has the
advantage that it is very similar to the existing TCG-proposed integrity reporting pro-
tocol. Prover and verifier must, therefore, only minimally modify their attestation
interface. This protocol can be classified as an active attestation, since it requires the
verifier to provide a nonce for the server. To use the protocol a direct connection to the
verifier must be established; it is thus not possible to relay the attestation message to
other parties.
The biggest advantage of Timestamped Hash-Chain Attestation and the Tickstamp
Attestation is that these protocols are passive attestations, which require no direct
communication between server and client to deliver integrity information. A client can
thus collect attestation tokens which he received from other entities and see how the
configuration of a particular server changed over time. If this is a desirable feature,
the SML must be integrated inside the attestation tokens τ , which would remove the
need of a direct connection to the prover and the verifier can collect attestation tokens
without noticing the server. However, to ensure freshness of the attestation token and
to complete the authentication process, a direct communication between server and
client is needed.
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The Timestamped Hash-Chain Attestation is based on the TPM’s ability to generate
a key which is bound to the actual platform configuration. While this is a very elegant
solution to realize attestation, its major drawback is that the process of creating one
key and binding it to a platform configuration requires a high computational effort.
This causes that this process is rather impractical if the platform configuration changes
often overtime. We already discussed that issue in Section 3.5.3. However, compared
to a client, the platform configuration of a server does not often change overtime. As a
result, the concept is especially feasible in the scenario we are considering here.
Both protocols require a TTP either for providing a synchronization token or for
the initial nonce. Since the Timestamped Hash-Chain Attestation requires additional
security mechanisms, we suggest to use, depending on the scenario, either the Tickstamp
Attestation or the Multiple-Hash Attestation.
To prevent an attacker from performing masquerading attacks on the authenticity
of the platform configuration, our protocols establish a secure channel between the
involved entities. This secure channel is then used for transmitting the privacy-related
Stored Measurement Log. Although the computation of these cryptographic operations
degrade the server performance, we believe that ensuring the authenticity of integrity
information is necessary in order to enable secure integrity reporting.
However, it should also be noted that these cryptographic operations can be com-
puted very efficiently and only increase the time for answering one attestation request
by 0.70% and are in the range of milliseconds.
4.7 Summary
In scenarios where an entity is frequently requested to deliver integrity information,
existing protocols for performing the TCG-specified platform attestation scale badly.
Such scenarios mainly include a client-server architecture, where a large number of
clients frequently request integrity information of a particular server. This restriction
is caused by the fact that a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) possesses very restricted
computation power and is highly involved in the process of platform attestation.
In this chapter, we proposed three solutions to overcome the bottleneck of a TPM
and thus to perform platform attestation in scenarios where a frequent integrity verifi-
cation is needed. Our proposed protocols do not require any modifications to the TPM
hardware or any modifications to the measurement process. Although our protocols
are based on the TPM-based binary attestation and treat PCR values as measurement
data, they could be easily modified to send other forms of measurement data, such as
measurement data collected in run-time measurement systems. We presented a perfor-
mance evaluation as well as a security analysis of our proposed protocol; the results
clearly indicate that the protocols can considerably reduce the performance overhead
of the attestation process.
Chapter 5
Privacy-Preserving Attestation
Attestation protocols often reveal the platform configuration of the challenger. Since
this is not, in every case, a desirable feature, privacy-preserving mechanisms may be
necessary in order to be able to make a statement about the trust level of a platform
without revealing the exact configuration. In this chapter, we present a mechanism to
deal with such a restriction. This chapter shares some material with: An Approach to
a Trustworthy System Architecture using Virtualization [156] and Trust, Security and
Privacy in VANETs – A Multilayered Security Architecture for C2C-Communication
[159].
5.1 Introduction
One component that is critical for verifying the integrity of a remote platform config-
uration is the Stored Measurement Log (SML). The SML is a data structure in which
all events that affect the platform integrity are stored. The SML is needed for the
verifying entity to make a trust decision about the requesting system’s platform con-
figuration. However, this approach reveals the platform configuration of the requesting
system. Since this is not, in every case, a desirable feature, privacy-preserving mech-
anisms may be necessary for making a statement about the trust level of a platform
without revealing the exact configuration. Without such mechanisms, market domi-
nant vendors could, for example, introduce attestation techniques and deny access to
their services if a client runs a competitor’s software in parallel. One approach that
introduces privacy-preserving mechanisms was proposed by Sadeghi et al. [139]. The
authors propose representing a platform configuration not by static integrity metrics,
but by a set of properties that characterize a specific application. A webrowser of two
different vendors would, thus, have the same properties. Since simply transferring the
properties that characterize a particular application are not privacy related, this ap-
proach seems to be a very elegant solution. However, the authors do not specify how a
property exactly looks and how a property is generated. Exacerbating this problem is
the fact that based on the complexity of current applications, the issue of whether or not
small atomic properties that clearly describe a particular application can be extracted
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is debatable. In addition, the problem of how to handle recent security vulnerabilities
or new software versions is unclear. Assume for example that an application provides a
specific property. However, whether this application still provides this specific property
when a vulnerability in this application has been found is unclear.
To alleviate these problems, we propose a distributed integrity validation architec-
ture (shown in Figure 5.1). In this approach, integrity validation is performed not
through one single entity, but through a number of independent collaborating software
integrity validators. This approach enables one to
• outsource the SML validation process so that the producer of a software compo-
nent verifies the trust level of a software component provided by himself and
• split the SML into self contained subdivided SMLs, where one subdivided SML
corresponds to one software component.
Validator
Validator
Prover
Validator
TPM
Verifier
Figure 5.1: Distributed Integrity Validation Architecture
Using this approach, the trust level of a prover can be validated without transferring
the complete SML to one single entity. In addition, the structure that describes the
platform configuration is split into different parts. Only the possession of all parts of the
subdivided SML enable the discovery of the whole platform configuration of a specific
entity.
This chapter is organized as follows. We first present the notation used in this chap-
ter in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we present the basic idea of our distributed integrity
validation architecture and give a high level description of our approach, explaining the
different associated algorithms. In Section 5.4, we present our architecture’s security
protocol, which provides freshness and authenticity of software integrity values. Section
5.5 provides a security analysis of our architecture. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.6.
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5.2 Notation
We use the following notation throughout this chapter.
P The complete SML as matrix. The matrix has the form
P =
(
m1 m2 m3
m4 m5 −
)
. (5.1)
Each row of P represents the measurements performed inside a platform
configuration register. For example, m1,m2,m3 are the measurements
measured to PCR[0]. A − inidicates that no further measuremens oc-
cured in this register.
C The matrix containing all events that were measured in platform con-
figuration registers. It is a single-column matrix where the first entry
denotes the hash-value stored in PCR[0]. The second entry holds the
hash value stored in PCR[1] and so on. C can be generated based on P
by successively hashing each entry in one row of P by using the classical
PCR comutation function (Equation 2.1). C is typically implemented as
a TPM PCR COMPOSITE structure in a TPM.
Sig(C) The signed C matrix that provides proof of authenticity of software in-
tegrity values.
n The platform configuration register number n.
i The i-th measurement event.
Pn,i An entry of P where n is the platform configuration register number
n, i.e., the row-index, and i is the i-the measurement event, i.e., the
column-index.
R All measurements occured after Pn,i. R is always a single-row matrix.
Rj One entry of matrix R. This is simply a hash-value.
L is a hash-value and denotes all measurements before occurance of the
measurement event Pn,i. It is computed by L = h(Lold || inext).
h(.) A one way hash function, i.e., SHA1.
M is a single-column matrix that holds the signature of the validator on a
specific hash-value. One entry of the matrix is referenced with Mj .
T is a structure where trusted reference values for a specific application
are stored. This structure is needed for the validator to verify whether
a specific measurement can be validated as trusted.
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5.3 Ticket-Based Attestation
A SML-structure is basically divided into two parts. The first part reflects the pre-
kernel measurement stage (BIOS and TPM-GRUB Boot Loader) while the second part
reflects the post-boot measurement stage, as for example, measured by IBM’s integrity
measurement architecture (IMA) [142]. We performed analysis of the distribution of
measurements and the amounts of measurements in both stages. Our analysis shows
that a large number of software components are software components coming from one
software producer or one software distributor. This is especially true for the pre-kernel
measurements, i.e., measurement 1-63, which belong to the BIOS and can be easily
verified by the software producer of the BIOS. Thus, it is obvious to combine these
measurements into one measurement and represent this combined measurement as a
composed hash-value. As a result, the complete SML could be splitted into multiple
parts, where one part is represented by a composed hash-value, i.e., the sum of all hash
values which can be validated by the same validator. A validator can then validate all
measurements used to compose the hash-value and certify the composed hash-value,
stating that all measurements are trusted.
In the following, we again call the platform that wants to attest to the contents of
its platform register as the prover. The platform that receives some sort of measure-
ments and validates the trust level of the prover is referred to as the validator. The
validator issues some sort of ticket that states that a specific measurement or a set of
measurements is trusted. This ticket can then be transferred to a verifier to prove that
the platform of the prover is trusted.
5.3.1 High-Level Description
The hierarchy of our proposed SML structure is shown in Figure 5.2. The complete
SML, which clearly describes the integrity of a platform, is composed of an implemen-
tation specific number of subdivided SMLs where each sub-SML describes all software
components measured in one particular platform configuration register. For each SML,
there again exists one atomic SML-entry that is related to each software integrity metric
and measured in one PCR. We refer to this atomic measurement entry as a measurement
event.
To validate the trust level of a specific platform, the prover transmits all measure-
ment events of a specific PCR, together with the hash-value of the PCR to the entity
that can make a trust decision for the measurement related software component, i.e.,
the software producer or some sort of software validator. The deciding entity then
compares the measurement with trusted reference values that he manages and verifies
whether this measurement was used to calculate the received value of the PCR. If the
verification succeeds, the validator creates a special purpose data structure that vouches
for the trust level of the software measurement. This special purpose data structure
must be cryptographically protected and bound to the platform that provided the plat-
form integrity values in order to ensure freshness, authenticity and confidentiality. For
the sake of simplicity, we view this structure as a signature created by the validator
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SML
sub-SML for 
PCR[0]
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Measurement Value (fingerprint == SHA1) Filename Type
AE1BC1746AFD2AC1ECD1D9EEEAEBD125A6A9EB8D libdl-2.3.2.so library
Figure 5.2: Hierarchy of the SML
on a specific measurement event and refer to it as ticket. We will discuss the detailed
syntax of this structure and the security mechanisms in Section 5.4. If a special purpose
data structure can be obtained for every measurement, a verifier can validate that the
platform configuration is trusted.
5.3.2 Integrity Reporting Algorithm
In the following, we present in detail how the proposed concept of Section 5.3 can be
realized. For this purpose, we assume that a system wants to report to another entity
that it is in a trusted system configuration without revealing the complete system
configuration to the verifier. A measurement engine runs on the system of the prover
and has generated the matrix P (which is simply the SML). The prover then wants to
receive from the validators a ticket that proves that his system is in a trusted state.
To prevent that each validator receives the complete matrix P (which would reveal the
complete system configuration of the prover), the prover compresses the hash values, so
that a specific validator only receives the part of P that he needs to receive in order to
make a trust decision. For this purpose, the prover compresses the measurements and
generates L.
L is generated as follows. All measurements (1, . . . , i− 1) that occured before mea-
surement event number i can be compressed into one hash-value by iteratively com-
puting the function L = h(Lold || i − 1) with i > 2. This process increases privacy
since a validator cannot compute the pre-image of hi−1 so as to determine the exact
measurement event i − 1. However, since the used SHA1 hash-function h is not ho-
momorph and non-associative under the concatenation operation, i.e., h(a) ||h(b) 6=
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h(a || b) and h(a || b) || c 6= h(a || (b || c)), we cannot analogously compress R into one
hash-value. Before we present the algorithm that realizes this description, we will first
explain the basic scheme using a simple example.
Suppose the following 160-bit SHA1 measurements m1,m2,m3,m4,m5 were mea-
sured on a system. Measurements m1 to m3 have been measured into PCR[0] and
m4,m5 have been measured into PCR[1], i.e., PCR[1] holds the value k = h(m4||m5).
Thus, the matrix P is of the following form:
P =
(
m1 m2 m3
m4 m5 −
)
(5.2)
For each entry in matrix P, the matrix R and the hash-value L are computed. The
scheme starts with the first entry of PCR[0]. Thus, P0,0 = m1, L = (), indicating an
empty matrix, and R = ( m2 m3 ). The hash-value P0,0 = m1,R, L, and Sig(C) are
transferred to a specific validator. If P0,0 is trusted, the validator delivers a signature
on m1 back to the prover. The second measurement P0,1 = m2 yields L = m1 and
R = ( m3 ). P0,1,R, L, Sig(C), and the signature on m1 are transferred to a specific
validator. If P0,1 is trusted, the validator delivers a signature on h(m1||m2) back to the
prover. The third measurement P0,2 = m3 yields L = h(m1||m2) and R = (). The hash-
value P2,0 = m3,R, L, Sig(C) and the signature on h(m1||m2) are again transferred to
a validator. If P0,2 is trusted, the validator delivers a signature on h(h(m1||m2)||m3)
back to the validator and this signature is placed in M0. The algorithm continues with
P1,0 = m4 and keeps on running until all measurements are transferred to a validator.
The algorithm for reporting the integrity of a prover to a certain validator is shown in
Algorithm 1. This algorithm processes each recorded measurement event and transfers
the corresponding measurement event Pn,i, the hash-value of all previous measurements
L, a signature of all previous measurements Sig(L), all following measurements R and
Sig(C) to a validator.
The algorithm requires the SML matrix P, Sig(C), and the number of platform
configuration registers a, i.e., (PCR[0,. . . , a]), as input. As output, the algorithm re-
turns the matrixM, where each entry of matrixM holds a signature of a 160-bit hash
value. The algorithm returns (RET FAIL) if the validation failed and (RET SUCCESS) if
the validation was successful.
Algorithm 1 uses the functions getMeasurement(Pn,k), which simply returns the
160-bit measurement of measurement event Pn,k, and getValidator(Pn,i), which re-
turns the unique identifier of the software producer or the validator of measurement
event Pn,i. This process is analogous to the TCG-defined SML verification and can,
for example, be accomplished by a public database that includes information about the
validator and their supplied software. The function getNumberofSMLs(P, n) returns the
number of measurement events that were recorded into PCR[n].
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Integrity Reporting
Input : P,Sig(C) , a
Output: RET SUCCESS+M | RET FAIL +Pn,i
M := 0
for n := 0 to a do
L, Sig(L) := 0
R := 0
i := 0
while i ≤ getNumberofSMLs(P, n) do
for j := i+ 1 to getNumberofSMLs(P, n) do
Rj := getMeasurement(Pn,j)
Vn,i := getValidator(Pn,i)
Transmit (Pn,i , n, i, R , L,Sig(C), Sig(L)) to Vn,i
Wait until Vn,i replies
if reply != Sig(L) or reply = ”not trusted” then
return (RET FAIL; Pn,i)
if L = 0 then
L := h(getMeasurement(Pn,i))
else
L := h(L || getMeasurement(Pn,i)
i+ +
R := 0
Mn :=Sig(L)
return (RET SUCCESS; M)
5.3.3 Integrity Validation Algorithm
The algorithm for integrity validation is executed by the validator. The algorithm
verifies whether:
• the reported software measurement is consistent with one trusted reference soft-
ware integrity measurement and thus included in T ,
• the signature of Sig(C) is valid, stating that Sig(C) was created by an authentic
TPM,
• the signature of Sig(L), which was created by the previous validator is valid,
stating that all software components that were measured before Pn,i are trusted,
and
• the reported software measurement is a component used to generate Sig(C) and,
thus, part of the platform configuration of the prover.
The integrity validation algorithm requires the output of Algorithm 1 as well as a set
of trusted reference values T as input. It creates a special purpose signature structure
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Sig(L), which states that the measurement event Pn,i and all previous measurements
are trusted. The detailed syntax and the security mechanisms of the structure Sig(L)
are discussed in Section 5.4. Before we present the algorithm, we again explain the
basic scheme using an example. For this purpose, we continue the example from above.
Suppose P0,0 = m1,R, L and Sig(C) have been received by a specific validator.
The validator first checks that m1 is included in T and, thus, is consistent with a
trusted reference software integrity measurement. The validator then verifies whether
Sig(C) was created on an authentic TPM by verifying Sig(C) and whether Sig(L) was
created by a known validator. Then, the validator tries to recompute C in order to
check that P0,0 is part of the signature. For this purpose, the validator computes
V = h(h(m1||m2)||m3) and uses the public-key of the prover to verify that V is equal
to C. If everything checks out, the validator computes a signature on m1 by computing
L = h(L||m1) and signing L with his private key. The signature on L, Sig(L) is then
transferred back to the prover.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for Integrity Validation
Input : Pn,i , i,R , L,Sig(L)Sig(C), T
Output: RET FAIL +Pn,i | RET SUCCESS + Sig(L)
if getMeasurement(Pn,i)∈ T then
if VerifySig(Sig(C)) and VerifySig(Sig(L)) then
V := h(L || getMeasurement(Pn,i))
L := h(L || getMeasurement(Pn,i))
for j = i+ 1 to MaxNumber(R) do
V := h(V ||Rj)
if V = getPCRMeasurement(Sig(C), n) then
Create Sig(L)
return RET SUCCESS; Sig(L)
return RET FAIL ; Pn,i
The algorithm for integrity validation is shown in Algorithm 2. It uses the function
VerifySig(Sig(C)) and VerifySig(Sig(L)). Both simply verify that the signature of
Sig(C), and the signature of all previous measurements are valid. It returns RET SUCCESS
if all checks succeed. The function MaxNumber(R) returns the number of measurement
events in R and getPCRMeasurement(Sig(C), n) returns platform configuration register
n’s 160-bit hash value used to compute the signature over all platform configuration
registers.
5.3.4 Performance Optimizations
Our proposed algorithms work well if the trust level of a system is represented by a
small number of measurements. If the system is characterized by a large number of
software components running on the machine, such as in a complex open and non-
resource constraint operating system environment, the process gets too complex and
5.3. TICKET-BASED ATTESTATION 81
is, thus, impractical. In addition, it seems unlikely and impractical that the validator
of the measurement mi is able and willing to validate the signature of the previous
measurement mi−1; thus, certifying that all software components measured before mi
are trusted.
To overcome these restrictions and to provide performance optimizations, we assume
that each platform configuration register is validated by one validator. This is a legit-
imate assumption, since future next-generation secure operating system environments,
that are either based on a virtual machine monitor [67, 20, 156] or on a microkernel
[68, 137, 101] provide better isolation and also measured execution environments. In
particular, these secure operating system environments enable establishing a Dynamic
Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM) [38, 6, 92]. A DRTM effectively removes the
measurements of the BIOS, ROM and Bootloader from the trust chain. It is, thus,
possible to establish a new trust chain with the DRTM as trust anchor. Additionally,
using a DRTM significantly reduces the amount of measurements necessary to clearly
describe the state of a platform, thereby causing the trust level of a specific software
component to not only depend on those software components running on the platform,
but only on software components that are part of the software component’s execution
environment.
For optimizing the performance, we divide the integrity validation into intermediate
hash-computation steps that are certified by only one validator. Since intermediate
steps are only represented by one hash-value, a verifier can hardly determine the ex-
act platform configuration. Our division is possible because all measurements by an
integrity measurement architecture are performed iteratively and represented by a hash-
chain. This means, in effect, that the value of each platform configuration register is
validated by a single validator, which causes that only one signature operation per
platform configuration register needs to be performed.
One verifier is responsible for one intermediate step and in order to verify the signa-
ture of a Sig(C), all intermediate steps must have a signature. The prover then transmits
to the verifier the signed special purpose data structures for each intermediate step as
well as Sig(C). The verifier then verifies the trust level of the prover by re-composing C
based on the information given in the intermediate attestation steps and by validating
Sig(C).
Each entry of matrix P is again denoted Pn,i and Pn denotes the n-th row vector in
P, which are actually all software integrity measurement events measured into PCR[n].
For simplicity reasons, we assume that a measurement event is only a SHA1 fingerprint
and does not include information about the filename, the type of file and so on. A
platform configuration is divided into a number of intermediate steps, which are denoted
ISn, with n = 1, . . . , x where each intermediate step is represented as a SHA1 hash-
value. One intermediate step, ISn, is composed by computing Equation (5.3) and is a
hash-value over all entries in Pn:
ISn = h( . . . h(h(Pn,0 ||Pn,1) ||Pn,2) . . .). (5.3)
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All Pn are transferred to their respective validator Vn using Algorithm 3, who computes
Equation 5.3 and creates a special purpose signature on ISn. We denote this structure
as Sig(ISn). We again explain this scheme using a simple example.
Suppose we have the 160-bit SHA1 measurements m1,m2,m3,m4,m5. Measure-
ments m1 to m3 have been measured into PCR[0] and m4,m5 have been measured into
PCR[1]. Thus, the 1-st row vector in matrix P is of the following form:
P1 =
(
m1 m2 m3
)
(5.4)
For each row vector in matrix P, the matrix Pn and Sig(C) are transferred to the
validator. For P1 the validator delivers a signature on the first intermediate step back.
This signature is simply a signature on h(h(m1 ||m2) ||m3). The algorithm continues
with P2 =
(
m4 m5 −
)
.
In the following, we only present the algorithm for integrity reporting with inter-
mediate steps as shown in Algorithm 3. The algorithm for integrity verification of
intermediate steps can be constructed analogously and is rather similar to Algorithm
1. The only difference is that validating the signatures of the previous validator can be
skipped.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm for Integrity Reporting with intermediate steps
Input : P,Sig(C) , a
Output: RET SUCCESS+ M | RET FAIL +Pn,i
M := 0
for n := 0 to a do
Vn := getValidator(Pn)
Transmit (Pn, Sig(C)) to Vn
Wait until Vn replies
if reply != Sig(ISn) or reply = ”not trusted” then
return (”Validation failed on”; Pn,i)
Mn := Sig(ISn).
return (RET SUCCESS; M)
5.3.5 Integrity Verification
If the prover’s platform is trusted, he has received, for each intermediate step, a signa-
ture of the form Sig(ISn). To prove to a certain verifier that his platform has received
attestation and is, thus, trusted, he transfers the matrixM together with Sig(C) to the
verifier. The verifier verifies that all signatures of Sig(ISn) with n = 1, . . . , a are valid
and that Equation 5.5 and 5.6 holds.
t = h( IS0 || IS1 || IS2 || . . . || ISn) (5.5)
t
?= E(KAIK ,Sig(C)) (5.6)
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The verification can be computed using Equation (5.6) because Sig(C) is a signed
TPM PCR COMPOSITE structure [168] which is computed by simply concatenating all hash-
values of the platform configuration and then computing the signature of the hash-value
([168], pp. 69). Using Equation (5.6) for the verification computation provides privacy
to the platform configuration of the prover because his platform configuration is only
represented by hash-values and no SML needs to be transferred.
5.4 Security Mechanisms
In the last sections, we presented the basic concept of dividing a complete SML into
smaller self-contained parts and showed how this concept can be used to provide a proof
of the trust level of a system. We also presented the algorithms that can be used to
realize this concept. However, this concept requires security mechanisms and a special
type of attestation. In this section, we present the necessary security mechanisms that
enable using our proposed concept. The protocol proposed herein is based on the
same foundation as Protocol 4.4.6, which we already presented in Chapter 4. Thus,
it satisfies Requirement 1 and Requirement 3 of a secure attestation channel. For
simplicity reasons, we do only present the main protocol steps without negotiation of
an additional symmetric key between verifier and prover. However, the protocol can be
easily extended with the necessary steps of negotiating a key (e.g., by adapting steps (1)
- (4) of Protocol 4.4.6 into the protocol). The integration of the necessary steps is trivial
and, hence, omitted here. As a result, Requirement 2 is satisfied if an additional key-
establishment is integrated inside the protocol. Under that circumstances, an attacker
cannot eavesdrop on the communication channel and learn P .
The ticket-based attestation protocol is shown in Protocol 5.4.1. The protocol only
provides one possible realization of the concepts introduced in this chapter. Since the
creation of a TPM-bound key might result in performance degradation (Compare Sec-
tion 3.5.3), the security mechanism could also be adapted depending on the application
scenario. We will, for example, use a modified version (adapted to e-commerce) of this
protocol in Chapter 9.
Protocol 5.4.1: Ticket-based Attestation
SUMMARY: Secure integrity reporting with integrity verification and ticket issuing
RESULT: Ticket-based attestation: key-establishment with key-confirmation
1. Notation.
Vn denotes a validator with n ∈ {1, . . . , a}
B is the prover
A denotes a verifier
Pn denotes the n-th row of matrix P, i.e., a part of the SML
2. System Setup.
Vx and A must acquire (and validate) the certificate of the Privacy-CA to validate
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Cert(AIK, KAIK)
B must acquire (and validate) the certificates of V n to verify Sig(ISn)
3. Protocol messages of the certification phase.
V n ← B : Cert(AIK, KAIK), Pn, Cert(TK, KTK) (I)
V n → B : {Sig(ISn)}KTK (II)
4. Protocol messages of the attestation phase.
A ← B : M, Cert(AIK, KAIK), Cert(TK, KTK) (1)
A → B : {Na, KAB}KTK (2)
A ← B : {Na}KAB (3)
5. Protocol actions.
(a) Precomputation and Pre-deployment by B. B creates a non-migratable TPM
key (KTK) that is bound to a specific set of platform configuration registers.
B certifies KTK with K−1AIK . The resulting structure is denoted Cert(TK,
KTS) and includes a TPM PCR INFO structure which gives an assertion to
which PCRs KTK is bound. The AIK signed TPM PCR COMPOSITE structure
Sig(C) is also part of this certificate.
(b) B executes Algorithm 3 which transfers for each platform configuration reg-
ister, the corresponding Pn in message (I) to the verifier responsible for
validating Pn.
(c) V n verifies whether the intermediate step is trusted using Algorithm 2. For
this purpose, V n verifies all signatures and validates whether all entries of
Pn are trusted. In addition, B verifies whether he can re-construct the C
used to generate Sig(C) using Equation (5.1).
(d) V n computes Equation 5.1 and 5.2 and transfers message (II) to B.
ISn = h( . . . h(h(Pn,0 ||Pn,1) ||Pn,2) . . .), (5.1)
Sig(ISn) = {timestamp, Certifier, ISn,KTK}K−1Vn . (5.2)
B has now received a set of Sig(ISn) which is denotedM and can subsequently be
used by B to prove that he obtained attestation. After completing the certification
phase, B is ready to answer attestation requests.
(a) To prove to A that B has obtained attestation, he transfers message (1) to
A.
(b) A verifies whether he can re-construct a TPM PCR INFO structure using the
information transferred in M. If the re-constructed TPM PCR INFO structure
is consistent to the one transmitted in Cert(TK, KTK) and the signature
validation of Cert(TK, KTK) succeeds, the matrix M is untampered and
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all measurements of M are also reflected inside the PCRs of the TPM. A
then verifies all signatures and that he trusts the validator Vn to certify
Vn, ∀n ∈ {1 . . . a}. In addition, B verifies that the key KTK is a TPM
bound key which is bound to the platform configuration registers certified
by Vn. If all checks succeed, A creates a non-predictable nonce Na and a
session key KAB. B then transfers message (2) to B.
(c) B is only able to decrypt message (2) if his current platform configuration still
matches the platform configuration when the key KTK was first generated.
B decrypts message (2) and uses KAB to transfer message (3) to A.
(d) A verifies the freshness of Na. If this holds, B has provided a proof that he
obtained attestation and that his current platform configuration is consistent
to the platform configuration certified by Vn, ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , a} .
5.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we perform an analysis of the security mechanisms of Protocol 5.4.1.
The security of Protocol 5.4.1 relies on the assurance that a specific non-migratable
TPM key, satisfying certain criteria, is used. This assurance is made using a certificate
generated through TPM CertifyKey. It has already been verified by Lo¨hr et al. [103],
Sadeghi et al. [137] and Stumpf et al. [160] that this concept enables secure integrity
reporting. We will, thus, only verify that our proposal provides the same security as
[103, 137, 160].
5.5.1 Certification Phase
This section analyzes whether our proposed concept can be used to validate the trust
level of a complete system.
The state of a TPM-enhanced platform is reflected by the values of a set of platform
configuration registers. To transmit a set of platform configuration registers and to at-
test to their contents, a signed structure Sig(C), of the form
Sig(C) = {PCR[0] || PCR[1] ||PCR[2] || PCR[3] || . . .}K−1AIK is created. We again assume,
for simplicity reasons, that Pn,i denotes the i-th 160-bit measurement measured in plat-
form configuration register n. Each PCR holds a 160-bit hash value, which is composed
of a hash-value of the form hPn,i = h(hPn,i−1 ||Pn,i). Each validator of a PCR receives
Pn, which is the n-th row of matrix P. A validator verifies that the received Pn is
trusted by comparing it with reference values. He can then construct C, by computing
Equation (5.1), and verify that Equations (5.2) holds. Therefore, Sig(C), can be rewrit-
ten as S = {h(h( . . . h(h(P0,0||P0,1)||P0,2) . . .) || PCR[1] || PCR[2] || PCR[3] || . . .)}K−1AIK .
Each validator of a PCR receives Pn which is the n-th row of matrix P.
C = h (PCR[n-1] ||h(. . . h(h(Pn,i−1 ||Pn,i) ||Pn,i+1) . . .) || PCR[n+ 1] . . .), (5.1)
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C ?= E(KAIK ,Sig(C)). (5.2)
If, for every verifier n, all Pn,i are trusted, and for each verifier, Equation 5.2 holds,
the complete system is trusted. This holds since E(KAIK ,Sig(C)) = h(. . . h(h(. . .
h(h(Pn,i−1 ||Pn,i) ||Pn,i+1) . . .)||h(h(Pn+1,i−1 ||Pn+1,i) ||Pn+1,i+1) . . .)|| . . . ).
Each verifier creates a ticket of the form {timestamp, Certifier, ISn,KTK}K−1Vn , which
certifies a specific intermediate step, i.e., PCR, as trusted. Only the possession of all
tickets enables a clear description of the state of a platform. If a ticket is missing or
one or more tickets are issued for a key other than KTK , the complete platform is in
an untrusted state. Replaying an old ticket or relaying it to another platform is not
possible, since the ticket is bound to a specific key KTK and, thus, only usable on the
platform where KTK is located. Since this key is also protected by a hardware TPM,
it is hard for an attacker to extract this key.
5.5.2 Attestation Phase
To enable proving that a platform configuration is trusted, the prover transfers the
matrixM, which contains all Sig(ISn) with n ∈ {1, . . . , a} to the verifier. The verifier
validates that all entries have a valid signature and that he trusts the certifier to create
signatures on a specific hash-value. It is thus important that there exists a public-
key infrastructure, that makes a certifier liable for their issued tickets. Otherwise,
it would be possible for a malicious certifier to certify unknown or malicious hash-
values. However, it should be noted that this problem also arises within the TCG-
defined SML validation. The TCG-defined SML validation requires so-called Reference
Integrity Metric (RIM) Certificates [172] which are signed by a trusted certifier and are
comparable to the ticket we introduced in Section 5.2. Therefore the TCG-defined SML
validation process does not provide better security or liability than our approach.
A general goal for an attacker in the process of platform attestation is to try to
replay an unfresh platform configuration, so as to masquerade an untrusted platform
configuration as trusted. For this purpose, the attacker could try to generate multiple
keys, KTK , which are bound to a broad, diverse set of non-trusted platform configura-
tions. He could then execute the certification phase of Protocol 5.4.1, trying to collect
as many Sig(ISn) as possible, with all keys he generated previously. Afterwards, he
tries to compose a complete M using the answers of the validators. However, since for
each key only a subset of ISn is trusted, he would not be able to compose a complete
M belonging to only one specific KTK . Thus, if he were to use his composed M to
prove to a certain verifier that he obtained attestation, the validator could detect this
attack since not all tickets have been issued for the same key KTK .
Another attack could involve a verifier creating a bound key KTK in a non-trusted
platform configuration. He could then collect and store all Sig(ISn) that he is able to
obtain under this platform configuration. Note that he would not get a certificate for
each ISn, since his platform is not trusted. The attacker could then change into an
untrusted platform configuration where the missing IS is trusted. He would then try to
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re-generate the same key KTK but under the new platform configuration. This would
enable him to compose a complete M, which would state that his complete platform
configuration is trusted. However, this attack fails, since the attacker has to use the
true random number generator of the TPM and it is computationally infeasible to again
compute the same key KTK .
Replay, relay, or man-in-the-middle attacks on the ticket Sig(ISn) are not successful,
since the ticket is bound to a specific key KTK . Attacks of this type are detected by
the challenge-response phase accomplished in steps (2) and (3). If the verifier is not
trusted for generating the session key KAB, Protocol 5.4.1 can be easily extended by
using a Diffie-Helman-based key-establishment as, for example, proposed in Chapter 3.
Our proposed solution does not reveal the exact platform configuration to a verifier,
because the trust-level of a platform configuration is represented by a set of signed
hash-values. Since each hash-value is computed based on Equation (5.1) and the used
hash-function is pre-image resistant, it is computationally infeasible to find the input
parameters of the pre-image. However, the signature of the validator permits drawing
conclusions concerning the software application running on the prover’s platform. If,
for example, only one validator is responsible for ticket issuance of one software appli-
cation and, thus, one measurement event, a validator can rediscover that this specific
application is running on the prover’s platform. To alleviate this problem, blinded sig-
natures combined with zero-knowledge proofs [85, 28, 23] could be used. This approach
would enable each validator to obtain a certificate on a blinded public key and, thus, to
embed the public key into a public key hierarchy. The verifier could then validate that
a specific public key is part of a key hierarchy without directly recovering the identity
of the validator. However, the exact specification of such a cryptographic certification
protocol is not part of this thesis and remains for future work.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a distributed integrity validation architecture that allows
outsourcing the attestation process. Our approach enables dividing a whole platform
configuration into self-contained, independent parts. All independent parts are trans-
ferred to independent validators in order to verify the trust level of one self-contained
part. Since all independent parts can be combined to represent the whole platform
configuration, a platform can prove its complete trust level to a second entity by trans-
ferring all independent and validated parts. For our proposed concept, we also presented
a security protocol that provides freshness and authenticity of software integrity val-
ues and prevents an adversary from masquerading an untrusted platform configuration.
Our proposed protocol is secure, since it is based on the property of a non-migratable
key bound to a specific platform configuration. While our protocol is rather imprac-
tical if it is used in very complex non-constraint operating systems characterized by
a large amount of measurements, it is utilizable in next-generation operating system
environments based on virtualization or in embedded systems. In these environments,
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the trust level of a platform can be represented by a small number of measurements,
thereby making our proposed solution to be reasonable practical.
Chapter 6
Lightweight Attestation
In this chapter, we show how attestation techniques can be realized in systems with
very low computation power. This chapter shares some material with: Detecting Node
Compromise in Hybrid Wireless Sensor Networks using Attestation Techniques [96].
6.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters, we have seen how the trusted platform module can be used
to establish secure attestation channels. The protocols proposed therein require asym-
metric cryptography and a relative high computation power to compute and establish
shared keys, which enable establishing an authentic attestation channel. In addition,
these protocols have an intrinsic complexity as some sort of validation entity has to de-
termine the trust level of a particular communication partner using the complex SML.
We referred to this process as explicit attestation (compare Section 3.2). The explicit
attestation may be very complex, especially when many software components are in-
volved and are represented by the SML. To make a statement of the trust level of a
certain platform, it is necessary that the manufacturer of a particular software provides
trusted reference values, with which the SML can be processed and the resulting values
be re-computed. If one manufacturer is not providing reference values for a particular
process, or the SML contains a process to which no trusted reference value can be found,
the complete software system should be declared as being not trusted. Thus, this flexi-
bility of being able to report a big amount of measurements is also its major drawback.
However, in resource-constrained systems or systems with very low computation power,
such as wireless sensor networks or embedded systems, a complex attestation process
that is based on asymmetric cryptography is impractical. With respect to attestation
techniques, these systems are characterized by two issues:
1. These systems do often not possess enough computation power to perform asym-
metric cryptography.
2. The software configuration of these systems often does not change during their
whole lifetime.
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In this chapter, we propose two lightweight TPM-based attestation protocols for
resource-constrained systems. These protocols allow performing an implicit attestation
by utilizing the fact that the software configuration of resource-constrained systems
often does not change during their whole lifetime. Our proposed protocols enable a low-
cost node to verify the trust level of another node which possesses more computation
power and which are equipped with a Trusted Platform Module. Both protocols do not
require expensive public key cryptography and the exchanged messages are very short.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce the setting of our
work. In this context, we present two application scenarios for lightweight attestation
techniques and show for each scenario that there is a need for using attestation tech-
niques. In Section 6.3, we show the assumptions of our work and also explain the specific
notation we are using in this chapter. Section 6.4 is the core part of this chapter and
deals with the attestation protocols, which we propose for securing resource-constrained
systems. In Section 6.5, we analyze our proposed protocols regarding security and per-
formance and in Section 6.7, we finally present a summary of this chapter.
6.2 Setting
Due to the large scale and desired low-cost of embedded networks, it is not feasible to
integrate a TPM into each individual node. Fortunately, many embedded networks are
organized in clusters where a minority of nodes perform some special functions. We
consider such a cluster-organized network. It consists of two different types of nodes.
One type of nodes are low-cost cluster nodes (CNs) and the other type of nodes are
more expensive super nodes (SNs) which are additionally equipped with a TPM. TPM-
equipped nodes act as super node for a number of low-cost cluster nodes. The super
nodes possess more computation power and perform a number of special operations
such as data aggregation or key-management for the cluster nodes in their vicinity.
In the following, we present two different scenarios for this setting. We will also
show for each scenario, why there is a need for applying attestation techniques and
which threats evolve in these scenarios.
6.2.1 Scenario: Wireless Sensor Networks
A perfect example for a network that can be organized in clusters are Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) [2]. These networks provide a technological basis for many differ-
ent security-critical applications, such as military surveillance, critical infrastructure
protection and surveillance. WSNs can be deployed in unattended and even hostile
environments for monitoring the physical world. The monitored environment is covered
by hundreds or even thousands of sensor nodes with embedded sensing, computation,
and wireless communication capabilities. If sensor nodes are not specially protected,
an adversary can easily compromise them, recover information (e.g., keying material)
stored on the nodes, and subvert them to act as authorized nodes in the network to
perform insider attacks.
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Figure 6.1 shows a cluster of a wireless sensor network. The figure shows a num-
ber of different cluster nodes, realized by the Berkeley Mica Motes [41] as they are
communicating with one Stargate platform [42] acting as super node.
Figure 6.1: Cluster of a Wireless Sensor Network
Especially a super node is a valuable target for an adversary since these nodes
perform some special operations and also possess all cryptographic keys of all sensor
nodes in the vicinity. If an adversary is able to compromise one super node, thus,
getting access to all stored cryptographic keys, he can easily frame all sensor nodes in
his vicinity and also easily inject bogus data to the network. If an adversary would
have compromised only one cluster node, injecting false reports into the network would
be much more difficult, as the super node may verify whether other nodes also report
the same event before he transmits the report to the sink. An adversary can therefore
inflict substantial damage to the whole network, by only compromising one super node.
A sensor network consisting of super nodes and cluster nodes can be deployed ran-
domly, e.g., via aerial scattering. That means the immediate neighboring nodes of any
sensor node are not known in advance. Super nodes and cluster nodes communicate
with each other through a multihop communication, which is caused amongst others
by the limited power supply of each node. The sensed data is sent via multihop com-
munication to the sink. The sink is assumed not to be constrained in its resources and
cannot be compromised. It possesses all keying material shared with the sensor nodes.
6.2.2 Scenario: Embedded Systems
Besides wireless sensor networks, cluster-organized networks are increasingly being used
in the realm of embedded systems and processors, where a number of nodes with small
computation power communicate with other embedded controllers that possess more
computation power. Since embedded controllers are more and more integrated in nearly
every electronic device. Examples can be found in the whole transportation systems
from planes to vehicles. Automotive safety systems such as the anti-lock braking system
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(ABS), Electronic Stability Control (ESC/ESP), and automatic four-wheel drive are
other examples which are realized by embedded systems. The communication between
these systems is not necessarily realized through a wireless connection, but through
hard wired bus connections. The messages are generated by sensors or other controllers
and are exchanged through a wide variety of different bus-systems, such as CAN [82],
Flexray, and MOST [48]. To enable the different controllers on different bus-systems
to communicate with each others, gateways are used to transfer messages to different
bus-systems. These gateways manage the protocol conversions and also perform some
special tasks, such as filtering messages, interpreting messages as well as performing
routing and transmission of network messages on the different in-vehicle serial bus sys-
tems. These gateways are realized through microcontrollers, such as the 32-bit ARM7
microcontroller with IVN gateway functionality from Philips [122] and have a relatively
high computation power (around 60 Mhz). These gateways also provide a programming
interface through a serial port and can, thus, be re-programmed very easily [43]. How-
ever, no software protection methods are in place, and if an attacker is in possession
of a controlling device, he can easily re-program the gateways of a vehicle. To make
matters worse, no mechanisms are in place to protect messages while they are sent over
the different bus-systems [113]. An attacker can, hence, eavesdrop on all traffic, inject
packets, or replay old packets.
In the following, the gateways are also referred to as super node, since they perform
similar operations as the super node in the scenario of WSN. In contrast to WSNs, super
nodes (i.e., gateways) used in the automotive realm are very vulnerable to attacks, due
to the severe consequences a faulty gateway can inflict. An attacker could, for example,
re-program one gateway which would result in serious threats. Simply imagine wrong
brake signals or wrong stearing commands inflicted by a faulty gateway.
In contrast to the WSN scenario, the multihop communication is sparingly used
in embedded systems. That is mainly caused by the fact that embedded networks
seldomly cover wide areas. Thus, direct hard-wired connections or bus systems are
often available. However, we will assume that multihop communication can also be
applied in embedded systems, because the multihop communication provides a higher
flexibility and more general solutions. Attestation protocols that enable secure integrity
validation in multihop communication also enable secure integrity validation in a one-
hop communication, but not vice versa.
We will mainly explain our proposed security mechanisms and the attestation pro-
tocols using the WSN scenario. However, all our developed security mechanisms can
also be used in this scenario.
6.3 Assumptions
We assume that CNs are very limited in their storage and have low computational,
communication, and/or energy resources. However, they have enough space to store a
few bytes of keying information and are able to perform some basic operations, such
as computing hash functions, symmetric encryption, etc. However, they are not able
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to perform public key cryptography. The exact characteristic of such a node depends
on the scenario. A node in the WSN scenario, for example, might be comparable to
the Berkeley Mica Motes [41] and is very limited in its energy resources. In contrast, a
node in the embedded systems scenario might not be that limited in its energy resources,
since it does not necessarily depend on an own autonomic power supply.
SNs are assumed to possess much more computing power, memory capacity, and
energy resources, e.g., comparable to the resources of the Stargate platform [42] or to
the Philips gateways [122]. The TPM, integrated in the SNs, is used to protect keys and
other security related data. We do not require any modification of the TPM, such as
adding support for symmetric encryption with external data. Since present TPMs only
support internal symmetric encryption, some data must be stored temporarily in the
Random Access Memory (RAM) of a SN for further processing. For example, if the SNs
are Linux-based systems (such as the stargate platform), all necessary driver modules
and applications which allow access to the RAM should be disabled. Therefore, a static
kernel has to be configured which prohibits the dynamic reloading of modules and all
other possibilities to make a memory dump (e.g., file systems such as /proc/kcore has
to be disabled). As soon as future TPMs support symmetric encryption with external
data, the assumption that an adversary cannot access the RAM can be removed.
To subvert a SN, an adversary must re-program and reboot the node to either mod-
ify the system so that access to the RAM is possible or to access the security related
data directly. After a reboot with a modified system, the platform configuration is
changed and the access to sealed data is no longer possible. Thus, this data is neither
accessible directly to the adversary nor loaded into the RAM. To achieve the binding
of cryptographic keys to a specific platform configuration, which subsequently prevents
rebooting in a compromised system configuration, we assume that we have a reduced
measurement architecture, such as IBM’s IMA [142], that extends the trust chain spec-
ified by the TCG up to the firmware and, therefore, includes integrity measurement of
the kernel and operating system of the SN.
We assume an adversary who tries to compromise a SN to access stored information,
e.g., keying material, and misuse the node to perform insider attacks, e.g., injecting false
reports to cause false alarms. Therefore, the adversary can try to read out data or re-
program the node to behave according to the purposes of the adversary. Furthermore,
we consider an adversary based Dolev-Yao intruder model [50], who can eavesdrop on
all traffic, inject packets, or replay old packets.
Since SNs are a valuable target for an adversary, it is reasonable to equip them
with a TPM in scenarios where a high level of security is desired. CNs and a base-
station or some sort of central processing unit should be able to verify whether a SN
is still trusted, even if it is multiple hops away. We also refer to this base-station
as sink. Since CNs are very limited in their resources, attestation protocols must be
very lightweight, i.e., requiring only few, small messages and cheap operations (such as
symmetric encryption). Sensed data is sent via multihop communication to the sink.
The sink is assumed not to be constrained in its resources and cannot be compromised.
It possesses all keying material shared with the sensor nodes.
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Notation SNs are denoted as SNi, i = 1, . . . , a and the CNs are denoted as CNj , j =
1, . . . , b, where b a.
Applying a cryptographic hash function h on data m is denoted with h(m). A one-
way hash chain [98] stored on SNi is denoted with CSNi = cSNi0 , . . . , c
SNi
n . The hash
chain is a sequence of hash values of some fixed length l generated by a hash function
h : {0, 1}g → {0, 1}l where g  l by applying the hash function h successively on a seed
value cSNi0 so that c
SNi
v+1 = h(c
SNi
v ), with v = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
A specific state of a SNi is referred to as platform configuration PSNi := (PCR[0], . . . ,
PCR[p]) and is stored in the appropriate PCRs of the TPM. Data m can be cryptograph-
ically bound to a certain platform configuration PSNi by using the TPM Seal command.
Using the TPM Unseal command, the TPM releases, i.e., decrypts m only if the platform
configuration has not been modified. This concept allows an implicit attestation to be
performed without a direct validation of the PCRs by a CN. Since we are abstracting
the TPM Seal and TPM Unseal commands, we denote our commands with Seal and
Unseal. Given a non-migratable asymmetric key pair (eSNi , dSNi), we denote the seal-
ing of data m for the platform configuration PSNi with {m}
eSNi
PSNi
= Seal(PSNi , eSNi ,m).
To unseal data m it is necessary that the current platform configuration P ′SNi is equal
to PSNi : m = Unseal(P
′
SNi
= PSNi , dSNi , {m}
eSNi
PSNi
).
6.4 Attestation Protocols
In this section, we describe our two proposed protocols which enable a CN to verify the
platform configuration of a SN. These protocols represent some basic primitives which
can be used in conjunction or in more complex protocols. To verify the trust level of
received data from CNs, a SN has to perform additional mechanisms like redundancy
checks or voting schemes.
We have adapted the sealing technique provided by the TPM to implement the
implicit attestation (see Section 3.2). The characteristics of an implicit attestation do
not require transferring the platform configuration (PCR values and SML). As a conse-
quence, it is not required to satisfy Requirement 3 of a secure attestation channel which
also does only apply for the explicit attestation. Our proposed attestation protocols
consist of an initialization phase and an attestation phase. In the initialization phase
the platform configuration of a SN is trusted. All data needed to perform a successful
attestation is sealed in this phase to this platform configuration. Access to this sealed
data is only possible if the SN is in the initial specified platform configuration. Com-
promising a SN results in a different platform configuration where access to this data
is not possible. Thus, a successful attestation is no longer possible.
The first proposed protocol enables a broadcast attestation, where a SN broadcasts
its platform configuration to its CNs in periodic intervals. This enables CNs to verify
the platform configuration of the SN simultaneously. The second protocol enables a
single CN (or the sink), to either individually verify the platform configuration of a SN
using a challenge response protocol or to send data to a SN and receive a confirmation
that the data has been received correctly and that the SN is trusted.
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6.4.1 Periodic Broadcast Attestation Protocol (PBAP)
In some scenarios, many CNs perform measurements in parallel and in regular intervals.
For example, a couple of CNs monitor the temperature in a specific region of the WSN.
Another possible scenario could be that a couple of CNs realized as pressure sensor,
monitor the tire pressure in a vehicle. The measurement is performed every 10 minutes
to see the change over time. Therefore, the CNs report their measurement nearly in
parallel and in specific time intervals to their SN. As a result, it might be desirable that
all CNs are able to simultaneously verify if their SN is still trusted using a lightweight
mechanism.
The PBAP adapts the idea of µTESLA [119] to use one-way hash chains for au-
thentication and extends it to enable attestation in hybrid WSNs. The sealing function
of the TPM is used to bind a one-way hash chain to the platform configuration of a
SN. A SN releases the values of the hash chain in periodic intervals, which can be veri-
fied by its CNs. This approach satisfies Requirement 1 of a secure attestation channel
since this concept enables the CNs to verify the freshness of integrity information. The
PBAP also integrates an authentication process to validate the authenticity of integrity
information, which is achieved by exchanging cryptographic secrets between SN and the
CNs in the secure initialization phase. However, Requirement 3 is not satisfied since no
secure attestation channel is established which ensures that the further communication
is bound to the currently attested SN.
The protocol is divided into two phases. In the initialization phase the SNs and the
CNs are pre-configured before deployment. In the attestation phase SNs periodically
broadcasts an attestation message. This phase normally lasts for the whole lifetime of
the SNs.
Initialization Before SNi is deployed, it is pre-configured with a non-migratable pub-
lic key pair (eSNi , dSNi) and a SNi specific hash chain C
SNi . The seed value cSNi0 of
the hash chain is generated on SNi using the TPM’s physical random number gener-
ator and used by the CPU to perform the additional computations. SNi is assumed
to possess only one valid platform configuration, denoted as PSNi . After SNi is pow-
ered up, a measurement about each component (BIOS, bootloader, operating system,
applications) is performed, and the related values are stored in the corresponding PCR
registers. Each value of the hash chain CSNi is sealed to this platform configuration
PSNi :
{cSNi0 }
eSNi
PSNi
= Seal(PSNi , eSNi , c
SNi
0 )
{cSNi1 }
eSNi
PSNi
= Seal(PSNi , eSNi , c
SNi
1 )
.
.
.
{cSNin }
eSNi
PSNi
= Seal(PSNi , eSNi , c
SNi
n )
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Each CNj which interacts with SNi is pre-configured with the last value cSNin of the
hash chain CSNi . Since the number of SNs is very small compared to the number of
CNs, the CNs could be preprogrammed with the values of all SNs. After deployment,
the CNs can only keep the values for its SN and another certain number of SNs in their
vicinity to save memory.
Attestation Protocol 6.4.2 shows how SNi periodically broadcasts its integrity. SNi
and the associated CNs (denoted as CN∗) are loosely time synchronized. The time is
divided into intervals Iλ, λ = 1, . . . , n. At the beginning of each interval, SNi sends
a broadcast attestation message to the CNs. The attestation messages consist of the
values of the hash chain released in reversed order of the generation and the identifier
Iλ of the current interval. If the platform configuration of SNi has not been modified,
it can unseal the values of the hash chain CSNi . We will shortly explain the first
attestation starting with the first interval I1.
In the first interval I1, SNi unseals the hash value cSNin−1 and transmits it together
with the interval identifier. In the second interval cSNin−2 is unsealed and transmitted
and so on. CN∗ check if the interval I1 stated within the message matches their local
interval counter I ′1 within a certain error range. If they match, CN∗ verify whether
h(cSNin−1) = c
SNi
n . If the equation holds, SNi is considered trusted and the value c
SNi
n
is overwritten with the value cSNin−1. In the next interval SNi releases c
SNi
n−2 and so on,
which are similarly checked. The protocol is shown in Protocol 6.4.2 and repeated from
λ = 1 to n. n must be fixed before the network is deployed and large enough for
performing enough attestations. In effect, the value of n describes how many PBAP
can be performed.
Protocol 6.4.2: Periodic Broadcast Attestation Protocol
SUMMARY: The SN periodically broadcasts its integrity
RESULT: Integrity reporting
1. Notation.
Iλ denotes a time interval
SN i is a super node
CN is a cluster node
PSNi denotes the current platform configuration
2. System Setup.
SNi and the associated CNs (denoted as CN∗) are loosely time synchronized. The
time is divided into intervals Iλ, λ = 1, . . . , n.
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3. Protocol steps.
Interval Node(s) Message or Action
Iλ SNi Unseal(PSNi , dSNi , {cSNin−λ}
eSNi
PSNi
) = cSNin−λ (1)
Iλ SNi → CN∗ cSNin−λ, Iλ (2)
Iλ CN∗ Iλ
?= I ′λ (3)
Iλ CN∗ if h(cSNin−λ)
?= cSNilasthash, SNi’s state is valid (4)
Iλ CN∗ overwrite cSNilasthash with c
SNi
n−λ (5)
. . . . . . . . .
4. Protocol actions.
(a) In the first step, the super node SNi unseals the hash value cSNin−1.
(b) The hash value cSNin−1 is transmitted to all CN∗
(c) CN∗ check if the interval Iλ stated within the message matches their local
interval counter I ′λ within a certain error range.
(d) If the intervals match, CN∗ verify whether h(cSNin−λ) = c
SNi
lasthash. If the equa-
tion holds, the super node SNi is considered trusted.
(e) The value cSNilasthash is overwritten with the value c
SNi
n−λ.
If the communication between the CNs and the SN is implemented through wireless
devices, a CN could miss some messages, e.g., due to unreliable communication. Thus,
CNs should not immediately declare a SN as being untrusted but wait for a certain
threshold of time. If a CN receives messages again, it can resynchronize by applying the
hash function multiple times. Assume a CN misses the released values cSNin−1 and c
SNi
n−2 in
I1 and I2. Receiving the value cSNin−3 in I3, the node can simply resynchronize and verify
the platform configuration of SNi by applying the hash function three times on cSNin−3 and
verify whether h(h(h(cSNin−3))) = c
SNi
n . But if the node does not receive any attestation
messages after a certain number of intervals and/or the individual attestation fails, the
CN should react by declaring SNi as not trusted. CN could then, for instance, switch
to a new SN.
6.4.3 Individual Attestation Protocol (IAP)
In contrast to the PBAP, the IAP can be used to individually verify whether the plat-
form configuration of a SN is trusted. A CN needs only to perform symmetric operations
and two short messages need to be exchanged. The messages are very small, because no
long public key primitives, e.g., keys, signatures need to be transmitted. Since trans-
mitting messages is the most cost intensive factor in WSNs [190], this is of particular
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interest, especially if the sink wants to verify the platform configuration of a SN. In this
case, messages are transferred along several hops.
The protocol we propose is again divided in initialization phase and attestation
phase. The initialization phase is performed only once after deployment of the sensor
nodes while the attestation phase can be performed every time a CN (or the sink) wants
to verify the platform configuration of a SN. In the embedded world, this initialization
phase could for example performed directly before a vehicle leaves the factory site.
Initialization Each CNj establishes a shared, symmetric key KCNj ,SNi with its SNi.
For this purpose, existing (non TPM-based) techniques, e.g., [191], might be used.
However, we recommend using a key establishment protocol that uses the functionality
of a TPM, e.g., [66]. This approach has the advantage that key generation within a
TPM is inherently more secure than key generation on off-the-shelf embedded platforms.
As in [191], we assume that this short period of time to establish pairwise keys is secure
and nodes cannot be compromised. The keys KCNj ,SNi are sealed on SNi to its valid
platform configuration PSNi . Thus, SNi can only access these keys if it is in its valid
state.
To enable the sink to perform the attestation with SNi, a shared symmetric key
KSink,SNi is preconfigured on SNi before deployment and sealed likewise.
Attestation Protocol 6.4.4 shows how CNj can verify the platform configuration of
SNi. First, CNj sends a challenge to SNi. The challenge consists of an encrypted
block containing a nonce and the identifier IDCNj of CNj , and an additionally IDCNj
in plaintext. KCNj ,SNi is used for encryption. After receiving the challenge, SNi unseals
KCNj ,SNi related to IDCNj . This is only possible if the platform configuration PSNi is
valid. Using this key, SNi decrypts the encrypted block and verifies if the decrypted
identifier is equal to the identifier received in plaintext. If they match, SNi knows
that this message originates from CNj , encrypts the nonce ′ using KCNj ,SNi , and sends
it back.1 Otherwise, SNi aborts. SNi then deletes KCNj ,SNi from the RAM. CNj
decrypts the received response message and checks if the decrypted nonce ′′ matches
the nonce it has sent in the first step. If they match, SNi is declared trusted and
CNj can send data to SNi. This data is encrypted using KCNj ,SNi . The attestation
of SNi by the sink is performed likewise, using the key KSink,SNi . Protocol 6.4.4 uses
a challenge-response authentication involving the TPM to verify freshness of integrity
information and thus satisfies Requirement 1. In addition, the ID of the CN is also
injected to prevent replay attacks. Requirement 3 is also satisfied by binding further
transaction data sent over the channel to a specific cryptographic key shared between
the SNi and CNj . In contrast to the PBAP, this approach ensures authenticity of the
attestation channel and, thus, establishes a secure attestation channel.
1However, the trust level of CNj cannot be assumed, because the node could be potentially com-
promised and the key is not protected by a TPM.
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Protocol 6.4.4: Individual Attestation Protocol
SUMMARY: A CN verifies the integrity of a SN
RESULT: Integrity validation
1. Notation.
SN i is a super node
CN is a cluster node
PSNi denotes the actual platform configuration
KCNj ,SNi denotes the shared key between CNj and SNi
2. Protocol steps.
CNj → SNi : IDCNj , {nonce, IDCNj}KCNj,SNi (1)
SNi Unseal(PSNi , dSNi , {KCNj ,SNi}
eSNi
PSNi
) = KCNj ,SNi (2)
SNi D({nonce, IDCNj}KCNj,SNi ,KCNj ,SNi) = (nonce ′, ID′CNj ) (3)
SNi check ID′CNj
?= IDCNj (4)
SNi E({nonce ′, IDSNi},KCNj ,SNi) = {nonce′, IDSNi}KCNj,SNi (5)
SNi → CNj : IDSNi , {nonce′, IDSNi}KCNj,SNi (6)
SNi delete KCNj ,SNi from RAM (7)
CNj D({nonce′, IDSNi}KCNj,SNi ,KCNj ,SNi) = (nonce ′′, ID′SNi) (8)
CNj if nonce ′′
?= nonce, state of SNi is valid (9)
3. Protocol actions.
(a) In the first step, CNj transfers an encrypted nonce together with its ID
using the shared key to SNi.
(b) SNi performs the TPM Unseal command and unseals the shared key.
(c) SNi decrypts the sent message an verifies in (4) whether the ID of the
decrypted message matches the ID sent in plaintext.
(d) SNi encrypts the decrypted nonce and the ID of CNj with the unsealed key.
The obtained message is transferred to CNj in (6).
(e) SNi deletes the unsealed key from its RAM.
(f) CNj decrypts the received message and verifies (9) if the received nonce
matches the nonce sent in (1).
It might also be preferable to directly transmit data in an attestation challenge rather
than waiting until an attestation response has been received and a SN is declared
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trusted. This might be preferable in scenarios where an immediate receipt of data is
important or where CNs send data very infrequently to a SN. Therefore, the protocol
is modified in steps (1) and (3). Protocol 6.4.5 shows the resulting protocol and also
satisfies Requirement 1 and Requirement 3 of a secure attestation channel (see Chapter
3. In step (1) CNj sends the data to SNi within the encrypted block. SNi can only
decrypt this message in step (3) if its platform configuration is valid and access the data.
All other steps remain the same as shown in Protocol 6.4.4. Thus, if CNj receives the
message in step (6) and the checks in steps (7) and (8) succeed, CNj can be assured
that SNi has successfully received the data and is still trusted.
Protocol 6.4.5: Modified Individual Attestation Protocol
SUMMARY: A CN delivers data that is bound to a specific state to a SN
RESULT: Data transfer with data confirmation and integrity reporting
1. Notation.
SNi is a super node
CN is a cluster node
PSNi denotes the actual platform configuration
KCNj ,SNi denotes the shared key between CNj and SNi
2. Protocol steps.
CNj → SNi : IDCNj , {nonce, IDCNj , data}KCNj,SNi (1)
SNi Unseal(PSNi , dSNi , {KCNj ,SNi}
eSNi
PSNi
) = KCNj ,SNi (2)
SNi D({nonce, IDCNj , data}KCNj,SNi ,KCNj ,SNi) =
(nonce ′, ID′CNj , data)
(3)
SNi check ID′CNj
?= IDCNj (4)
SNi E({nonce ′, IDSNi},KCNj ,SNi) = {nonce′, IDSNi}KCNj,SNi (5)
SNi → CNj : IDSNi , {nonce′, IDSNi}KCNj,SNi (6)
SNi delete KCNj ,SNi from RAM (7)
CNj D({nonce′, IDSNi}KCNj,SNi ,KCNj ,SNi) = (nonce ′′, ID′SNi) (8)
CNj if nonce ′′
?= nonce, state of SNi is valid (9)
3. Protocol actions.
(a) In the first step, CNj transfers an encrypted nonce together with its ID and
the sensed data using the shared key to SNi.
(b) SNi performs the TPM Unseal command and unseals the shared key.
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(c) SNi decrypts the sent message and verifies in (4) whether the ID of the
decrypted message matches the ID sent in plaintext.
(d) SNi encrypts the decrypted nonce and the ID of CNj with the unsealed key.
The obtained message is transferred to CNj in (6).
(e) SNi deletes the unsealed key from its RAM.
(f) CNj decrypts the received message and verifies in step (9) whether the re-
ceived nonce matches the nonce sent in (1).
6.5 Analysis
In this section, we first discuss the security of the two proposed attestation protocols.
Then, we evaluate their performance.
6.5.1 Security Discussion
The goal of both protocols is that CNs can prove the trust level of SNs. If an adversary
compromises a SN, he cannot successfully deceive the CNs or the sink to perform insider
attacks. We distinguish between two types of possible attacks:
(1) attacks against a SN directly and
(2) en-route attacks if the communication involves multiple hops.
Due to the unreliable multihop communication and the assumption that our com-
munication channel is insecure, we can only prove the trust level of SNs. But we cannot
prove whether a node is not trusted since either communication errors can result in mo-
dified attestation messages or malicious en-route nodes can modify forwarded messages
to defame a SN. This is different to most approaches of the software-based attestation
[150, 146] where a monitored and secured communication channel is assumed. If our
communication channel is also assumed to be secure, our protocols can be used to val-
idate whether a specific SN is not trusted. However, we believe that this assumption
is too restrictive and not very appropriate. Thus, our proposed attestation protocols
do not give a statement about the trust level of a used route. In addition, an invalid
attestation could be caused either by a compromised SN or by a compromised en-route
CN.
Security of the PBAP
To compromise a SN and forge a trusted platform configuration, an adversary needs
access to the hash chain. Therefore, he has to either perform the unseal command
under a compromised platform configuration, or try to access the key used to seal the
hash chain with physical attacks. As described in Section 2.1, the TPM is basically a
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smart card and offers high security mechanisms for preventing unauthorized extraction
of protected keys. This makes it extremely difficult for an adversary to retrieve the
necessary keys to decrypt the sealed hash chain. Additionally, access to the sealed hash
chain is only possible if the platform configuration has not been modified. This prevents
the unauthorized extraction of the values of the hash chain in a compromised system
environment. Even if an adversary could access the RAM of a sensor node, he cannot
retrieve other hash values, because for each attestation only the current hash value is
unsealed and loaded into the RAM.
However, our approach cannot handle runtime attacks caused by buffer overflows,
since we report the platform configuration measured in the initialization phase, i.e.,
when the software is first executed. Such attacks would result in a (malicious) modified
system configuration, but the platform configuration stored in the PCRs is still the
valid configuration.
If the attestation is performed between nodes which are multiple hops away, an
adversary might also try to perform a man-in-the middle attack by compromising an
en-route CN. The adversary can try to spoof, alter or replay attestation messages, or
perform a selective forwarding attack [90]. Spoofing is not possible, because PBAP is
not an authentication protocol. It gives an assertion about the trust level of the spe-
cific SN and not which node has relayed the message. Altering attestation messages
is possible and results in an unsuccessful attestation. To cope with that, a CN should
possess an additional mechanism which enables the CN to reach its SN using a different
communication path or change to a different SN. The CN can then use an alternative
path and perform the IAP with the SN to make a clear statement, whether the route,
or the node has been compromised. If the SN is compromised, a CN could, for exam-
ple, switch to another SN where the communication paths and the new SN may not
have been compromised. Replay attacks or an attack where an adversary first blocks
the forwarding of legitimate hash values to collect them, then compromises a SN and
finally releases these hash values are not possible, because hash values are only valid
for a specific interval, which is validated by each CN. Since the PBAP is performed
in plaintext an adversary can distinguish between attestation and data messages and
therefore perform a selective forwarding attack by forwarding attestation messages, but
blocking data messages. Such attacks are a general problem in WSNs and show that
the PBAP is not resistant against all attacks in a multihop scenario with malicious
en-route CNs.
Security of the IAP
The security of the IAP relies on the sealing of the symmetric keys to the valid platform
configuration analogue to the sealing of the hash chain described above. Thus, an
adversary compromising a SN cannot access the necessary keys to perform a successful
attestation.
If the attestation messages are forwarded along multiple hops, an adversary can
try to perform a man-in-the-middle attack. Since the IAP includes an authentication
protocol, spoofing is not possible. A SN detects the modification of the first attestation
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message (see Protocol 6.4.4) by an en-route adversary, since the included identifier does
not match the identifier sent in plaintext. If the adversary alters the response sent to a
CN, the latter cannot distinguish if either the attestation has failed or if the message has
been altered by the adversary. Replay attacks are not possible, because a new nonce is
used in each message. Since attestation messages and data messages have the same form
(identifier plus encrypted data block), an adversary cannot distinguish between them
to perform a sophisticated selective forwarding attack. If the modified IAP is used,
where data is sent in the first step, an adversary might be able to distinguish between
this message and the response message (step 6) because of the different lengths of the
messages. To cope with that, the message sent in step 6 could be padded to the same
length.
Thus, if an attestation fails, a CN should first try to perform a new attestation
of the same SN using another communication path, if possible. If this is not possible
or the attestation fails again, either the SN or a node on the communication path is
compromised. The CN should then select a new SN, since messages sent to the old one
might be susceptible to attacks.
Furthermore, in contrast to scenarios where SNs are not equipped with a TPM, a
single compromise of a SN does not result in the compromise of all shared keys stored
on this node. Even using the TPM in only a few nodes results in a higher resiliency to
node compromise.
6.5.2 Performance Analysis
Efficiency is crucial for security protocols for WSNs as well as embedded systems because
of the limited resources of nodes. Protocols should not introduce a high storage overhead
and should not significantly increase energy consumption. Since we assume that SNs
possess sufficient resources, we perform our analysis only for the CNs. We restrict us
to only perform an analysis for the WSN scenario, since these devices typically possess
lower computation power and lesser power supply. For this purpose, we first analyze the
additional storage requirements. Next, we estimate the additional energy consumption
by evaluating the computational and communication overhead.
Storage Requirements
For the PBAP, a CN must store one hash value and the identifier for the corresponding
SN. Depending on the network configuration, it might also store hash values (and identi-
fiers) for other SNs in its vicinity. Let LN , and LH denote the length of a node identifier
and a hash value respectively. Let the number of SNs for which a CN stores values be
v. Thus, the storage requirements SRPBAP for a CN are:
SRPBAP = v ∗ (LN + LH). (6.1)
For example, suppose a CN stores values for 5 SNs. The length of each hash value is 64
bits and the length of a node identifier is 10 bits. This results in a total of 46.25 bytes.
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For the IAP, a CN must store one symmetric key for each SN with which it wants
to perform an attestation. Let this number be denoted by w and the length of a key
denoted by LK . Thus, the storage requirements SRIAP for a CN are:
SRIAP = w ∗ LK . (6.2)
For example, suppose a CN stores keys for 5 SNs. The length of each key is 64 bits.
This results in a total of 40 bytes.
The Berkeley Mica2 Mote [41] offers 4KB of SRAM. As a result, a CN of type
Berkeley Mica2 Mote can store 512 keys, giving him the ability of performing the IAP
with 512 different SNs. In case of the PBAP, he can store approx. 443 hash values,
thus, a CN is able to attest 443 different SNs using the PBAP. Therefore, the storage
requirements are suitable for current sensor nodes, even if both protocols are used in
conjunction.
Energy Consumption
The PBAP requires a CN to receive one attestation message and to perform one hash
computation at each time interval. An attestation message consists of a hash value
and an identifier of the interval, e.g., a counter. Although computing hash values only
marginally increases energy consumption [119], we consider the computational overhead,
since a hash computation is performed in each time interval.
We use e1 = e1s + e1r to denote the energy consumed in sending and receiving
one byte, and e2 to denote the energy for one hash computation. In addition to the
notation used above, let LT denote the length needed for the interval identifier. The
total number of intervals in the whole lifetime of the network is denoted with t. This
results in an additional energy consumption:
EPBAP = t ∗ ((LT + LH) ∗ e1r + e2). (6.3)
For example, suppose the lifetime of the network is one year and broadcast messages
are sent every 10 minutes. Therefore, a 16 bit counter is sufficient for numbering each
interval. We use the results presented in [190] to quantify e1s = 16.25 µJ for sending,
e1r = 12.5 µJ for receiving, and e1 = 28.75 µJ for sending and receiving one byte using
Berkeley Mica2 Motes. The energy consumed for performing one hash computation
using RC5 [127] block cipher is e2 = 15 µJ . This results in a total energy consumption
of 7358.4 mJ . The Mica2 Motes are powered with two 1.5 V AA batteries in series
connection. We assume a total capacity of 2750 mAh using standard AA batteries
which results in 29700 J . Thus, the ratio of energy consumed in one year by the PBAP
is about 0.025% of the total available energy which is negligibly small.
The IAP requires a CN to generate and send a challenge2, and the verification
of the response (see Protocol 6.4.4, steps 1, 6, 8 and 9). The challenge requires one
nonce generation, one encryption and one transmission, while the response verification
2We do not consider the case where data is sent within the challenge, because we estimate only the
additional overhead introduced by our protocol.
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requires the receipt of one message, one decryption and one comparison of two values.
As in [120], the nonce is generated using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) as
pseudo-random number generator with a generator key KrandCNj . The energy consumed
using RC5 for MAC generation is e2 = 15 µJ . The encryption cost using RC5 are
also 15 µJ . We neglect the energy cost for the comparison of two values since they are
negligibly small. Thus, the additional energy consumption is:
EIAP = 3 ∗ e2 + (e1s + e1r) ∗ (2 ∗ LN + LH). (6.4)
Assuming the values from above, this results in a total energy consumption on a CN for
one individual attestation of about 347 µJ which is 1.17 ∗ 10−6% of the total available
energy. As a result, a CN can execute the IAP approx. 85.6 million times.
Attestation
Service TPM
Figure 6.2: Communication between the TPM and an attestation service to realize the
initialization phase of the IAP
6.6 Implementation
In order to run simulations about the performance and the behavior of an attestation-
enhanced WSN in the presence of an adversary, the protocols proposed in this chapter
have been implemented [51] using tpm4java framework3 and J-SIM4. For this purpose,
3http://tpm4java.datenzone.de
4http://www.j-sim.org/
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the J-SIM environment has been modified and enhanced to support three different types
of additional nodes. The first node type is the source CN, which receives attestation
messages or creates attestation challenges and forwards them in the direction of the
SN. The second node type is a relaying node, that only receives a message and relays
this message in the direction of the SN. The third node type is the SN. All SNs run
an attestation service that is responsible for the communication to the TPM of the
SN. To execute the attestation protocols, a network consisting of these three types of
nodes is created using the J-Sim framework. Then, the attestation service running on
the SNs execute the initialization phase in which the keys (KCNj ,SNi with j ∈ 1, . . . , b)
or the hash chain (CSNi = cSNi0 , . . . , c
SNi
n ) are sealed to the initial (trusted) platform
configuration of the SN. In the following, we restrict us to shortly discuss the imple-
mentation of the IAP initialization phase. All other protocols are implemented likewise
and only require that the message is delivered to a specific node. Further details about
the implementation of these protocols can be found in [51]. Figure 6.2 shows the
involved TPM commands necessary for realizing the initialization phase of the individ-
ual attestation phase. The attestation service first establishes a TPM Object-Specific
Authorization Protocol (OSAP) session to the TPM (1). This command requires au-
thorization (owner-password and srk-password) and computes a cryptographic secret
and a handle (srkHandle) to this session (2); both to protect the whole session traffic
(Cf. [171], pp. 71). The returned handle is then used to issue the TPM CreateWrapKey
command (3). This command generates a TPM key which is used to encrypt all TPM
sealed data. This generated key is first loaded (5) and then used to seal all shared
symmetric keys between the SN and the CNs (7).
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we showed how attestation techniques can be realized in systems with
very low computation power. In this context, we presented two attestation protocols for
a network organized in clusters. The network consists of resource constrained cluster
nodes and super nodes with more resources equipped with a TPM-chip that acts as a
trust anchor. The first protocol provides a broadcast attestation, i.e., allowing a super
node to attest its system integrity to multiple cluster nodes simultaneously, while the
second protocol is able to carry out a direct attestation between a single cluster node
(or the sink) and one super node. Both protocols allow cluster nodes to verify whether
the platform configuration of a super node is trusted or not, even if they are multiple
hops away. We have also shown in this chapter, that both the overhead for storage and
the energy consumption are negligible.
Part III
Attestation-supporting Security
Architecture
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Chapter 7
Security Architecture
In this chapter, we present the security architecture for trusted transactions in highly
sensitive environments. This architecture enables leveraging attestation techniques for
trust establishment in distributed systems, so as to guarantee that the system is free of
malware and that its software has not been tampered with. Most parts of this chapter
have been previously published in An Approach to a Trustworthy System Architecture
Using Virtualization [156], Towards Secure E-Commerce Based on Virtualization and
Attestation Techniques [158] and An Architecture providing Virtualization-Based Pro-
tection Mechanisms against Insider Attacks [161]. However, these publications did not
include a detailed evaluation of the security architecture.
7.1 Introduction
In the first part of this thesis, we analyzed how attestation techniques can be used to
ensure a trusted and malware free platform. For this purpose, we proposed a number
of protocols that enable establishing secure attestation channels and can be used by a
second entity for placing trust in a remote entity’s system configuration. In this context,
we showed how secure attestation channels can be established, how the scalability of
attestation techniques can be improved, and how an efficient attestation can be realized
and the platform validation process be simplified. However, using one of these proposed
attestation protocols in an open-, non-constrained software system is impractical. This
is due to the fact that currently available and wide-spread operating systems are very
complex and not very reliable. They suffer from fundamental design flaws because of
their monolithic design concept. Monolithic operating systems tend to integrate all ser-
vices in the base kernel and, thus, overload the kernel with functionalities that run at
the highest privilege level, causing the approach to break the principle of least privilege
[143]. In addition, such systems do not provide strong isolation between execution envi-
ronments. As a result, in order to use attestation techniques to ascertain that a specific
target application is trusted, all executed software components of the operating system
need to be fully trusted, even if they have no direct impact on the target application.
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To make matters worse, it is necessary to measure all executed operating system
components, resulting in hundreds of measurements, each requiring that a trusted ref-
erence value be provided. This shows that it is not feasible to use attestation techniques
in currently available, non-constrained operating system environments.
In this chapter, we present a security architecture for non-resource constrained plat-
forms that does not possess the drawbacks of current operating systems. To this end, we
show how the security of operating system environments can be enhanced by establish-
ing multiple isolated execution environments with different trust levels. These separate
environments are created by several different virtual machines (VM) running on a single
system. This approach keeps certain instances separate, giving us the ability to attest
to one instance at a time rather than to the whole operating system environment. Like
Terra [67], we use different types of virtual machines to realize isolated compartments:
A trusted VM which is responsible for running highly sensitive code, an open VM, which
runs arbitrary software components, and a management VM, which is responsible for
spawning new VMs. Besides presenting the operating system environment, we will also
show how attestation techniques can also be used to secure the operating system en-
vironment. In this context, we will show that combining virtualization and Trusted
Computing eliminates intrinsic problems that each faces when used alone.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we present the challenges that
our security architecture must solve. Chapter 7.4 shows the basic design concepts
of our approach and Section 7.5 presents the detailed security architecture and the
security mechanisms of our approach. In Section 7.6 we show how one virtual machine
can report its integrity to a remote entity in order to establish trust in the respective
system configurations. Section 7.7 evaluates our architecture and we analyze whether
the challenges presented in Section 7.2 are solved. Finally, we summarize this chapter
in Section 7.10.
7.2 Security Challenges
In this section, we present the challenges our security architecture must solve. In this
context, we first show where subversive programs such as malware and spyware typically
attack when trying to compromise a system. Based on this foundation, we present
our considered adversary model. Finally, we will show how attestation techniques can
be used to detect whether a system is an uncompromised state and which further
restrictions need to be solved.
7.2.1 Malware Attack Points
Before we construct and present the system architecture, we will look at potential
attacks that threaten current operating systems and their applications. In this context,
we assume that a simple application that enables secure transactions between particular
platforms is running on an arbitrary operating system, such as Linux or Windows.
A particular user uses the application to enter and transfer confidential data, e.g., a
password, to a communication partner. In the following, we denote such an application
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as a secure transaction client. A transaction is, thus, the transmission of confidential
information to another communication partner. Using this scenario, we will describe
where the vulnerabilities are and present typical attack points. For this purpose, we
adapt and extend the classification that we proposed in [161] and combine it with the
classification proposed by Grawrock in [73]. The resulting classification consists of four
different categories: Software Manipulating Attacks, Hardware Attacks, Input attacks
and Output Attacks.
Software Manipulation Attacks
Software manipulation attacks try to access the memory that is allocated by the secure
transaction client to gain access to the stored password. This is the typical attack vector
of malware. These attacks mostly try to execute a malicious software component in ring
0 of the CPU. In this highest CPU privilege level, it is possible to access all running
programs, including the secure transaction client. The operating system, as well as
device drivers, typically run in this highest privilege ring. An attacker could, therefore,
try to install a malicious device driver in order to gain access to the whole memory.
Hardware Attacks
Hardware attacks are attacks that exploit the characteristic of hardware components in
order to get access to protected data. One example of such an attack is when a device
with direct memory access (DMA) is used to extract confidential data. DMA allows
hardware subsystems (especially peripherals) to directly access the system memory for
reading or writing. DMA bypasses any protection managed by the CPU and allows
access to the entire memory. Thus, an attacker can manipulate a device to perform a
malicous DMA access to a memory region currently allocated by the secure transaction
software. Note that this class of attacks does not include hardware attacks that cannot
be conducted by malware, such as, mechanical or electrical probing attacks on the
hardware components.
Manipulated Input
This class of attacks includes all attacks that occur on the software interface of in-
formation input. This comprises attacks that try to access secret data by capturing
keystrokes using software mechanisms. This can be achieved by manipulating the ex-
isting keyboard device driver or by installing a key logger. This key logger need not
necessarily be executed in ring 0 as shown in [29], but can also be executed in a lower
CPU privilege level.
Manipulated Output
This class comprises attacks that occur on the software interface of information output.
This includes attacks that are able to manipulate the output in attempt to trick the
user into entering his password into a malicious program. Typical attacks of this type
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are phishing attacks [44], screen scraping, changing the display driver, changing the
X-Server or altering transaction data [99].
In addition, server spoofing falls into this category. An attacker could try to mas-
querade a server, e.g., by redirecting the network traffic using a DNS poisoning attack
or by modifying the /etc/hosts file and, thus, force a user into entering or transferring
confidential data to this server.
7.2.2 Attacker Model
We assume an adversary who tries to access sensitive transaction data entered by a par-
ticular user into the simple application for secure transactions. The adversary is able
to perform all attacks discussed in Section 7.2.1 as well as the relay attack presented in
Chapter 3 to circumvent potentially used attestation techniques. However, the adver-
sary is not able to perform attacks that require physical access to the machine. We also
assume that the attacker is not able to find collisions of the hash-function used by the
TPM and that the hash-function is 2nd pre-image resistant [131], i.e., it is infeasible for
an attacker to find for a given x another x′ with the characteristic that f(x) = f(x′),
where f is the cryptographic hash-function.
7.3 Ensuring System Integrity using Attestation Techniques
To detect that a system is infected by malware, the TPM-based binary attestation could
be used. To realize the TPM-based binary attestation, a measurement architecture [142]
is required that measures every executed binary and adds the obtained measurements
to the PCRs of a TPM. In addition, each executed software component’s execution is
recorded by the stored measurement log (SML). Therefore, the SML and the PCRs
reflect the current state of a platform. An attestation interface is then used to establish
a secure channel (Compare Section 3) and to transfer the measurements to a verifier
using platform attestation. As a result, the verifier receives a list of all binaries that have
been executed since the last reboot of the machine and is able to determine whether a
platform is trusted. If the platform has been infected by malware, it is not trusted and
the verifier will not let the user enter his confidential data1. However, this approach
has three problems:
Time Discrepancies The first problem is that the load-time measurement does not
correctly reflect the runtime-behavior, since the received list of executed binaries gives
no hint about what was executed after the remote attestation. This fact is similar
to the problem of the time-of-use and the time-of-attestation discrepancy [152, 83],
also often referred to as time-of-check and time-of-use (TOCTUE) problem [145]. This
discrepancy addresses the problem that a software component may be correct at the
1It should be noted that this is simplified, since a successful platform attestation could have also been
simulated. We will discuss this in detail in Chapter 9 where we also present a solution for this restriction.
However, for the sake of simplicity, we assume at this place, that this attack can be prevented using
the described process.
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time of attestation, but not at the time the code is used. In this context, we mainly
encounter two types of problems:
1. A software component, such as a key logger or Trojan horse may be executed after
the remote attestation. Although the malware is located on the client machine at
the time of the attestation, it was not detected, because it was executed after the
attestation took place.
2. A component’s integrity may be corrupted through runtime attacks, such as buffer
overflows, after the component has been measured and executed.
Incomplete Measurements The second problem is that only the executable binaries
of applications are inspected. Shell scripts and configuration files are not included in
the measurement. This is due to the fact that especially for arbitrary shell scripts or
configuration files, reference values can hardly be provided. This leads to the problem
that certain manipulations, e.g., manipulations of the configuration files, cannot be
detected by this approach.
Inefficiency Finally, the approach is inefficient, since it requires that all measure-
ments be known and fully trusted, even if they do not have a direct impact on the
application whose trust level is to be evaluated [83]. This is caused by the fact, that
all processes running on the machine can mutually influence each another [105, 84]. A
process running in the privileged-mode of the operating system, such as a device driver,
is able to inspect all memory regions that are allocated by another process.
To solve these challenges new approaches are needed that are able to reduce the com-
plexity and allow one to measure the complete system configuration including scripts
and configuration files.
7.4 Design Concept of the Security Architecture
Virtualization techniques have already been proposed in the literature [167] to increase
safety, reliability and dependability. In this context, these techniques are adapted
to provide isolated compartments that cannot be influenced by other isolated com-
partments running on the same system. Since virtualization is a very old concept,
these techniques have also been significantly investigated in the literature (compare
[69, 61, 1, 52, 183, 132]).
However, virtualization techniques can also be used to leverage attestation tech-
niques for trust establishment. The use of this concepts enables the reduction of the
complexity of the attestation process. Instead of attesting to the whole platform con-
figuration, including all processes running on the machine, our approach only attests to
processes that are required for trusted operations. Processes that are not responsible
for establishing communication with a remote entity, and therefore not required for the
transaction, i.e, the transmission of confidential data, itself, should neither be included
in the integrity measurement nor be able to influence the transaction. The integrity
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measurement and the integrity reporting should, therefore, only include sensitive pro-
cesses that are vital for the whole transaction and should exclude other applications,
such as e-mail, multimedia-applications, or office-applications.
Using virtualization techniques also enables a reduction in the amount of information
needed to describe the trust-level of a platform configuration. As a consequence, a
verifier is not able to discover the full platform configuration, including all running
processes, but only a subset of the full platform configuration. This approach, therefore,
satisfies potential emerging privacy-concerns.
To establish different execution environments and to only attest fragments of the
whole platform configuration, we use concepts similar to those provided in Terra [67].
The main difference is that our integrity measuring and reporting facilities are based
on techniques introduced by the TCG, thus, benefiting from a hardware-based trust
anchor. In contrast to Terra, we also show how trust can be guaranteed using secure
integrity protocols.
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Figure 7.1: Basic design concept of the security architecture
Figure 7.8 depicts the design principles of our security architecture. It consists of
three different types of virtual machines, a hypervisor for partitioning the underlying
hardware, and a hardware-based trust anchor. The trusted virtual machine monitor
(TVMM), or hypervisor, forms the foundation for our architecture by providing an
abstraction layer for the underlying hardware. We will shortly describe these different
components before we go in detail.
7.4.1 Overview of the Trusted VMM
The trusted VMM has privileged access to the hardware and is able to grant and
revoke resources to and from the running VMs (e.g., CPU scheduling). Because of
its privileged position, the VMM is able to inspect every single CPU cycle of each
virtual machine, therefore, needs to be trusted. We assume that the VMM is trusted
and that it reliably provides the properties of a VMM, i.e., strong isolation. Currently
available virtualization solutions provide strong isolation. However, strong isolation,
can still be circumvented with direct memory access (DMA) operations [62]. DMA
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operations access the memory without intervention by the CPU and, therefore, bypass
the hypervisor’s protection mechanisms. In hypervisors with secure sharing [89], the
requires I/O emulation is moved into the hypervisor layer, allowing them to prevent
such attacks; however, such hypervisors suffer from a high performance overhead and a
large Trusted Computing Base [140].
7.4.2 Overview of the Trust Anchor
In order to be able to report the system configuration of the virtual machines, a
hardware-based trust anchor, i.e., the Trusted Platform Modules is introduced. How-
ever, the TPM was never designed to be used in virtual environments, and is, thus,
not capable of being used in a system that is based on virtualization. This restriction
results from the fact that the TPM holds state specific data. If two different VMs are
accessing the same TPM, one VM could change the state of the TPM, which would also
change the state of the other virtual machine’s TPM. To overcome this restriction, we
make use of the approach by Berger et al. [20] who propose to virtualize the hardware
TPM, by equipping every VM with its own software TPM. This software TPM only
uses the underlying hardware TPM for certain operations. Access to this virtual TPM
is controlled by the VMM which provides an abstraction of the underlying hardware
TPM through a virtualized TPM interface. This virtual TPM (vTPM) is mainly used
by the trusted virtual machine (TVM), which, in turn, is used for trusted transactions
with a remote entity.
7.4.3 Virtual Machines
The VMM establishes several different execution environments by using various types
of virtual machines that are strongly isolated from one another. A virtual machine
only represents the interface for the bare hardware constructed by the VMM [69], and
each virtual machine needs its own software environment. Such software environments
are referred to as virtual appliances [144] and consist of a fully pre-installed and pre-
configured application and operating system environment. Our security architecture
consists of three different types of virtual machines.
Overview of the Trusted VM The TVM handles private and sensitive data and
runs a tiny OS with a minimal number of processes, thereby considerably reducing the
possible number of security vulnerabilities. The software image is supplied by a trusted
third party and consists of the TVM as well as the transaction client. Before startup, the
software image is measured by a measuring process before using the hardware hashing
engine of the TPM. These measurements are then made accessible inside the virtual
machine by adding them into the PCRs of the vTPM. For attestation, the trusted VM
transmits these measurements to a remote entity by accessing them through the vTPM
instance.
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Open Virtual Machine The open virtual machine is allowed to run arbitrary soft-
ware components and provides the semantics of today’s open machines. It runs ap-
plications with a lower trust grade, such as web-browsers or office applications. The
advantage of using an open VM is twofold. First, using an open virtual machine gives
us the ability to provide a software environment that can be used for any arbitrary
application. This enables us to construct an environment where full-open commodity
applications can be used without influencing the TVM. Second, security breaches by
compromised applications are restricted to the Open VM. These security breaches are
very likely, since the environment consists of multiple different applications with a wide
spectrum of security vulnerabilities.
Management Virtual Machine The management virtual machine is responsible for
starting, stopping and configuring the virtual machines. It provides security services
to the trusted VM, such as VM image integrity measurement and secure storage. The
management VM is closely connected to the virtual machine monitor, since it is a
privileged VM and has direct access to the hardware TPM.
7.5 Security Architecture
Our proposed security architecture and the involved security services are shown in
Figure 7.2. In this section, we will explain the components of our architecture and also
its underlying security mechanisms in detail.
7.5.1 Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor and Management VM
The TVMM and the management VM form the foundation of our security architecture.
The TVMM is a software layer that offers an interface to the hardware for the virtual
machines currently running on the platform. In general, the only purpose of a VMM is to
partition the underlying hardware and to provide an interface for the generic operation
systems running in the individual virtual machines. The properties of a virtual machine
monitor have been extensively studied in the literature (e.g., [24, 94, 32, 185, 180]), pro-
viding isolation, efficiency, compatibility and simplicity. In our security architecture,
the TVMM is closely connected to the management VM so as to provide additionally
security services to the virtual machines. These security services are: integrity mea-
surement, secure storage and TPM support. The security architecture, thus, has the
following characteristics:
Attestation The virtual machines are able to access the underlying Trusted Plat-
form Module without modifying the state of the TPM; if the state of the TPM were
modified, other virtual machines would be affected. An attestation service running
inside the virtual machine is able to report the local system state to a remote party
that authenticates the local system state. This, in turn, allows a remote entity to place
trust in the system configuration of a communication partner. This property is achieved
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Figure 7.2: The proposed security architecture
by virtualizing the TPM and by providing a software TPM for each TVM. Using the
TPM-Manager, the TVM is able to communicate with its vTPM.
Integrity Measurement Our security architecture supports integrity measurement
facilities so as to provide an explicit statement about the configuration of the virtual
machine. The management virtual machine provides a measurement agent, which com-
putes a SHA1 measurement over the virtual machine’s software image before spawning
the VM. The obtained measurements are stored inside the secure storage of the VM’s
vTPM.
Complete Trust Chain For trust establishment in a remote entity, it is essential
that the trust chain from the hardware-based trust anchor to the final application is
not interrupted. Therefore, the TCG trusted boot process is extended further to the
end-user application, including measurement of the bootloader, TVMM and VM.
Secure Storage To prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data, the security ar-
chitecture provides a secure storage where data is protected by cryptographic mea-
sures. Access to this secure storage is only granted, if the authentication credentials
are correctly asserted. The secure storage is protected by the TPM and, thus, through
hardware measures.
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Attestation Completeness Attesting the full image of a virtual machine allows a
complete attestation of all software components, including all started processes, configu-
ration files, kernel modules, and scripts. This property solves the problem of incomplete
measurements, which was described in Section 7.3.
Compartmentalization The characteristic of platform attestation only enables mak-
ing a statement about the trust level of a particular platform at a specific point in time.
However, it cannot make a decision about future state transitions that can lead to a
state that is not trusted. The TVMM must, therefore, possess mechanisms that only
allow state transitions of the system that cannot influence the Trusted VM. This char-
acteristic is achieved by the strong isolation property provided by a virtual machine
monitor. This property solves inefficiency and time discrepancy problem that were
described in Section 7.3. We will explain this issue in the next section.
7.5.2 Trusted Virtual Machine
Each virtual machine runs an own virtual appliance. Such a virtual appliance is usu-
ally configured to host only a single application (a secure transaction software) and
the complexity of the included operating system is reduced to its minimal size. This
approach significantly enhances system security, because the chance of vulnerabilities
increases with the complexity of a system [15]. Consequently, the OS of the virtual
appliance must be configured in such a way that it only supports a minimal number of
user space software and kernel components, e.g., device drivers. It can, for example, be
realized as a microkernel [102]. Device drivers have error rates that are three to seven
times higher than ordinary code [35] and approximately 70 percent of the operating
system consists of device drivers; therefore, reducing the total number of device drivers
in the operating system clearly decreases the errors of an operating system, in turn, the
potential vulnerabilities that could be used by an adversary to spy on a user’s entered
sensitive data. This fact is a basic design criteria for the Trusted Virtual Machine, which
acts as a container to run sensitive software processes. If an adversary could exploit a
vulnerability of a device driver, the adversary could spy on sensitive data entered by a
user. In addition, the operating system running in the TVM must be configured in a
way that it is not allowed to reach a state that is not fully trusted. Thus, it must be
configured so as to be incapable of reaching a state that is not fully trusted. Thus, it
must be configured to forbid the execution of additional software components, including
kernel modules or user applications. Note that is approach is feasible since a Trusted
Virtual Machine only consists of one specific application which is intended for a specific
purpose. As a result, there is no need for executing additional software components.
In addition the OS, a virtual appliance contains one user application. This user
application is a software application with a very high protection level, such as a secure
homebanking client or a secure environment for displaying and signing documents with
a smart card. Each time a new trusted VM is created, a virtual TPM instance is initi-
ated and the PCRs 0-15 are filled with the PCR values from the underlying hardware
TPM. Additionally, the hash value of the measured image is stored in the virtual TPM’s
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PCR[16]. The TVM also provides an attestation service (See Figure 7.2), which en-
ables accessing the content of the platform configuration register and, thus, the secure
reporting of its integrity to a remote entity.
To further potential reduce vulnerabilities the TVM distinguishes between program
memory and data memory, similar to the Harvard architecture. The program memory
holds the program machine code represented by a sequence of instructions and the data
memory holds data that are related to the user’s transactions. Any modifications to
the program memory cannot be written back to the virtual appliance, meaning that
each time before the TVM spawns, its program memory is reverted to its initial state.
This approach has the following advantage: The client software only has a single
valid system state, which, in turn, reduces attestation complexity. The virtual machine
is also equipped with a secondary disk image that can be used to store transferred data
and information about former transactions. This data can be protected by storing the
secondary disk image inside the secure storage provided by the Management VM. The
data can also be protected by sealing it to the vTPM of the TVM, thus, directly binding
it to a specific virtual appliance. We will discuss this security mechanism in Section
7.5.4.
Isolating program and data memory are realized through two different disk images.
The secondary disk image is used to store state specific data. However, since data stored
on the secondary disk image may be able to influence the runtime condition, only data
that originates from the secure transaction software is stored there. Moreover, we also
perform consistency checks to ensure that the disk image has not been compromised by
malicious software. Because former transactions of the TVM are stored on a secondary
disk image, the TVM can be easily updated without the loss of old transaction data, if
newer version of the virtual appliance are published.
Decrypt 
TVM-Image 
from Secure 
Storage
Measure 
TVM-Image
Start TVM
Create 
vTPM 
Instance
Create 
vAIK-
Credential
Attestation 
of TVM
Use TVM
Figure 7.3: Actions taken when a Trusted VM spawns
The actions taken when a Trusted VM spawns are shown in Figure 7.3. The figure
shows that before a trusted virtual machine is ready for use, a number of steps have to
be performed that include the decryption of the virtual appliance (often also refferred
to as image) and the initialization of the TVM’s virtual TPM. As soon as the TVM
spawned, it can provide a proof about its trust level using platform attestation.
7.5.3 Virtual TPM
In order to successfully use a virtual TPM as trust anchor, the following requirements
must be satisfied:
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R.1: Performance This goal states that the overhead from using a TPM in a VM
should be negligible compared to directly executing commands on the TPM. The VM
should therefore be able to execute TPM commands at nearly the same speed as when
these commands are used on a non-virtualized machine.
R.2: Compatibility It should be possible to execute TPM command code in a VM
without modifying the code or adapting it to the virtualized environment. Therefore,
we explicitly forbid using paravirtualization techniques [185].
R.3: Simplicity A fault in a VMM can cause a failure in all VMs which could result
in a crashing VM. A VMM that provides abstraction and sharing of a TPM should
therefore be as simple as possible [132].
R.4: Security A TPM that is used in a VM should provide the same security prop-
erties as if the TPM would be accessed natively.
R.5: Minimal modifications to the specification If the specifications by the
TCG must be modified, these modifications should be as slight as possible, leaving the
modifications and the specification as compatible as possible.
To satisfy these requirements, we are using a virtual TPM that is implemented in
software and runs inside the Management VM. The advantage of a software TPM is that
the requirements R.1, R.2, and R.5 can be achieved very easily, while the requirements
R.5 and R.3 are harder to achieve. To achieve R.5, the software TPM needs to be
protected by the hardware TPM to enable storing of persistent data. R.3 is partly
achieved by implementing a software TPM that is as simple as possible.
In order to place trust into measurements reported from a virtual TPM, a com-
plete trust chain from the hardware-based trust anchor up to and including the end
application needs to be established. This includes all measurements performed by the
hardware TPM as specified by the TCG [170], the bootloader (e.g., TrustedGrub [8])
and the hypervisor and the VM instances, including the virtual appliances. When a
virtual TPM spawns, its PCR values are initialized with values from the underlying
hardware TPM, as shown in Figure 7.4.
PCR Content of TPM Content of vTPM
0..7 Measurmnt. of CRTM and BIOS Measurmnt. of CRTM and BIOS
8..15 Measurmnt. of the Bootloader and TVMM Measurmnt. of the Bootloader and TVMM
16 empty Measurmnt. of the virtual appliance
17.. empty for free use
Figure 7.4: Mapping of the PCR values
In order to report the platform configuration of a TVM, a strong binding between
vTPM and TPM must exist. Otherwise, it would be possible for the vTPM to report
PCR values to a remote entity that are different from the ones that were measured by
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the underlying hardware TPM. Berger et al. [20] have already proposed three differ-
ent solutions for this problem. After careful considerations, we decided to employ the
solution in which each virtual AIK is bound to a hardware AIK. We believe that this
solution has several advantages over the others. On the one hand it has strong similar-
ities to the concepts provided by the TCG specifications as an additional Privacy-CA,
and on the other hand, it allows quick spawning of additional vTPM instances.
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Figure 7.5: Binding the vTPM to TPM
Figure 7.5 shows the association of a vTPM with an underlying hardware TPM, as
realized by our architecture. In step 1, the host TPM creates an AIK and in step 2
retrieves a corresponding credential through a Privacy-CA or via DAA [23]. In step 3,
the vTPM then creates a vAIK, which is signed by the Host TPM, using his own AIK.
To prevent replay and masquerading attacks, a Nonce provided by the vTPM instance,
an additional timestamp, and the hash values of the hardware TPM’s PCR[0..15] are
embedded into this signed message. The integration of the PCR value in the vAIK
credential is necessary, since a trusted software configuration could otherwise be forged.
In Section 7.7.2, we will discuss why this concept prevents an attacker from forging a
trusted software configuration. The corresponding credential is then encrypted using the
KvEK and sent to the vTPM instance (5), that is in possession of K−1vEK and, therefore,
able to decrypt this message. A vAIK credential contains the vTPM generated public
vAIK and consists of:
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• Timestamp
• Hardware PCR[0..15]
• Nonce
• vAIK
signed with AIK
• AIK credentials
For the remote attestation process, the vAIK is used to perform the TPM Quote com-
mand. The verifying party can then decide whether the remote platform configuration
is trusted by validating the vAIK credential and the delivered output of the TPM Quote
command. A platform configuration is deemed trusted if the following conditions are
satisfied:
• The vAIK is authentic and generated by a vTPM
• The vTPM is authentic and protected by a hardware TPM
• The hypervisor including management VM is in a trusted system state
• The hardware TPM is authentic
• The TVM is in a trusted state
7.5.4 Secure Storage
Secure storage is an isolated memory area where sensitive data is stored. Access to
this area is always controlled by the management VM and only authorized processes
are allowed to access this storage. The secure storage provides integrity, confidentiality
and authenticity and is protected by non-migratable keys, which reside in the hardware
TPM. It is not resistant against replay attacks, where a user replays the actual secure
storage with an old secure storage. To achieve protection against attacks of this type,
some sort of TPM protected counters, as introduced in [137] or [160] could be used.
However, we do not consider these attacks, since they cannot be conducted by malware
and are only relevant in the Information Rights Management scenario. In addition,
these solutions do not enable data backup, thus, creating the need for an additional
backup concept. We use the secure storage for the following three purposes:
Protecting State Specific vTPM Data
Since a virtual TPM is a software TPM, it is necessary to protect state information of
the vTPM with hardware measures. For this purpose, each vTPM instance possesses
its own memory structure, where vTPM state specific data, such as cryptographic keys,
is stored. To prevent an adversary from modifying this structure, the whole structure is
either encrypted or sealed with a non-migratable key that resides inside the hardware
TPM. When a virtual machine and its associated vTPM instance spawns, the TPM-
Manager (See Figure 7.2) decrypts the memory structure of the vTPM and assigns the
decrypted vTPM memory structure to the currently spawned vTPM instance.
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Protecting VM Images
Every virtual appliance of a virtual machine can be stored inside the secure storage. The
virtual appliance is then protected by a non-migratable key stored inside the hardware
TPM. Before a specific TPM-protected virtual machine can be spawned, the TPM-
Manager decrypts the image using the non-migratable key stored inside the hardware
TPM and launches a VM using the decrypted image. This concept prevents an adver-
sary from maliciously modifying a virtual appliance without the notice of a particular
user.
Protecting VM Specific Data
Sensitive transaction data can be stored inside the secure storage of the Management
VM. This is realized by a combination of security services offered by the Management
VM as well as VM specific security services. The state specific vTPM data is protected
by a security service running in the Management VM, and the transaction data of a
specific VM is protected by a security service running inside a specific VM.
Protecting VM specific data can again be realized by either sealing the data to
a specific state or by encrypting the data with an encryption key that resides in the
virtual TPM. The choice depends on the scenario and is implementation specific. In
the following, we will show, in detail, how data can be protected by sealing it. This
concept provides better security compared to only encrypting data; this is due to the
fact that state changes (for example changes caused by malicious modifications to the
hypervisor [93]) are also detected. However, protecting data by encrypting it with an
encryption key that resides inside the TPM is analogous and requires only minimal
modifications to the mechanisms presented here. For simplicity reasons, we will in the
following only make use of asymmetric cryptography. However, to enhance efficency a
hybrid encryption scheme could also be used. In that case, the storage data is encrypted
with a symmetric key and the symmetric key is bound to the TPM using an asymmetric
key.
We denote the structure that stores transaction data with D. This structure is
then sealed by a VM specific security service to a specific time ∆t using the following
function: Seal(Dn, PCRInfo, HvSRK). H is a key-handle for the relevant storage root
key and PCRInfo is a TPM PCR INFO structure that contains the information to which
PCRs Dn will be bound. The cryptographic key used to unseal the structure D is the
storage root key vSRK of the virtual TPM. The TPM PCR INFO structure [168] contains
the PCR values 0-16 and, thus, a specific vTPM state. The operation to unseal is
denoted Unseal({Dn}vSRK) where for simplicity reasons {Dn}vSRK also includes the
structure of the platform configuration registers. Unsealing the {Dn}vSRK at ∆t+ x is
then only possible if the current platform configuration, i.e., the PCRs of the vTPM, is
equal to the platform configuration that {Dn}vSRK is bound to.
Using the Management VM to spawn a Trusted VM that provides TPM protection
to transaction data, therefore, requires a combination of sealing data to a vTPM and
sealing data to a hardware TPM. Figure 7.6 shows the involved protocol steps.
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1. MVM → TPM : TPM OSAP(authData)
2. MVM ← TPM : HSRK
3. MVM → TPM : Unseal({vTPM Storage}SRK , HSRK)
4. TPM : Check if the values of the current PCRs [0-15] are
equal to the PCRs {vTPM Storage} is bound to
6. MVM ← TPM : vTPM Storage
7. MVM ← TPM : TPM SUCCESS
8. MVM : Initialize vTPM
9. MVM : Launch and measure TVM
10. TVM → vTPM : TPM OSAP(authData)
11. TVM ← vTPM : HvSRK
12. TVM → vTPM : Unseal({Dn}vSRK , HSRK)
13. vTPM : Check if the values of the current PCRs [0-16] are
equal to the PCRs Dn is bound to
14. TVM ← vTPM : Dn
15. TVM ← vTPM : TPM SUCCESS
Figure 7.6: Protocol steps of a spawning vTPM that is protected by the hardware TPM
First, a TPM Object-Specific Authorization Protocol (OSAP) session is created be-
tween the TPM and the MVM. This command requires authorization (owner-password
and SRK -password) and computes a cryptographic secret and a handle (HSRK) to this
session; both to protect the whole session traffic (see [174], pp. 71). The returned han-
dle is then used to issue the Unseal command. The TPM then unseals the encrypted
vTPM Storage and delivers the output back to the MVM. The MVM then initializes a
new vTPM as shown in 7.5 with the decrypted vTPM Storage and spawns and measures
a new TVM.
7.6 Attestation of Virtual Machines
To enable the trusted VM to report its integrity and, thus, to place trust into the used
system configuration, attestation techniques are used. For this purpose, we use the Pro-
tocol 3.6.3, which establishes a secure attestation channel and prevents masquerading
attacks on the authenticity of the platform configuration. In addition, it guarantees an
end-to-end communication and prevents the attestation channel from becoming com-
promised by another component of the security architecture (e.g., Management VM)
that could take over the attestation channel after the attestation has succeeded.
In our approach, the attestation service is located inside the TVM. This is different
than [137, 87, 86] where the attestation service is part of the security kernel. How-
ever, our approach has two advantages over integrating the attestation service into the
security kernel (in our case the Management VM):
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(1) It enables reducing the complexity of the security kernel (Trusted Computing base),
since only the necessary components for integrity reporting, such as the measure-
ment agent, are integrated.
(2) It enables supporting a wide-variety of different attestation methods each satisfying
different security objectives.
The second advantage is of vital importance since it seems unlikely that only one
unique attestation method will be used by distributed applications that use remote
attestation. Integrating the attestation service inside the security kernel would require
to adapt the attestation service and to integrate all attestation services inside the se-
curity kernel. This is a potential vulnerability that is exacerbated by the fact that the
attestation service runs in the highest privilege-level of the CPU.
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(7) Request attestation
(2) Request vAIK credential
(10) sig and vAIK credential
(1) Initialize vTPM
TPM Manager TPM
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(11) sig and vAIK credential
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(4) Create vAIK 
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Figure 7.7: Simplified attestation process
The simplified process of our remote attestation protocol is illustrated in Figure 7.7.
It consists of an initialization phase and an attestation phase. The initialization phase
yields a vAIK credential, which is then used in the attestation phase to sign the PCRs.
This vAIK credential is generated and signed by an AIK from the hardware TPM as
explained in Section 7.5.3 and shown in Figure 7.5. In the first step of the initialization
phase, the vTPM is initialized, which, in turn, requests a new vAIK credential from
the hardware TPM (steps 2 and 3). The hardware TPM issues a vAIK credential and
sends it to the vTPM (steps 5 and 6). The attestation phase then establishes a secure
attestation channel as explained in Section 3.5.
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7.7 Evaluation of the Architecture
In the following section, we evaluate our proposed architecture. We will first divide our
architecture into layers and show how each layer provides protection mechanisms for
the layers above. Using this approach, we show how we solve the security challenges
described in Section 7.2.
7.7.1 Protection Layers
The protection architecture is shown in Figure 7.8 and consists of components divided
into four protection layers. Each component located on a single layer provides security
mechanisms to protect the components located on the layer directly above. In the
case of a successful attack on one layer, the layers below can prevent the attacker from
successfully accessing confidential data.
Hypervisor
TPM
Hardware
Management
VM
Open VM Trusted VM
vTPM
Application
Protection Layer 4
Protection Layer 3
Protection Layer 2
Protection Layer 1
Figure 7.8: Protection architecture organized in layers
Protection Layer 4: TPM and Hardware
The TPM is the anchor of trust and the basis for the attestation. It holds several
non-migratable, client-specific keys to protect the vTPM and the secure storage of the
security architecture. The protection mechanism of this layer is twofold: it provides a
mechanism with which each executed software component can be identified (1) and a
secure and protected storage (2).
Such a protection mechanism prevents attacks on the authenticity of the software
components, for instance, an attack where some sort of subversive software component
tries to foist a user into entering sensitive data into a compromised software applica-
tion. Such an attack can, for example, be conducted if a user accidentally executes a
malicious software component that modifies parts of the operating system or installs
a malicious hypervisor [93] to enable spying on sensitive data. Using characteristics
of virtualization-supporting hardware, such attacks can also be performed without re-
booting the system [135]. These attacks are also relevant if a system is used that is
based on virtualization as shown in [93, 192, 187]. This shows that virtualization tech-
niques on their own are not sufficient to prevent attacks on the authenticity of software
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components, but require attestation techniques that enable detecting whether a system
has been compromised.
Protection Layer 3: Hypervisor and Management VM
The hypervisor is the first part of protection layer 3 and provides an abstraction layer
for the underlying hardware. It provides the protection mechanisms discussed in Section
7.5.1, which are: strong isolation of the virtual machines (i.e., compartmentalization),
attestation, integrity measurement, a complete trust chain and attestation complete-
ness. These mechanisms ensure that different virtual machines cannot influence each
other, e.g., by reading each other’s memory. Each virtual machine uses a virtual de-
vice driver to communicate with the underlying hardware. The hypervisor ensures that
these device drivers can only access the memory of the corresponding virtual machine.
In contrast, when applications of different trust levels are running on a machine with-
out virtualization, an attacker could use a malicious device driver to gain system wide
access (Compare Section 7.2).
The management virtual machine is the second part of protection layer 3. It is
responsible for starting, stopping and configuring the virtual machines. It is included
in protection layer 3 because it is closely connected to the hypervisor and is a privileged
VM with direct access to the hardware TPM.
Protection Layer 2: Open VM and Trusted VM
Protection layer 2 consists of the open VM and the Trusted VM. The open VM is
allowed to run arbitrary software components. It runs applications with a lower trust
level, such as web browsers or office applications. The open VM provides the semantics
of today’s open machines and, therefore, has no additional protection mechanisms for
upper layers.
The TVM runs the trusted transaction client and a tiny OS or a microkernel with
a minimal number of software components, to reduce the possible number of security
vulnerabilities.
The TVM runs in protection layer 2 and provides a virtual TPM as an additional
protection mechanism. The operating system of the TVM uses this vTPM to protect
the trusted transaction client running in protection layer 1. We use this vTPM to
perform a complete attestation of the entire hard disk of the TVM, thereby ensuring
that neither the operating system, its configuration, nor the attestation service running
on top of the operating system are manipulated. Note that this is only practical when a
minimal operating system with only one special-purpose application s used.. As a result,
the verification of the state of the entire virtual machine requires only one reference
value. This eliminates the main disadvantage of the binary attestation, namely the
need to maintain a large amount of reference values. Moreover, during the attestation,
a verifying entity checks whether the protection layers below the operating system, e.g.,
the hypervisor, are trusted. If the TVM establishes a secure channel to another remote
entity, the vTPM is additionally used to ensure authenticity of software integrity values
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and to protect cryptographic secrets. The corresponding protocol is discussed in Section
7.6.
All I/O interfaces that can be used to extract data from a TVM need to be blocked
or controlled. For example, the management VM ensures that the program and data
memory of the TVM are isolated and the TVM cannot modify the program memory.
This mechanisms prevents an attacker from modifying the program memory and booting
into a malicious platform configuration.
Protection Layer 1: Secure Transaction Client
Protection layer 1 consists of the application that enables secure transactions with ar-
bitrary platforms. In order to enable secure transactions, protection layer 1 enables
establishing secure channels using the vTPM as well as answering attestation requests.
It is implementation specific and whether or not the transaction client provides addi-
tional security mechanisms, such as mechanisms to harden it against runtime attacks,
depends on the application scenario. We will show in Chapter 9 how such a secure
transaction architecture can be realized.
7.7.2 Security Evaluation
In the following section, we evaluate and analyze whether the security mechanisms
described in Section 7.7 solve the security challenges described in Section 7.2. We
assume that the secure transaction client, which we introduced in Section 7.2, is running
in a TVM and that its integrity is ensured using attestation techniques. Based on the
attacker model introduced in Section 7.2.2, we consider an attacker who tries to access
sensitive transaction data.
Software Manipulation Attacks
Each protection layer is measured before execution by the layer below. This results in
a chain of trust with the property that all software manipulation attacks that modify
a software component before it has been measured are reliably detected. However, to
prevent the detection of a compromised system configuration, an attacker can use the
following attack patterns:
(1) he manipulates the software integrity after it has been measured using a runtime
attack,
(2) he alters the software integrity measurements so that they reflect a trusted
software configuration, and
(3) he manipulates the measurement process so that a specific subversive applica-
tion is not measured or the chain of trust is not complete.
In the following, we will study different underlying attack vectors that an adversary
may use in order to successfully perform an attack of types (1), (2) and (3). Figure
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7.9 shows these possible attack vectors. The arrows 1-4 indicate a starting point of a
possible attack vector and the arrows that additionally possess an alphabetic character
mark the further proceeding of an adversary.
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Figure 7.9: Attack vectors on our security architecture
Attacks on the TVM (Arrow 1) The attacker may be able to exploit a vulnera-
bility of one software component in order to perform an attack of type (1). The risk of
these runtime attacks on the TVM’s operating system is reduced, because the operating
system of the TVM is directly adapted to only host one user application and has a small
code complexity. This reduced complexity enables the use of a very simple operating
system with only a small set of services. Since simplicity was found to be the source of
greatest protection against system penetrations [9], this approach is more resistant to
runtime attacks than using a more complex operating system. Moreover, we choose a
strict system configuration to minimize possible attack methods, e.g., network connec-
tions are restricted, the hard disk of the TVM is read-only and swapping is disabled.
Since the TVM’s operating system is either realized as a microkernel, such as MINIX
[79] or L4 [101], or it has the characteristics of a microkernel, it is basically possible to
formally verify its correctness w.r.t. certain precisely stated security predicates. Thus,
formal methods [95] could be used to ensure that no exploitable vulnerability exists,
thereby resulting in verified security [124]. Additionally, the OS is configured in such
a way that it is not possible to execute additional software components with the privi-
leges of the operating system. For example, a static security kernel is used that not only
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prohibits the dynamic reloading of modules, but also all other possibilities to access the
whole memory allocated to the VM (e.g., file systems such as /proc/kcore has to be
disabled). Attacks of types (2) and (3) cannot be performed since the processes needed
to be manipulated in order to perform a successful attack are located on the layers
below.
Attacks on the Open VM (Arrow 2) The Open VM is allowed to run arbitrary
software components and provides the semantics of today’s open machines. As a result,
the environment consists of multiple different applications with a wide spectrum of
security vulnerabilities. As a consequence, it is very likely that an attacker is able to
perform an attack of type (1) by exploiting a vulnerability to gain control and install
subversive applications. In contrast to the TVM, the Open VM is not equipped with a
means of measuring software components. Therefore, it is not possible to detect that
the software environment has been maliciously modified. However, since the underlying
protection layer provides isolation of software environments, it is not possible to access
sensitive data, since security breaches by compromised applications are contained inside
the Open VM. Thus, it is not feasible for an attacker to access sensitive data stored
inside the TVM or inside the secure storage. However, since it seems likely that the
attacker is able to gain full control of the Open VM, he may be able to perform a
hardware attack and break out of the compartment, thereby undermining the isolation
characteristic of the hypervisor. These attacks are visualised by arrows 2b and 2c of
Figure 7.9.
Assume that an attacker has completely taken control of the Open VM. He might
then try to perform a malicious DMA access to a memory area allocated by the Hypervi-
sor, Management VM or Trusted VM. For example, the very widespread Xen hypervisor
[14], which we also use in our approach, allocates the top 64MB of each address space.
Under normal conditions, this address space is protected by the CPU and the operating
system of the Open VM cannot directly access this area. However, since DMA bypasses
any protection managed by the CPU, an attacker can use the physical address of the
hypervisor’s allocated address space to access the address space and then overwrite key-
data structures. [187] and [53] recently showed that the Xen hypervisor is vulnerable
to such attacks and that an attacker can circumvent the isolation characteristic of a
hypervisor. Using this approach an adversary can access the hypervisor, thereby giving
him access to the memory of all VMs since the hypervisor is privileged against all VMs.
We will further analyze this attack in Section 7.7.2 and also present a mechanism to
cope with this threat.
Attacks of type (2) and (3) can be performed if the attacker has taken full control
of the system and, thus, successfully broken out of the Open VM. Since the attacker
then has the same potential as if he had successfully overtaken the Management VM
directly, we will discuss this issue in the next paragraph.
Attacks on the Management VM (Arrow 3) The Management VM runs a tiny
operating system or microkernel with only a small set of services. These services are
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mainly the security services explained in Section 7.5.1, namely the VM Manager, TPM
Manager, TPM Device Driver, Secure Storage and a Measurement Agent. In addition,
the Management VM provides split-device drivers [62] for all devices that cannot be
virtualized with hardware measures [37]. A split-device driver is necessary for devices
such as the TPM since currently available TPMs cannot be virtualized with hardware
measures, as we will explain in Chapter 8.
To successfully perform an attack of type (1), an adversary has to exploit a vulner-
ability in either the operating system of the Management VM, or in any of the security
services offered by the Management VM. Since the memory of the management VM
is also isolated from the memory of the TVM, a hardware attack, as explained in the
preceding paragraph, can be used to access the memory of a TVM. This is visualised
as arrow 3c in Figure 7.9. The risk of such runtime attacks on the Management VM
are reduced, because the code complexity of the Management VM is very low and soft-
ware with lower complexity is expected to have less errors than software with higher
complexity. To additionally enhance the security, formal methods should be used to
prevent the emergence of software vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an adver-
sary. However, another disadvantage is that our software TPM extends the code base
of the management VM, thus violating R.3 of a virtual TPM.
Additionally, the Management VM is responsible for providing a Secure Storage
and the Measurement Agents. If an attacker gained access to the Management VM
and is not able to perform a malicious DMA to access the memory of a TVM, he might
perform an attack of types (2) and (3). He could achieve a type 3 attack, for example, by
substituting the virtual appliance of the Trusted VM with a malicious virtual appliance
and altering the measurement agent so that the agent provides malicious measurements
(attack (3)). Alternatively, he could achieve an attack of type 2, for example, by altering
measurements stored inside the virtual TPM’s storage or accessing cryptographic keys
stored inside the vTPM. However, to successfully perform these attack types, he needs
to modify the security services during runtime, i.e., after they have been measured. This
is necessary since during the attestation, not only the measurements of the vTPM are
validated, but also the measurements of the underlying hardware TPM. If an adversary
only modifies the measurements of the vTPM, the measurements would differ from the
measurements stored inside the hardware TPM (compare Section 7.5.3). However, it is
much easier for an adversary to access data which are stored in a virtual TPM than if
they were stored in the hardware TPM. For example, it is possible for an adversary to
extract keying material from a software TPM by accessing the memory during runtime.
Although this may result in a malicious software configuration which can be detected,
an adversary might have gained access to sensitive keying material. As a result, our
software TPM does not completely achieve the security requirement for a virtual TPM
(R.4) as presented in Section 7.5.3.
Attacks on the Hypervisor (Arrow 4) The hypervisor consists of a very low code
complexity (e.g., Secvisor comprises of only 1112 lines of code [148]), particularly when
compared to operating systems, and does not expose interfaces that could be used for
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an attack; therefore, attacks of type (1) are difficult. If an attacker were to gain access
to the hypervisor, he could perform attacks of types (1) and (2) as already discussed in
the preceding paragraph.
Manipulate Input
Input manipulation attacks try to access confidential data by capturing keystrokes. In
our security architecture, these attacks can be situated on the TVM, the Management
VM or the hypervisor.
Manipulating the input at the TVM is rather difficult since the TVM’s code com-
plexity is very low and the only possibility would be to perform a runtime attack and
then install some sort of key-logger. Since the integrity of the TVM is measured each
time it spawns, the time window to perform such an attack is very small. In addition,
each attack needs to be performed from scratch since it is not possible to persistently
modify the program code of the TVM. Another possibility for spying on a user’s en-
tered confidential data is to modify the hypervisor or the management VM. This would
lead to a successful attack if the keyboard device-driver were virtualized using software
techniques [62]. If software techniques have been used to virtualize the keyboard device
driver, a backend device driver resides in the Management VM and can be altered to spy
on a user’s entered data. In that case, a successful runtime attack on the Management
VM or the hypervisor must be performed.
However, if the keyboard device-driver are virtualized using hardware techniques
[37], only a successful runtime attack in the TVM enables an attacker to capture
keystrokes. Gaining access to the hypervisor or Management VM would in the lat-
ter case not be sufficient to capture keystrokes.
Manipulate Output
Output manipulation attacks manipulate the information output of a software system.
These attacks are prevented by ensuring that the software integrity of the devices for
information output are trusted. Here, as in the preceding sections, runtime attacks are
still possible and the only threat.
Output attacks that exploit human characteristics, such as phishing [44], can be
easily prevented by binding transaction data directly to a specific transaction session
using cryptographic keys; because this solution is implementation specific and depends
on the application scenario, we will present the security mechanisms in Section 9, where
we present an application scenario and the corresponding security mechanisms.
Hardware Attacks
We have already discussed that hardware attacks can be used to perform software
manipulation attacks. One such critical hardware attack is a DMA attack, currently
the only method to circumvent the isolation characteristic provided by the hypervisor.
DMA attacks can either be handled entirely in software by emulating all I/O devices,
thereby causing a high performance degradation, or by providing a hardware I/O MMU
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[186, 19] that supports secure DMA, e.g., as provided by Intel’s Trusted Execution
Technology [38] or by AMD’s SVM [6]. A hardware I/O MMU has similar characteristics
to a conventional Memory Management Unit (MMU) and translates VM-visible virtual
addresses used in DMA transactions to physical addresses. It also provides memory
protection against illegal access by I/O devices.
These hardware mechanisms, thus, can prevent a virtual machine from breaking
out of its compartment by using malicious DMA accesses. As a consequence, our
security architecture can prevent malicious DMA accesses if a hardware I/O MMU is
used. Probing attacks are difficult to inhibit, but we do not cosider them, because they
cannot be performed by software components.
7.8 Implementation
The security architecture has been implemented in Java using version 3 of Xen [14].
Further details on the implementation can be found in [81]. The Xen hypervisor is
very compact and, therefore, fulfills the requirement of a small Trusted Computing
base. It employs a unique VM called Dom0, which is created in the initialization phase
and is responsible for spawning new VMs. This Dom0 component, therefore, acts as
the Management VM in our architecture. It is also responsible for the assignment of
I/O devices to the VMs. Other VMs spawned by the Dom0 are called DomUs (User
domains) and run a paravirtualized Linux. The DomUs utilize the driver support of
the Dom0 by introducing a split device driver [62, 7]. This split device driver, as the
name implies, is split into a back end and a front end. The back end runs in the Dom0
and the front end is implemented in the DomU. Since the Dom0 has privileged access
to the other DomUs, it needs to be trusted. Therefore, we suggest that the Dom0 only
runs a minimal operating system, while the open VM, which is realized through another
DomU, runs the productive operating system. Our implemented security architecture
runs on a IA-32 Core2 Duo Processor, which supports the preliminary VT-d architecture
[37] and, thus, an I/O MMU as well as the establishment of DRTMs. However, at the
current stage of implementation, we do neither use an I/O MMU nor a DRTM.
Our implemented security architecture is shown in Figure 7.10, which displays one
virtual machine, the hypervisor, Dom0, the different vTPM parts, and the communica-
tion paths between those components and the underlying hardware TPM.
Modification of vTPM
The available vTPM module in Xen has been extended to allow integrity measure-
ment. The vTPM module is a reduced driver-pair compared to the one introduced
in [20], and, therefore, neither supports attestation nor migration of vTPMs. The
modifications to the back end vTPM (vTPM Manager) and the front end vTPM
interface required nearly 300 lines of code. The vTPM and vTPM manager were
extended with the commands TPM CreateVTPMCredentials, TPM RetrieveVTPM-
Credentials and TPM VTPMManager ResetSessions. TPM CreateVTPMCredentials
enables a vTPM to retrieve a vAIK and an EK and send them to the back end vTPM
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Figure 7.10: Implemented Architecture using Xen. The arrows indicate the communi-
cation path between the different components.
manager. The vTPM Manager then uses a Java Host Tool to communicate with the
hardware TPM which, in turn, carries out the hardware operations.
The client application was developed by extending the already existing Java frame-
work2 to allow spawning of several virtual TPM instances. The main advantage of the
tpm4java framework over trusted Java3 is that it is independent of TrouSerS 4, and
can, therefore, talk directly to the /dev/tpm device. The library was also extended
to support the issuing of vAIK s by adding the TPM commands TPM CreateVTPM-
Credentials and TPM RetrieveVTPMCredentials.
Integrity Measurement
For integrity measurement, we replaced the existing starting scripts of Xen with a
wrapper that loads the image of the virtual machine from the secure storage, extracts
the image, and calculates the hash of the image. The hash value is then temporarily
cached in the Dom0 and the virtual machine is started with the extracted image and a
second empty disk image for storing application specific data. This allows us to store
arbitrary content, e.g., information about former transactions, without influencing the
status of the VM. The second disk image can also be protected by either binding
it directly to the underlying TPM or by sealing it to specific platform configuration
registers as explained in Section 7.5.4. The vTPM-Manager then transfers the PCRs
of the underlying hardware TPM and the measured image to every spawned vTPM
instance. In our current implementation, the spawning of an additional trusted VM
with a 2GB image takes approximately 124 seconds since a new vAIK credential has
2http://tpm4java.datenzone.de/trac
3http://trustedjava.sourceforge.net/
4http://trousers.sourceforge.net/
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to be generated by the TPM. This also includes the calculation of the hash value of
the disk image, which is the main source of processing time. The VM pauses in an
idle phase until the vAIK credential has been issued. The vTPM is then initialized as
shown in Figure 7.4.
Attestation Protocol
An attestation service runs inside the Trusted Virtual Machine. This attestation service
awaits attestation requests from a remote entity and answers the requests by invoking
the virtual TPM. The virtual TPM is in possession of a vAIK credential that has
been issued by the underlying hardware TPM. Using this credential, a TVM is able to
prove its trust level to a remote entity without invoking components of the underlying
hypervisor or Dom0. The attestation service is completely implemented in Java and its
integrity is ensured by validating the measured hash-value of the TVM image.
7.9 Related Work
Another approach that enables attestation is used in the Integrity Measurement Ar-
chitecture (IMA) [142], where the authors present a comprehensive prototype based on
Trusted Computing technologies and wherein integrity measurement is implemented by
examining the hashes of all executed binaries. However, the prototype is not based
on virtualization technologies, and, therefore, achieves no strong isolation between pro-
cesses. This makes it necessary to transfer transfer a complete SML to the remote
entity, which, in turn, must validate all started processes to determine the trust level
of a platform.
Berger et al. [20] illustrate how to virtualize a TPM and present a driver-pair that
utilizes these concepts. Our work differs in the attestation process of virtual machines
and in the way the mapping between the PCRs is performed. In contrast to [20], where
the IMA is used for providing measurements, we argue that a complete verification
is reached by only measuring the image of a VM. Furthermore, Berger et al. do not
specify how the binding of a virtualized TPM (vTPM) to a TPM is performed.
Mccune et al. [107] propose an architecture that allows the execution of a completely
isolated application without requiring a VMM. The approach utilizes a hardware-based
dynamic root of trust provided by AMD’s SVM architecture [6] or Intel’s TXT archi-
tecture [38]. Using these hardware architectures, Mccune et al. execute a completely
isolated software component directly on the hardware. The authors propose to only ex-
ecute a very small piece of application logic (PAL) in this environment. This approach
could also be adapted to our security architecture and the TVM could be executed di-
rectly on hardware within such a PAL. However, since this approach does not support
virtual TPMs, the secure storage and the attestation mechanisms of the TVM must
then be realized in another way.
Numerous approaches have taken shape that try to construct secure operating sys-
tems or secure operating system environments. These approaches can be divided into
two categories (Security Kernels and Virual Machine Monitors).
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7.9.1 Security Kernels
The first category covers approaches that try to develop new security kernels from
scratch. Approaches that can be included in this category are all approaches that are
based on a microkernel, such as L4 [101], Nizza [154], Minix [78, 80] or Exokernel [58].
All these approaches provide only a minimal security kernel that only provides a small
set of services, such as Inter-Process Communication and Memory Management. Device
drivers are running in a higher privilege-level of the CPU, often referred to as Server-
Domain, and are not part of the security kernel. Security kernels do not necessarily
enable establishing multiple isolated operating system environments. However, they
often provide a stronger isolation between processes. All these approaches try to con-
struct secure and reliable operating systems. However, they do not integrate Trusted
Computing functionalities to ensure that a system behaves as expected. This gap is
expected to be filled by the Open-TC project [110] and the EMSCB-project [55]. Both
projects try to enhance these approaches with Trusted Computing functionality.
7.9.2 Virtual Machine Monitors
The second category covers approaches that try to establish secure operating system
environments. These environments are characterized by the fact that they do not nec-
essarily require new operating system design, but use many functionalities of existing
operating systems. All approaches are based on a virtual machine monitor fall into
this category. Microkernels and virtual machine monitors have many things in common
[76, 77]; however, microkernels are basically more complex than virtual machine moni-
tors. Virtual machine monitors only provide abstraction to the hardware and partitions
the hardware. In contrast to microkernels, it is not possible to execute applications di-
rectly on this virtual machine monitor. Thus, these environments require one or more
operating system to execute additional applications. The following proposals try to
establish secure operating system environments:
Garfinkel et al. [67] introduce an approach to create a virtual machine-based plat-
form that allows attestation of virtual machines called Terra. Garfinkel et al. utilize
VMWare’s ESX Server to establish different types of virtual machines (Closed Box and
Open Box ) and to report the state of a closed box machine to a remote entity. Our
approach differs in that Terra neither uses a hardware-based trust anchor (the TPM
in our approach) nor allows attestation without the direct involvement of the VMM.
For attestation, the VM in Terra has to contact the attestation interface that is being
executed on the VMM, which can only report the status of the VM at the time of
initialization. Using a virtualized TPM, in contrast allows, on the one hand, direct
attestation and the reporting of fine-grained platform configurations and, on the other
hand, the full functionalities of a trusted platform module, e.g., sealing. Terra also
suffers from using a large Trusted Computing base, which is a potential security threat
and is, therefore, not applicable in high security environments.
Palladium formerly known as Microsoft’s Next Generation Secure Computing Base
(NGSCB) [56, 118] is an approach that aims at establishing a small Trusted Computing
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base, while satisfying the need for open mass-market operating systems. The approach
is also based on a virtual machine monitor, called an isolation kernel, which establishes
two different execution environments, i.e, VMs, with different trust-levels. NGSCB
highly depends on hardware virtualization technology as well as on Trusted Computing
technology. NGSCB also requires a security kernel (nexus) that runs on the isolation
kernel. This nexus has similarities to the TVM in our approach. However, it does not
provide any means of using attestation techniques for trust-establishment.
Secvisor is another very interesting approach that has been proposed by Seshadri
et al. [148]. In this approach, the authors propose a very small virtual machine mon-
itor that heavily makes use of virtualization-supportive hardware. Since Secvisor only
supports one virtual machine, the hypervisor does not need to perform scheduling or
interrupt handling and is, thus, very small. Secvisor aims at ensuring code integrity for
commodity OS kernels. However, since it only supports one virtual machine, isolated
security sensitive environments that can be used for sensitive transactions can hardly
be formed.
Jansen et al. [87] also showed how the integrity of different virtual machines can be
ensured by adding Trusted Computing technology to a virtual machine monitor. In this
context, Jansen et al. make use of the Xen-hypervisor and, similar to us, add Trusted
Computing to the Dom0. However, in contrast to our work, Jansen et al. propose to
integrate the attestation service in the privileged Dom0. We believe that this approach
is rather impractical since integrating the attestation service inside the Dom0 increases
the complexity of this Domain. In addition, Jansen et al. only implemented parts of
their design, and, therefore, it can only be speculated how the exact realization will
look.
7.10 Summary
We have presented the design and security mechanism of a security architecture that
is capable of supporting attestation techniques. Our proposed security architecture is
based on virtualization-techniques and provides an isolated security environment where
confidential data can be processed. We introduced a four layer protection architecture
based on virtualization technology and attestation techniques. The four layer approach
enables (1) leveraging attestation techniques for trust-establishment by achieving a
meaningful attestation process and (2) containing security breaches in an isolated com-
partment. This approach guarantees software integrity and prevents an attacker from
tampering with the software configuration of a platform. Our proposed security archi-
tecture can be used as a foundation for constructing next-generation secure operating
systems that rely on Trusted Computing technology. Since we do not use some sort of
sealing techniques, sytem updates in our architecture can be easily handled. However,
the virtual TPM used in our approach is not able to achieve all our introduced security
requirements for a virtual TPM. As a result, a new approach which we will discuss in
the next chapter is necessary.
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Chapter 8
Virtualization-Enhanced TPMs
In this chapter, we present the design of a TPM that supports hardware-based virtual-
ization techniques. Our approach enables multiple virtual machines to use the complete
power of a hardware TPM by providing for every virtual machine (VM) the illusion that
it has its own hardware TPM. The approach presented in this chapter uses recent de-
velopments in the virtualization technology of processor architectures. This chapter
shares some material with Enhancing Trusted Platform Modules with Hardware-Based
Virtualization Techniques [157].
8.1 Introduction
We have seen in the preceding chapters, that using the attestation mechanisms of the
TPM requires a system that is based on virtualization [123]. This is especially true if
a system wants to demonstrate to a remote party that it is in a trusted state by using
the attestation facilities of a TPM.
Virtualization technologies are getting increasing interest from both industry and
academia because they offer an alternative means of hardening an operating system and,
thus, of increasing system security [14, 118]. This trend is also reflected in the current
hardware architectures. Intel [37, 38] and AMD [6] have added virtualization support
to their processor architectures in order to accommodate emerging developments that
require the support of multiple virtual machines (VMs) on a single entity. This is
not only of interest in the server market, where the execution of multiple commodity
operating systems should be supported on a single machine, but also in the client area,
where there is a need to completely increase system security and reliability [167].
Unfortunately, as already mentioned in Chapter 7, the TPM was never designed to
be used in virtual environments, and is, thus, not capable of being used in a system that
is based on virtualization. We circumvented this fact be introducing a software TPM
in Chapter 7 that enables the different virtual machines to use their own virtual TPM.
However, this approach does not provide the same security level, since the virtual TPM
is completely implemented in software and, thus, cryptographic secrets are temporarily
not protected by hardware. If for example an attacker gained control of the Management
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VM, he might be able to access the secure storage of a virtual TPM and access sensitive
VM data.
To provide life-time protection of cryptographic secrets and the possibility of using
the functionalities of a hardware-based TPM inside the VMs, we propose to use a
TPM that is capable of supporting virtualization with hardware measures. We present
the design of such a TPM and show how the interactions between the VMs and the
TPM could be realized. The approach presented in this chapter utilizes hardware-based
virtualization techniques as provided through Intel’s VT processor architecture.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: we first look in Section 8.8
at other work that is related to our proposal. We then extract requirements for a
hardware-based virtual TPM and present the main idea of our approach in Section 8.2.
In Section 8.3, we explain our architecture and the components that are involved in
our approach. Section 8.4 shows how we enable the different VMs to directly use the
underlying hardware TPM. Section 8.5 presents the protocol for securely migrating a
TPM context to another VM. In Section 8.6, we explain how the endorsement credentials
for the different TPM contexts are handled and how the TPM management commands
are realized. We summarize with Section 8.9.
8.2 Virtualizing the TPM
One design criteria of currently available TPMs was that they should be easily attach-
able to a mainboard of a PC. Attaching a TPM to an Low Pin Count (LPC) bus seemed
to be a very convenient solution; however, this approach is very problematic as it does
not enable the establishment of trust relationships using the TPM in a system that is
based on virtualization [156]. One solution for this problem is to use software TPMs
[20, 156] that only use the underlying hardware TPM for certain operations. This ap-
proach allows the virtualization of the TPM and, thus, the establishment of trust in a
system that is based on virtualization. We used this approach in Chapter 7 However,
a software TPM cannot provide the same protection level if it is evaluated according
to Common Criteria, because software TPMs does not provide mechanisms for pre-
venting unauthorized access to protected data, such as active shields or active security
sensors. However, a high evaluation may be necessary if VMs are using a TPM and
rely on Trusted Computing technology. To enable a VM to use the full functionality
of a hardware TPM without accepting security restrictions, we propose a multi-context
TPM that is completely realized in hardware.
8.2.1 Requirements
In this section we present the design goals for using a TPM in virtual environments. We
have already presented them in Section 7.5.3 and shown in Section 7.7.2 that a software
TPM cannot achieve all requirements. We will we again recapitulate these design goals
since not all goals were achieved by the software TPM.
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R.1: Performance This goal states that the overhead from using a TPM in a VM
should be negligible compared to directly executing commands on the TPM. The VM
should therefore be able to execute TPM commands at nearly the same speed as when
these commands are used on a non-virtualized machine.
R.2: Compatibility It should be possible to execute TPM command code in a VM
without modifying the code or adapting it to the virtualized environment. Therefore,
we explicitly forbid using paravirtualization techniques [185].
R.3: Simplicity A fault in a VMM can cause a failure in all VMs which could result
in a crashing VM. A VMM that provides abstraction and sharing of a TPM should
therefore be as simple as possible [132].
R.4: Security A TPM that is used in a VM should provide the same security prop-
erties as if the TPM would be accessed natively. This goal was not achieved by the
softare TPM.
R.5: Minimal modifications to the specification If the specifications by the
TCG must be modified, these modifications should be as slight as possible, leaving the
modifications and the specification as compatible as possible.
8.2.2 Our Approach
The main challenges to providing hardware enhanced virtualization of TPMs is deter-
mining how to handle TPM data that is specific for a certain platform, e.g., data that is
specific for the physical machine. Such data includes the owner-password of the TPM,
the PCRs, the Storage-Root-Key (SRK ) and the EK. This data cannot be shared across
all VMs, because if it were, a VM could modify this data, which would result in a TPM
state change and, thus, influence the TPM state of the other VMs.
It is necessary to provide every VM with its own instance of a full-fledged hardware
TPM, including its own owner-password, PCRs, SRK s and EK s. Since it should be
possible to use the hardware TPM for a theoretical unlimited number of VMs, the
multi-context TPM should be flexible and not associate one specific TPM, non-volatile
memory region for every VM.
We propose that the multi-context TPM operates on a Control Structure that is
loaded into the TPM each time a particular VM operates on its TPM. A VMM is
responsible for providing an abstract interface to the underlying hardware TPM and
for isolating the different TPM instances. It also performs scheduling operations and
is responsible for assigning an unique ID to every VM. This unique ID refers to a
specific TPM context. If a VM wants to issue a command to the hardware TPM, the
VMM loads the corresponding TPM Control Structure (TPMCS) into the TPM (if
not already loaded) and the TPM then operates on this structure. The TPM Control
Structure is a data structure that encapsulates all the information needed to capture
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Figure 8.1: Layout of a multi-context TPM
the state of a TPM or to resume a TPM. This approach enables the direct execution
of the TPM instructions from a VM on a TPM, and is, thus, very efficient. To provide
a hardware protection mechanism, we introduce another privilege level to the TPM.
A virtual machine runs in a lower TPM privilege level and, thus, can only operate on
its own TPM Control Structure. Operations on other TPMCS can only be done by
management commands issued by a VMM. The issuing of such a command by the VM
must be intercepted and results in a controlled context switch to the VMM. We will
discuss this mechanism in detail in Section 8.4.
8.3 TPM Architecture
The layout of our multi-context TPM is shown in Figure 8.1. Despite the components
of a generic TPM, it also provides a second non-volatile storage in which the active
TPM Control Structure is loaded. The data of the TPM Control Structure can only be
loaded and unloaded into the TPM by TPM management commands. When a TPM
Control Structure is unloaded and written back to background storage, it is always
protected by secrets that are stored in the root-data structure. Both the root-data
structure and the TPM Control Structure hold TPM specific data that is expected to
never leave the TPM, as specified by the TCG. This includes Endorsement keys (EK s),
Attestation Identity Keys (AIK s), etc. Only TPM commands that are issued by a VMM
can operate on the root-data structure. Replay attacks on the TPM Control Structure
are, in principle, possible. However, these attacks are also particularily problematic
in the current specification. To overcome these problems, an extension of the TPM
specification as proposed by us in [91] could be used. Note that such replay attacks
could basically be used to replay old PCRs values stored in the TPM Control Structure.
However, these attacks would require a modified and malicious VMM and would thus
be detected since the hashvalue of the integrity of the VMM is stored in the root-data
structure of the TPM (see Section 8.3.3).
We assume that our multi-context TPM is either integrated on the CPU or on a fast
bus, and has a direct connection to the CPU, leaving it essentially free of hard speed
constraints compared to the LPC bus.
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8.3.1 TPM Protection Rings
To provide the TPM with a hardware-based protection architecture and to isolate one
VM TPM context from another, we introduce hierarchical protection domains (protec-
tion rings) into the TPM. These protection rings are shown in Figure 8.2 and distin-
guishes two different TPM modes of execution. For this purpose, we introduce a 1-bit
non-volatile control register (CR), which the actual TPM state refers to. Every time a
context switch occurs, i.e., a controlled state transition from non-privilege TPM mode
to the privilege TPM mode and vice versa, the TPM control register is set appropri-
ately. The Figure also shows which x86 CPU modes, and which software (VMM or
guest-OS), is executed in which ring. If our TPM is directly integrated inside the CPU,
and is therefore able to use the protection rings of the CPU, the integration of the CR
inside the TPM could be omitted. Nevertheless, our proposed architecture requires a
direct interaction with the CPU in order to satisfy the necessary protection domains
and to ensure that context switches are reliably enforced. Hence, we require a strong
collaboration between CPU and TPM as we will see in the following sections.
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Figure 8.2: Privilege level of a multi-context TPM
The VMM ought to be run in the privilege VMX root-operation of the CPU as well
as in the TPM privilege mode. The VMM runs on a higher privilege level of the TPM
and is, thus, able to manage TPM state transitions. However, under the assumption
that the authorization data (e.g. owner password) of the TPM are kept secure inside the
VM, the VMM cannot inspect the communication between VM and TPM. Parts of the
communication between TPM and the software stack are encrypted with a session-key
that is derived from the authorization data (Cf. [171], pp. 60).
8.3.2 TPM Back-End Device Driver
The TPM back-end device driver is integrated into the VMM and therefore runs in ring
0 of the CPU’s VMX-root mode. Its main purposes are isolating the different TPM
interfaces and scheduling the TPM commands invoked by the VM. It also maintains a
data set including the unique IDs of each TPM context as well as their associations to
the VMs. Note that this TPM back-end device driver does not need to implement the
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Figure 8.3: Transition between different TPM contexts
full software stack of the TPM, since conventional operations on the TPM are issued
by VMs that implement their own software stacks.
Figure 8.3 shows a typical sequence of operations inside a virtualized TPM envi-
ronment. The white areas of the Figure show the operations of a VMM that set up
the environment for every VM and its corresponding TPM context. The gray areas
represent two different VMs with their corresponding TPM contexts. The transition
between VMM and VM are invoked by special instructions, which can only be executed
in the TPM privilege mode.
Every TPM that has been turned on in normal mode can be made to enter the
virtualization mode by executing the TPM Xon operation. The transition of the TPM
contexts needs to be synchronized with the transitions between the different modes of
execution on the Intel VT-X/I architecture, in order to support direct native execution
on the TPM. This property is discussed in detail in Section 8.4.
The VMM assigns for every TPM context, as well as for every VM instance, an
execution time in which the VM is allowed to execute operations on the TPM. This
execution time not only includes the time a VM is allowed to use the TPM, but also
how long the VM is allowed to use the CPU. Determining the exact execution time is
task of a scheduling algorithm, such as round-robin. Thus, all VM does not necessarily
receive the same execution time to execute instructions on the underlying resources. If
this execution time has passed, the VMM regains control of the TPM and assigns the
next context of the TPM. To keep the VMM from losing control of the TPM, the VMM
must set an interval timer, that states how long the VM is allowed to use the TPM and
the underlying processor. This interval timer is set by the VMM before passing control
to a VM. It counts down clock circles and if it reaches zero, triggers an interrupt. The
interrupt then passes the control back to the VMM.
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8.3.3 TPM Control Structure
A transition from one TPM context to another is controlled by the VMM through a
TPM Control Structure (TPMCS). The VMM associates to every TPM context its own
TPM Control Structure. This structure holds all state specific TPM data as shown in
Figure 8.4 and only the TPM can operate on this structure. Each time the VMM closes
a TPM context and spawns a new context, the old Control Structure is saved on the
background storage and the new Control Structure is loaded into the TPM. Since this
Control Structure holds sensitive TPM data, cryptographic measures must be in place
to prevent unauthorized modifying of a Control Structure.
To protect this TPM structure from unauthorized modifications, we propose using
the Storage Root Key of the TPM to seal this structure to the current platform config-
uration of the system. This SRK is stored inside the TPM root-structure and is only
accessible by the TPM in the root-mode of the TPM. Sealing the structure to a set of
platform configuration registers is necessary for ensuring that the VMM is in its initial
state and trusted. In contrast to the SRK of the VM, the SRK of the root-mode will
never leave the TPM.
Fields of the TPM Control Structure
Storage Root Key
PCRs [16..23]
Attestation Identity Keys
Endorsement Key
Endorsement Credential
Monotonic Counter Values
Values of the non-volatile storage
Delegation Tables
TPM context data
DAA TPM specific secret (f)
TPM PERMANENT FLAGS/DATA
TPM STANY FLAGS/DATA
TPM STCLEAR FLAGS/DATA
Authorization data
Figure 8.4: TPM Control Structure
The TPM also possesses a number of special purpose registers, such as the tick
counter or the PCRs. Tick counter and the lower values of the PCRs are special, since
both should be consistent in all VMs. We suggest that the tick counter and the PCRs
[0..15], which hold the data from the bootstrap procedure and the VMM’s integrity, be
stored in a special region of the TPM. Every TPM context should be able to read the
values stored in these registers. Writing to this registers is only possible if the TPM is
in the privilege mode and its CR is set to 0. To enable a VM to attest its configuration,
the TPM computes the signature on PCRs [0..15] and PCRs [16..23] using one AIK
stored inside the loaded TPM Control Structure.
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8.3.4 Extended Instruction Set
To realize the management features of the TPM, we extend the specification to a number
of additional TPM commands. These commands manage the TPM state and are used
to control the different TPM contexts. All commands are executable only by the VMM,
since they must be executed in ring 0 of the TPM. If one such command is executed in
ring 1 of the TPM, they trap into the VMM, where a dispatcher emulates the instruction.
In the remainder of this paper, these instructions are referred to as sensitive instructions.
The TPM also supports a number of instructions that allow a TPM context of being
migrated to another TPM. We will explain these instructions in detail in the remainder
of this work.
• TPM Xon, TPM Xoff enables/disables the second privilege level of the TPM
• TPM Launch creates and launches a new TPM context and an empty TPMCS
• TPM Resume loads an existing TPMCS into the TPM and launches the correspond-
ing TPM contexts
• TPM Exit saves an existing TPMCS and seals it to certain PCRs
• TPM Clear deletes an existing TPMCS and the corresponding TPM context
• TPM Migrate migrates an existing TPMCS from a source TPM to a destination
TPM
• TPM InitializeMigration initializes the migration procedure on the source TPM
• TPM InitializeImport initializes the migration procedure on the destination
TPM
• TPM Import imports a migrated TPMCS into the destination TPM
These instructions also control which TPM context and which corresponding VM
will receive the underlying hardware TPM, thus, which VM is allowed to operate on
the TPM.
8.4 Direct Native Execution
For virtualizing a resource, there exist a number of different techniques. A processor is
typically shared by a number of processes or VMs and every process is allowed to use the
resource for a particular time period. This technique is also adapted to our approach.
However, other techniques also exist, for example, partitioning which is normally done
for background storage (disks); and emulation, which is for example used in the software
TPM approach [20] or if a processor is completely emulated [17].
The main advantage of the sharing technique is that it enables direct native execution
and the use of efficient virtualization, as stated by Popek and Goldberg’s first Theorem
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[69]. To enable an efficient virtualizable TPM, we adapt the TPM so that it is possible
to execute nearly all instructions directly on the TPM and, thus, to satisfy Popek and
Goldberg’s first Theorem.
In order to achieve direct native execution, it is absolutely necessary that sensitive
instructions trap into the VMM. Sensitive instructions are instructions which can result
in an illegal TPM state change. If such a sensitive instruction is executed by a VM it
must trap into the VMM where a dispatcher routine emulates the instruction. However,
since the TPM does not possess its own program counter, it cannot autonomously trap
into the VMM if it encounters a sensitive instruction. This property is similar to
sensitive x86 processor instructions such as POPF, which do not perform a trap if they
are executed in the non-privilege processor mode [129].
Since TPM state transitions and VM state transitions are synchronized and con-
trolled by the VMM, the VM, which is actually the owner of the processor also occupies
the TPM. Therefore, only the VM that currently has execution time on the processor
can issue commands to the TPM. Consequently, we only have to consider the case in
which a sensitive instruction is executed in ring 1, such as TPM Exit.
8.4.1 Handling Sensitive Instructions
If a sensitive instruction, such as TPM Exit, is executed in ring 1, the TPM must trap
into the VMM. Sensitive commands must be executable only by the VMM, otherwise,
a VM could overwrite values of a TPM Control Structure which belongs to another
TPM context. Since a VMM cannot inspect all commands sent by a VM, the TPM
must decide whether or not this command is to be executed. If the TPM receives a
management command, it should check internally whether the TPM CR is in ring 0.
If not, the TPM should jump to the dispatcher routine running inside the VMM. Note
that either the VMM or the VM could issue a management command while the TPM’s
privilege level is set to 1. This is due to the fact that the status register of the CPU
and the TPM are not necessarily synchronized. Thus, it could happen, that the CPU
is operating in VMX-root mode, while the CR of the TPM is still set to 1. In that case,
the CR of the TPM must first be set to 0 before the TPM can execute a VMM issued
management command.
Since the TPM cannot directly modify the program counter of the CPU if it receives
a privilege command, an exception must be caused that allows the CPU to jump into
the correct dispatcher routine inside the VMM. We propose to use interrupt requests
as they are typically used by other PCI devices through the INTR bus signal [39]. If
the TPM is integrated inside the CPU, the TPM might be able to directly modify the
program counter and, thus, jump directly into the dispatcher routine of the VMM.
Algorithm 4 shows the steps performed by the CPU and the TPM respectively. If an
exception happens, the TPM signals an interrupt by emitting the INTR bus signal. The
processor then reads from the system bus the interrupt vector number provided by an
external interrupt controller. This vector number signals to the CPU which interrupt
is caused. Based on the information given inside the VMCS held by the VT-I/X CPU,
the CPU performs a vmexit and jumps into the corresponding dispatcher routine of
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Algorithm 4: Handling sensitive instructions
TPM receives TPM Exit ;
if CR0 = 0 then
Execute TPM Exit ;
else
CR0 := 0 ;
Execute INTR ;
Interrupt causes vmexit ;
CPU loads exit information from VMCS ;
CPU sets PC to VMM entry point address ;
VMM executes/emulates TPM Exit ;
CR0 := 1 ;
vmentry (VMCS) ;
the VMM. For this purpose, the VMCS of the VT-I/X architecture must hold the
information where the TPM dispatcher routine is located in memory.
8.4.2 Scheduling the TPM
The VMM is responsible for the transitions between different VM contexts. This ap-
proach is analogous to scheduling VMs. However, the problem is that if the TPM is
not directly integrated into the CPU, the privilege level of the TPM does not directly
depend on the privilege level of the CPU. Thus, a vmexit does not directly set the
control register of the TPM to zero. Therefore, a controlled state transition must be
passed to the TPM, which then issues an interrupt that jumps to a concrete entry point
of the VMM.
Figure 8.5 shows the actions performed by the VMM in retiring one VM and ac-
tivating the next VM. The figure also shows the value of the TPM control register.
The CPU performs a vmexit that is caused by the interval timer and sets the PC to a
specific entry point of the VMM. This controlled state transition also stores the actual
state of the VM inside the VMCS. The VMM then determines which VM is next in line
to use the processor. The VMM then closes the TPM context by sending a TPM Exit
command to the TPM. The TPM resets its control register to zero, issues an interrupt
and delivers the corresponding interrupt vector number using an interrupt controller to
the CPU [39]. Based on the actual interrupt descriptor table (IDT), the CPU again
jumps to a specific entry point of the VMM, where the instruction is again sent to
the TPM. The VMM then resumes the next TPM context by sending the TPM Launch
command together with the stored and encrypted TPMCS to the TPM. Afterwards,
the VMM resets the interrupt timer and relinquishes control to the VM by loading the
VM state information into the CPU (vmentry).
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Figure 8.5: Workflow of retiring one VM/TPM and activating the next VM/TPM
8.5 Secure TPM Context Migration
VMs can be migrated to other platforms. Since a VM might have stored cryptographic
keys inside our multi-context TPM, we have to consider how a complete TPM context
is securely migrated to another TPM. Basically, all state information of a TPM context
is stored inside the TPM Control Structure. However, since this Control Structure is
bound to a specific TPM, it cannot be transferred directly.
To prevent a TPMCS’s being migrated to multiple contexts or an old TPMCS’s
being again replayed into the system, we propose the use of the monotonic counter of
the TPM to synchronize all existing TPM contexts with the root-structure of the TPM.
For this purpose, each TPMCS and the root-TPM structure hold a register in which
both are incremented each time a TPMCS is migrated. We refer to this register as
the migration counter. Before a TPMCS can be migrated, the TPM internally verifies
whether both migration counters have the same value. If an already migrated TPMCS
is loaded again in the TPM, its migration counter differs from the one stored inside the
TPM and the TPM will refuse to operate on this structure. This check must always
be performed before a TPM context is allowed to operate on a TPMCS. Note that the
migration counter cannot be reset and can only be incremented. Before a TPMCS can
be migrated to another context, it must be ensured that the destination platform is in
a trusted state. This should be done by remotely verifying the platform state of the
destination platform using platform attestation. For this purpose, a secure attestation
channel, such as the one established by Protocol 3.6.3 must be established. We assume
that a secure attestation channel has been established between both entities and that
our migration protocol runs inside the resulting channel.
Figure 8.6 shows our migration protocol. It has similarities to the concept the TCG
introduced with migratable keys and simply transfers an encrypted TPMCS blob to the
other TPM. The TPMCS is directly bound to random nonces generated on the source
and the destination platform to prevent a TPMCS from being migrated to multiple
TPMs.
In the first two steps, the TPM generates a non-migratable TPM key KA and
certifies this key to provide assurances that it is held in a protected storage of a genuine
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Figure 8.6: High-Level Migration Protocol
TPM. This key is then transferred together with a nonce (NA) and the AIK certificate
to the destination platform, where the import is initialized. The migration interface
verifies that the query is coming from a genuine TPM and that the KA is protected
by a TPM, using the provided certificates (Cf. [174], pp. 130). The destination TPM
initializes the import procedure by generating and certifying its own non-migratable
TPM key (KB). For this purpose, the interface of the migration platform must provide
owner authorization, including NA and the certificate of the source platform. Then,
the TPM delivers the encrypted package consisting of NA and NB to the migration
interface. The migration interface collects all certificates that are necessary to prove
that KB is a TPM protected key and transfers the package back to the source TPM. The
source migration interface then provides owner authorization to the TPM and delivers
the received encrypted package, including the TPMCS that is to be migrated to the
TPM. The TPM verifies authorization of the command and checks internally whether
the migration counter conforms to the migration counter of the TPMCS that is to be
migrated. If everything checks out, the TPM increments the internal migration counter
and the migration counter of all other TPMCS that reside on this system. The TPM
must ensure that the migration counter of each TPMCS is only incremented once, since
otherwise, an old TPMCS could be replayed into the system.
The TPM then encrypts the TPMCS and the nonces with the delivered TPM key
of the destination platform and transfers the package to the destination platform. The
TPM of the destination platform imports the package and activates the TPMCS if
the nonces and the asserted authorization data are correct. The migration procedure
finishes by setting the migration counter of the TPMCS to the destination’s TPM actual
value of the internal migration counter and by re-certifying the EK of the TPMCS.
8.6 TPM Credentials
Every TPM is uniquely identifiable by the Endorsement Key (EK ). This EK is pre-
installed by the manufacturer of the TPM and is used to generate the owner-password.
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In order to provide full-fledged TPMs for every TPM context, every context needs
to possess its own EK. However, it should also be possible for a verifier to decide
whether the EK of a TPM context is an authentic EK, i.e., generated and protected
by a hardware TPM. It is possible for a manufacturer to generate a number of EK s
and integrate them on our multi-context TPM. However, we believe that this process
is not feasible, since this would require an additional overhead for the manufacturer.
In addition, all EK s and certificates could be migrated out of the domain of the multi-
context TPM and deplete the device of its pre-installed EK s.
1. VMM → TPM : TPM OSAP(authData)
2. VMM ← TPM : H
3. VMM → TPM : TPM Exit(H)
4. TPM : Store TPMCS values in Dn+1
: Create PCRInfo Structure
: {Dn+1}SRK :=Seal(Dn+1, PCRInfo, H)
: sign+1 := D(Dn+1, K−1TPM )
5. VMM ← TPM : {Dn+1}SRK , sign+1
6. VMM → TPM : TPM Resume(H, {Dn}SRK , sign, authData)
7. TPM : Check if migration counter ?= TPMCS.migration counter
8. : Dn :=Unseal({Dn}SRK , H)
: Verify sign with Dn
: Load Dn into TPMCS
: CR0 := 1
9. VMM ← TPM : TPM SUCCESS
Figure 8.7: Exiting and Resuming a TPM context (CR of the TPM is set to 0)
We propose to establish a certificate chain with the EK, which is held in the root-
TPM structure as a root node. For every TPM context, the TPM generates its own EK,
which then becomes certified by the root EK. Generating EK s directly on the TPM is a
feature that current TPMs already support (Cf. [175], pp. 143). This process allows us
to obtain AIKs for every TPM context simply by verifying the certificate chain of the
EK. If a TPM is migrated, the EK of the migrated structure must then be re-certified
with the EK that resides on the destination platform.
In the following, we provide the protocols for creating and exiting a TPM context.
These protocols are exemplary for the other TPM commands that we introduced in
8.3.4.
8.6.1 Spawning a TPM Context
The protocol for creating a new TPM context is shown in Figure 8.8. First, a TPM
Object-Specific Authorization Protocol (OSAP) session is created between the TPM and
the VMM. This command requires authorization (owner-password and SRK -password)
and computes a cryptographic secret and a handle (H) to this session; both to protect
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the whole session traffic (Cf. [171], pp. 71). The returned handle is then used to issue
the TPM Launch command. The TPM then internally creates a new TPM context and
adds an EK and the corresponding credential to this structure.
1. VMM → TPM : TPM OSAP(authData)
2. VMM ← TPM : H
3. VMM → TPM : TPM Launch(H)
4. TPM : Create empty D
5. TPM : Create 2048-bit Endorsement key-pair (KvEK , K−1vEK)
: Sign KvEK with K−1EK
: Add Cert(KvEK) and KvEK to D
6. TPM : Load D into TPMCS data field
7. TPM : CR0 := 1
7. VMM ← TPM : TPM SUCCESS
8. VMM : LaunchandMeasureVM
Figure 8.8: Creating a new TPM context (CR of the TPM is set to 0)
After the TPMCS has been created, the VMs integrity is measured [156] and the
obtained measurements are added to the PCR value of the current loaded TPMCS.
8.6.2 Exiting a TPM Context
Exiting requires that the current loaded TPMCS is stored on the background storage.
To prevent an attacker from being able to inject corrupt data structures, a TPMCS is
sealed and signed with keys that are protected by the TPM. Figure 8.7 shows how this
is realized. The TPM creates a special purpose data structure Dn in which the current
values of a TPMCS are stored. This data structure is then sealed to the actual platform
configuration, which must also include the integrity of the VMM.
This can easily be achieved by using the Safer Mode Extension (SMX) of the Intel
TXT technology [38] or the AMD Secure Virtual Machine technology [6]. Both provide
a special CPU command; in the case of Intel, it is called getsec and in the case of
AMD, it is called skinit. These commands measure the VMM into a PCR and create a
so-called Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM).
We denote the sealing of the structure Dn+1 at a specific time ∆t with Seal(Dn+1,
PCRInfo, H). H is a key-handle for the storage root key and PCRInfo is a TPM PCR INFO
structure that contains the information to which PCRs Dn+1 will be bound. The
operation to unseal is denoted as Unseal({Dn+1}SRK) where for simplicity reasons
{Dn+1}SRK also includes the structure of the platform configuration registers. Unseal-
ing the {Dn+1}SRK at ∆t+x is then only possible if the current platform configuration
is equal to the platform configuration that {Dn+1}SRK is bound to.
The data structure (Dn) is additionally signed using a TPM specific signing key
(K−1TPM ), which is stored in the root-structure of the TPM only for that purpose. The
sealed data structure and the corresponding signature is then passed to the VMM,
which stores it locally. The VMM then executes the TPM Exit command and delivers
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the sealed data structure and the corresponding signature of the TPM context which
should be resumed by the TPM. The TPM internally verifies whether the migration
counter of the TPMCS is consistent with the one stored inside the migration counter
of the root-data structure. This verification prevents against an already migrated TPM
context or a replayed TPM context being again loaded into the TPM. The TPM then
unseals the structure and verifies that the signature sign+1 is a valid signature of Dn+1.
If the signature is valid, implying that the data structure was generated on this specific
TPM, the TPM loads the values Dn+1 into its internal memory.
8.7 Satisfied Security Requirements
In contrast to our first approach that used a software TPM to virtualize a TPM (com-
pare 7.5.3), we are now directly using a virtualization-enhanced hardware TPM. This
hardware TPM satisfies all requirements (R.1 - R.3) that a software TPM satifies. In
addition, it also satsifies the security requirement (R.4) since all cryptographic secrets
are protected by hardware measures and can thus only be accessed by hardware.
8.8 Related Work
Another very related proposal has been made by England and Loeser [57]. The authors
propose to safely share a TPM among other virtual machines by paravirtualizing the
TPM. All TPM data that cannot be shared is paravirtualized, i.e., the state of each
VM’s TPM is stored in software. This is for example true for the PCRs which cannot
be shared amongst all VMs. However, the approach has two major drawbacks. First, it
does not provide the same security level as our proposed multi-context hardware TPM,
and, Second, the EK must be shared through all VMs which is a potential security
vulnerability.
Sadeghi et al. propose in [136] a virtual TPM architecture that supports property-
based attestation. Their approach extends a virtual TPM with mechanisms that allows
migrating a vTPM instance to another platform that offers the same platform proper-
ties. However, in contrast to our work, the approach by Sadeghi et al. is also based on
the software TPM [20] and, thus, does not provide lifetime protection of secrets.
Similar to a TPM, ARM has introduced the TrustZone technology [5] which is an
extension to the ARM architecture. The TrustZone technology tries to ensure reliable
implementation of security critical applications by adding a second secure processor
execution mode in which applications with a higher protection level are run. In contrast
to the TPM, ARM TrustZone technology is implemented within the microprocessor
core itself. However, TrustZone does not provide the flexibility of a TPM and does only
support a small set of the functionalities that a TPM supports.
Intel and AMD have recently introduced the Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)
[38, 180] and the Secure Virtual Machine technology [6], respectively. Both architec-
tures extend the processor instruction set with a number of additional special purpose
instructions, that directly communicate with a TPM. In addition, these architectures
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implement virtualization technology and are, thus, capable of supporting different effi-
cient VMs with hardware measures.
8.9 Summary
Trusted Computing technologies provide a sound way of securing computer systems and
also a technological means for trust establishment. For this purpose, the Trusted Com-
puting Group introduced a hardware module called trusted platform module (TPM)
that protects cryptographic secrets and is capable of acting as a trust anchor. However,
the TPM cannot be used directly in next-generation operating systems that utilize vir-
tualization technologies. In this chapter, we proposed an efficient approach for using
TC-technology in virtual environments. Our approach extends the TPM specification
and shows how a hardware TPM that is capable of supporting virtualization with hard-
ware measures should be designed. To provide hardware-based protection domains, we
introduced a second TPM privilege level and a TPM Control Structure. The combi-
nation of both concepts allows a virtual environment to directly operate on the TPM
without loss of security properties. Since the approach we presented in this chapter uti-
lizes recent developments in the virtualization technology of processor architectures, it
could easily be adapted to integrate Trusted Computing technology in next-generation
processor architectures. In that case, highly-efficient and secure Trusted Computing
technology would be available to next-generation operating systems that are based on
virtualization.
Part IV
Transaction Software
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Chapter 9
Secure Transaction Software
This chapter presents a secure transaction software that can be used for sensitive e-
commerce transactions. This transaction software runs on our security architecture
presented in the preceding chapter and is, thus, capable of providing a proof that it is
in a trusted state. Parts of this chapter have been previously published in An Approach
to a Trustworthy System Architecture Using Virtualization [156] and Towards Secure
E-Commerce Based on Virtualization and Attestation Techniques [158].
9.1 Introduction
In the preceding sections, we presented the design and implementation of an attestation-
supporting security architecture. However, a security architecture cannot provide pro-
tection for confidential data if the application that is used as input interface and trans-
action software suffers from a wide range of vulnerabilities. This shows that besides an
underlying security architecture, the need for a secure transaction software evolves.
In today’s personal computers, security sensitive transactions are often facilitated
by the use of web-browsers such as Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, Mozilla’s Firefox or
Apple’s Safari. However, such browsers were never explicitly designed for acting as a
secure transaction software. Further complicating this problem is the issue of browser
help objects (such as flash players and video codecs) which extend the complexity of
these web-browsers. Since these components could be used to inject malicious code
and users are typically not adept at separating useful applications from malicious ones,
these components should not be part of a secure transaction client. Mozilla’s Firefox,
the most widespread web-browser, as an example, consists of around 1 million lines of
code, showing that the code complexity is huge. Because of their huge complexity and
the ability to execute additional programs, such as scripts, active code or applets, web-
browsers have become a de facto operating system [40]. However, since many software
engineering studies have shown that the code complexity is correlated with the number
of errors and defects [151, 15], a secure transaction software should be as simple as
possible.
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To make matters worse, the unsecure web-browsers typically run on unsecure and
unreliable operating systems. As shown in the preceding chapter, one vulnerability
of the underlying operating system can be exploited, thereby allowing an attacker to
surreptitiously install subversive programs, such as malware and spyware, which can
eavesdrop, record and distribute a user’s actions, passwords, credit card information,
bids in auctions or other sensitive data. As a result, it is difficult for users to ascertain
whether or not their computer’s software system can be trusted. However, such assur-
ances are necessary if users are to become more comfortable purchasing goods on-line
[59].
Another aspect that needs attention is that even if we are to assume trusted user
environments, a system may be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. MitM
attacks pose a serious threat to current electronic commerce applications that are based
on TLS [112]. These attacks exploit the fact that ordinary users often improperly verify
a merchant’s certificate. Even if the users carefully examine the certificate presented by
the merchant, they cannot be certain that the merchant’s identity is authentic, since
their own software could have maliciously modified the certificate presented to them.
In order for users to place trust in their system for use in e-commerce, it is, therefore,
necessary to provide them with assurances that:
1. they have a trusted client configuration.
2. authentication data, such as passwords, cannot be accidentally transferred to an
improperly verified server.
In this chapter, we present a secure transaction software that runs in the virtualization-
based environment presented in Chapter 7 to achieve strong isolation between com-
partments of different trust levels. This setup ensures that the sensitive e-commerce
transaction client is immune from infection by malicious processes running in different
compartments. To prevent MitM attacks on TLS and to ensure that the client appli-
cation is trusted, we propose several security protocols that are based on our proposed
attestation protocols. Using these protocols, we can ensure
1. that the client configuration remains untampered and trusted for the duration of
the transaction.
2. that confidential data, such as authentication passwords, are only accessible to
the electronic commerce server to which the users intend to transfer their data.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 9.2 describes our e-commerce archi-
tecture; in Sections 9.3 and 9.4, we discuss how to ensure that a client’s platform is
trusted and how to establish a secure channel with a remote host that is resistant to
MitM attacks. In Section 9.5, we provide an informal security analysis of our proposal.
In Section 9.6, we discuss some of the implementation issues that arise. In Section 9.7
we look at other work that is related to this chapter; and finally, we summarize with
Section 9.8.
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9.2 Overall E-Commerce Architecture
In contrast to existing e-commerce architectures, which often only consist of a server
and a client, our proposed architecture has an additional component. We employ a
trusted third party (TTP) that is responsible for distributing the secure transaction
software to clients and for subsequently validating the platform configuration of the
client platforms. The TTP maintains a data set of trusted reference values, which are
compared to the client’s platform configuration to determine the trust level of the client
platform. The reason for the TTP is that a typical server does not necessarily have the
potential to decide whether or not a particular client platform is trusted. In addition,
privacy issues would arise if a server were to know which software versions the client
uses.
1.) Login
Client TTP Server
3.) Ticket Presentation
4.) User Authentication, Transaction
2.) RA / Ticket issuing
Figure 9.1: Transaction Model
Figure 9.1 shows our transaction model. When the secure transaction software
(STS) running on the client connects to the platform provided by the TTP (step 1),
the client platform’s configuration is verified via platform attestation (step 2). When
the client’s platform is deemed trusted, the TTP issues a ticket that vouches for the
platform configuration of the client’s platform. This ticket will later be presented as a
credential so as to allow the platform configuration to obtain access to services offered
by the server (step 3).
9.2.1 Client Architecture
We use our proposed security architecture from Chapter 7 to enable the establishment
of several different execution environments that are strongly isolated from one another.
The secure transaction software (STS) runs in one isolated execution environment to
ensure that other applications cannot interfere with it. The architecture is depicted
in Figure 9.2. The TVM runs the STS and a tiny OS with a minimal set of software
components (this reduces the possible number of security vulnerabilities). The OS
and the STS are part of a virtual appliance (VA), which is a fully pre-installed and
pre-configured virtual machine image. To further reduce vulnerabilities, the TVM is
stateless, which means that any modifications in the guest system cannot be written
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back to the disk image. The TVM is also equipped with a secondary disk image that
can be used to store transferred data and information about former transactions.
Management VM 
(Dom 0)
Trusted VM
Attestation 
Service
TPM-Driver
Reduced Linux
vTPM-Manager
TPM-Driver
Reduced Linux
vTPMvTPM
Xen-Hypervisor
Conventional HardwareTPM 1.2
Open VM
Arbitrary Operating 
System
Application Application
Application
Application Application
STS
Figure 9.2: The secure transaction software runs in the TVM of our proposed security
architecture
9.2.2 Server Architecture
The server also runs the security architecture from Chapter 7 to provide better protec-
tion against attacks and to detect possible tampering with the software configuration.
In one TVM, the server executes a trading software that is able to communicate with
the STS and able to validate tickets issued by the TTP. The trading software is com-
parable to a conventional shop system that has been modified to support the creation
and verification of digital signatures and to verify the authenticity and validity of the
ticket that vouches for a trusted client configuration. Since this trading software runs
in one TVM, it can also make use of attestation techniques in order to prove that its
software configuration is in a trusted state. To satisfy scalability issues and to overcome
the performance bottleneck of a TPM, one of our protocols proposed in Chapter 4 can
be used.
9.2.3 Ticket-Based Attestation
We use the ticket-based remote attestation scheme as introduced in Chapter 5 to ver-
ify platform integrity, thereby validating that a communication partner’s platform is
trusted. Even though our approach introduced in Chapter 5 can handle multiple val-
idators, each of which verifies the integrity of one software component, we only employ
one validator, namely the TTP, which verifies the integrity of the entity’s whole plat-
form integrity. The reason for this is that due to the strong isolation between execution
environments provided by our security architecture, it is sufficient to only validate the
trust level of the TVM and its underlying layers. We assume that the TTP also has
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the potential to validate the underlying layers, which only consist of the hypervisor, the
Management VM and the Bootloader. Note that there is no need to validate the com-
plete boot-sequence including BIOS and ROM, since the hypervisor can be executed
using the skinit [6] or getsec instruction [38], thus establishing a DRTM [92].
9.3 Trusted Transaction Software
At present, users typically have little indication of the trust level of their platforms in-
cluding their transaction software. By isolating different compartments, virtualization
technologies reduce code complexity and the vulnerability to malicious code, thereby
minimizing the risk of a platform becoming compromised. However, even with virtual-
ization, users who interact with their platforms have no means of confirming that their
software is trusted. To cope with this problem, attestation techniques could solve this
problem by verifying the platform configuration through a remote entity and denying
access to a remote service if the platform is not considered trusted. However, adapt-
ing this mechanism to e-commerce is challenging since malicious software components
could simulate a successful attestation as well as a successful e-commerce transaction
whilst eavesdropping confidential data. As a result, the secure attestation protocols as
proposed in Chapter 3 cannot directly be applied.
9.3.1 Attestation Protocol
To ensure a trusted client configuration and to prevent malicious client applications
from spying on user entered data, we introduce a concept that shares some similarities
with the sealing concept, but circumvents the need for coping with legitimate system
updates. Legitimate system updates may occur very frequently even if a virtualization-
based system architecture, such as the security architecture in Chapter 7 is used. To
overcome this challenge, we subdivide the attestation process by adding an additional
initialization phase, which is only executed once. We assume that the platform configu-
ration of the client is trusted in this initialization phase. This phase could, for example,
be executed directly when the platform is first set up. It should be noted that the
initialization phase is only vulnerable to attacks that modify the complete attestation
process by simulating a trusted TTP.
We use an adapted version of Protocol 5.4.1 introduced in Chapter 5. This is due
to the fact that the platform configuration of our client may change very often. This
makes the approach used in Protocol 5.4.1 (i.e., generating a new TPM-bound key
each time the platform configuration changes) rather impractical. However, the basic
security mechanisms of Protocol 5.4.1 and the protocol proposed herein are identical.
The attestation protocol is divided into two separate protocols. In the initialization
phase the users choose a secret, which could also be a picture or a fractal structure,
to enhance usability. This secret is then cryptographically bound to the users’ TPM-
enabled platform. If the platform configuration is trusted, the attestation phase should
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decrypt this secret and display it to the users. This process assures the users that their
platform is in a trusted system state.
The complete protocol run of the initialization phase is shown in Protocol 9.3.2.
First, a secure attestation channel between B and T using Protocol 3.6.3 is established.
B is the entity that runs the TVM and T is a trusted third party. This secure attestation
channel is then used to transfer the attestation ticket and bind a user-specific secret to
platform B.
Protocol 9.3.2: Initialization Phase
SUMMARY: B answers the attestation challenge of T
RESULT: Establishment of a secure attestation channel: secret generation and bind-
ing to a platform
1. Protocol messages.
T → B : Nt, gt mod p, g, p (1)
T ← B : Cert(vAIK, KvAIK), {Nt, PCR, gb mod p}K−1vAIK (2)
T → B : {Nb, gt mod p}KTB (3)
T ← B : {Nb, Nt, SML, gb mod p}KTB (4)
T → B : {{gb mod p, g, p, timestamp}K−1T }KAB (5)
T ← B : {s,Cert(TPM, KTPM}KTB (6)
T → B : {{{ s }KTPM }KTTP }KTB (7)
2. Protocol actions.
(a) Precomputation by TTP. T selects an appropriate prime p and generator g
of Z∗p (2 ≤ g ≤ p− 2).
(b) T chooses a random secret t, 2 ≤ t ≤ p− 2, and computes gt mod p.
(c) Attestation challenge. T sends message (1) to B.
(d) B also chooses a random secret b, 2 ≤ b ≤ p− 2, and computes gb mod p.
(e) B computes the attestation response message by signing the own public
key, Nt and a set of PCRs using an vAIK.
(f) Attestation response. B delivers the signed message together with the
SML and the vAIK credential to T (2). Finally, B computes KTB =
(gt)b mod p.
(g) T verifies whether the delivered credentials are authentic and verifies if all
signatures are valid. Using the received gb mod p, T computes KTB =
(gb)a mod p and delivers an encrypted nonce in message (3) to B.
(h) B decrypts the nonce with KTB and delivers message (4) to T.
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(i) T decrypts message (4) and verifies freshness of the message. Finally, T
verifies whether the platform configuration of B is trusted using the SML.
(j) Ticket creation. T creates the attestation ticket shown in Equation 9.1 and
delivers τ to B.
τ = {gb mod p, g, p, timestamp}K−1T (9.1)
(k) B receives τ and creates a non-migratable TPM key KTPM . This key is cer-
tified with the vAIK and delivered to T. In addition, B chooses an arbitrary
secret s and delivers it to T.
(l) T encrypts s with KTPM and a TTP specific symmetric key KTTP . The
encrypted secret is delivered to B in message (7).
(m) B receives the encrypted secret {{ s }KTPM }KTTP and stores it.
After execution of the initialization phase, B is ready to execute the attestation
phase. In the attestation phase, the local stored secret s is delivered to the TTP
where it is decrypted and delivered back to B. In addition, T validates the platform
configuration of B and delivers a ticket that vouches for the trust level of B. This ticket
is later delivered to the server. The protocol run of the attestation phase is shown in
Protocol 9.3.3.
Protocol 9.3.3: Attestation Phase
SUMMARY: B answers the attestation challenge of T
RESULT: Establishment of a secure attestation channel: unbinding of a secret
and verification through the user
1. Protocol messages.
T → B : Nt, gt mod p, g, p (1)
T ← B : Cert(vAIK, KvAIK), {Nt, PCR, gb mod p}K−1vAIK (2)
T → B : {Nb, gt mod p}KTB (3)
T ← B : {Nb, Nt, SML, gb mod p}KTB (4)
T → B : {{gb mod p, g, p, timestamp}K−1T }KAB (5)
T ← B : {{{s}KTPM }KTTP }KTB (6)
T → B : {{s}KTPM }KTB (7)
2. Protocol actions.
(a) The protocol actions for delivering messages (1) to (5) are analogue to Pro-
tocol 9.3.2. See actions (a) to (j) of Protocol 9.3.2.
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(b) B loads the encrypted secret s from the background storage and delivers
{{{s}KTPM }KTTP } to T.
(c) T receives {{{s}KTPM }KTTP } and if B is trusted, it encrypts this message
and delivers {s}KTPM back to B.
(d) B receives {s}KTPM and decrypts the message using K−1TPM . The encrypted
secret s is displayed to the user.
9.4 User Authentication and Ticket Presentation
Most current e-commerce applications use a password-based user authentication. This
includes passwords, personal identification numbers (PINs), transaction authorization
numbers (TANs) and more sophisticated one time passwords (OTP). These token-based
user authentications are then integrated into an established TLS channel between client
and server. However, one has to be careful about embedding these password-based au-
thentication methods into an TLS-channel, since the confidentiality of the passwords
for authenticating a user depends on the authenticity of the server. If the server au-
thentication is done improperly by the user, e.g., by not clearly verifying the presented
certificate and the URL (see [88], [4]), an adversary could masquerade as a server, collect
usernames and passwords and later impersonate the user. This MitM attack is also pos-
sible if highly sophisticated one-time passwords or SecurID token-based authentication
methods are used, since the adversary could directly replay the collected authentica-
tion data into an already established session to an authentic server. Since the client
application does not prevent naive users from improperly verifying a presented server
certificate (and transferring their password to a malicious server), additional security
mechanisms must be in place.
9.4.1 Password-Based User Authentication and Ticket-Presentation
The solution we propose directly couples the user authentication to a second crypto-
graphic channel inside the TLS session. This second channel fulfills two requirements:
1. proof-of-possession of a ticket bound to the client’s platform issued by the TTP.
2. user-authentication is based on the already established secure channel and there-
fore only valid for this specific session.
Our proposed protocol is shown in Protocol 9.4.2. The protocol is executed between
one e-commerce server, which we denote with A and a client B. In the first steps, an
authentic TLS session is established and the ticket τ is verified. If the ticket τ is valid,
the server computes a DH-key pair [46], which acts as challenge for the client.
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Protocol 9.4.2: Ticket Presentation and User Authentication
RESULT: A authenticates the user
SUMMARY: Ticket presentation: ticket verification: key establishment with key-
confirmation: user authentication
1. Protocol messages.
A ↔ B : Establish TLS channel (1)
A ← B : {gb mod p, g, p, timestamp}K−1T (2)
A → B : ga mod p, Valid (3)
A ← B : {f(ga mod p, gb mod p, password), ID}KAB (4)
2. Protocol actions.
(a) A and B establish an TLS-channel. Alternatively, Protocol 3.7.4 can be used.
In that case, protocol messages (2), (3) and (4) must be slightly adapted.
(b) B transfers the Ticket τ = {gb mod p, g, p, timestamp}K−1T in message (2)
to A.
(c) A receives message (2), verifies freshness of the message and verifies all sig-
natures. If the validation suceeds, A creates a random secret a, 2 ≤ a ≤ p−2
and computes ga mod p. A delivers message (3) to B.
(d) B computes based on the ephemeral public DH-keys
v = f(ga mod p, gb mod p, password). The password is a secret that, A and
B have negotiated in advance, for example an arbitrary series of characters.
The function f must be a collision resistant hash-function [54], so that an
adversary is unable to compute the password based on the public keys and
the output of f . Finally, B computes the shared key KAB = (ga)b mod p
and transfers message (4) to A.
(e) A computes KAB = (gb)a mod p and decrypts message (4). Based on the
transferred public keys and the deposited password, A computes
v′ = f(ga mod p, gb mod p, password). If v ?= v′, the user of platform B
with the identity ID has successfully authenticated himself. In addition, he
provided a proof about the trust level of his platform and proven that he is
in possession of the valid ticket τ .
Protocol 9.4.2 can be executed very efficiently, since the server only has to verify
one signature and to compute the shared session key KAB. From this point on, this
shared key is used for the transaction. It should be noted that the generation of a new
DH key-pair can be omitted if the server has already seen g and p and generated a
key-pair based on these public parameters.
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9.4.3 Authentication Based on Smart Cards
TLS can also be used to mutually authenticate user and server. For this purpose, all
users are equipped with a certificate that is presented to the server. This certificate
allows us to omit the additional authentication method accomplished inside an existing
TLS session. This authentication mechanism prevents MitM attacks, since the adver-
sary cannot access the private key, which is stored on the smart card and used for
generating the TLS session key. If the user is in possession of a valid certificate and a
smart card, a mutually-authenticated TLS channel is established into which the ticket
T is transferred. In this case, steps 2-4 of our proposed Protocol 9.4.2 must be adapted
to ensure that the platform is in possession of the ticket.
9.5 Security Analysis
This section provides an informal security analysis of our security mechanisms and the
proposed protocols.
9.5.1 Forging a Trusted System Configuration
An attacker could try to forge a trusted system configuration by forging or replaying a
valid ticket. Since a ticket is directly bound to the current attested platform configu-
ration, an attacker cannot perform the challenge-response authentication process that
confirms the key ownership, which is integrated into the ticket.
Another possible attack is to replace the existing TVM, including the STS, with a
malicious TVM and simulate a successful attestation. For the success of this scheme,
the adversary must let the user perform a new initialization phase. However, the users
are able to detect this attack since they already completed the initialization phase and
provided their STS with a secret.
9.5.2 Accessing Confidential User Data
An adversary who is trying to access the password of a certain user may attempt to
simulate a successful attestation in order to force a user into entering his password into
a malicious client configuration. To achieve this goal, an adversary needs access to s,
which is only decryptable if both the TTP and the vTPM agree. A malicious host must,
therefore, transfer s to an honest host under his control and decrypt the message by the
TTP. Since the retrieved message is still encrypted with a key stored in the vTPM of
the malicious host, the adversary needs to transfer the key back to the malicious host.
However, the honest host runs a trusted system, which effectively prevents reading out
the memory for accessing and retrieving the key.
An adversary could also try to access the symmetric encryption key KTTP , which
the TTP uses for encryption. Since the adversary can pick passwords at random, the
adversary can perform an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack in attempt to crack the key
KTTP . We believe that this attack is very unlikely, since an adversary must pass the
attestation phase and, therefore, cannot use additional tools to support his computation.
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9.5.3 Security of the Password-Based User Authentication
Despite the existing shortcomings of password-based user authentication, e.g., their
vulnerability to phishing attacks [4], this method is currently wide spread and most of
the available e-commerce applications employ this method. Our proposed authentica-
tion scheme, which takes place in a second cryptographic channel, offers an end-to-end
communication that ends in a trusted virtual machine. To authenticate as a valid user,
one has to be able to answer the challenge, which is only possible if the platform has
obtained attestation and uses the corresponding ticket. The current one-time-password
(OTP) for authenticating the user is then computed based on the public key from the
server, the public key of the client and the shared password. A MitM may relay the
challenge (ga mod p) to the authentic user, but he cannot compute the shared key and,
thus, is not able to manipulate the upcoming transactions.
To clarify this attack, we look at the attack vector in detail. We assume that an
adversary M tries to authenticate himself against the server A using the obtained OTP
from B. The transmitted protocol messages are shown in Figure 9.3. The assumption
for this attack is that the adversary M is in possession of a ticket (gi mod p, g, p,
timestamp) that vouches for the trust level of his platform. In addition, we assume that
the user of platform B improperly verifies only the TLS-certificate presented to him.
A ↔ M : Establish TLS channel (1)
M ↔ B : Establish TLS channel (2)
A ← M : {gi mod p, g, p, timestamp}K−1T (3)
M ← B : {gb mod p, g, p, timestamp}K−1T (4)
A → M : ga mod p, Valid (5)
M → B : gi mod p, Valid (6)
M ← B : {f(gi mod p, gb mod p, password), ID}KMB (7)
A ← M : {f(gi mod p, gb mod p, password), ID}KAM (8)
Figure 9.3: Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Protocol 9.4.2
For a successful attack, it is necessary that the attacker modifies the challenge sent
to him by the server in step (5). Otherwise, it would not be possible for him to decrypt
the following communication, since A and B would have negotiated a cryptographic
key KAB. Due to the modified challenge in message (6), B computes his OTP based
on this message and transfers it to M. The adversary is able to encrypt this message
since he is in possession of the key KMB, but he cannot use this in another challenge
established between the adversary and A.
To prevent an adversary from launching dictionary attacks or brute-force attacks,
the public key of the client is additionally included in the computed OTP. Without
injecting the public key, a malicious server, trying to crack many passwords simulta-
neously, only needs to guess a password once, compute the OTP, and compare it to
all the other OTPs. In that case, the malicious server uses the same public key as a
challenge for multiple clients. However, with the public key of the client, all OTPs are
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based on different public keys of the client; so each guess must be computed separately
for each public key. We suggest that the password be a long secret in order to increase
the computational overhead for a malicious server to perform attacks of this type.
The robustness of this authentication scheme relies on the security of the one-way
hash-function used to compute f , more specifically, on the pre-image resistance of the
hash function [131]. f must be appropriately chosen so that it is a cryptographic hash
function which is collision and pre-image resistant. If these conditions are satisfied,
the probability of finding the password is comparable as hard as finding the pre-image
of an input without additionally adding public Diffie-Helman parameters. This is, for
example, easily verifiable if f is a random oracle [18].
Figure 9.4: The spawning of a Trusted VM. The upper shell shows the bootstrap proce-
dure of the TVM. The lower shell shows the contents of the vTPM. In this realization,
the TVM uses the x-server of the Management VM.
9.6 Implementation
We have implemented our proposed e-commerce architecture, including a trusted third
party, secure transaction software and a trading entity. The trading entity is a conven-
tional shop system that has been modified to support the creation and verification of
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Figure 9.5: Bootstrap procedure of the STS. After starting the TVM, the STS is directly
executed. The picture shows the user’s stored secret as deposited inside the TVM. The
shell also shows the operations of the vTPM-Manager running in the Management VM.
digital signatures and to verify the authenticity and validity of the ticket that vouches
for a trusted client configuration. Since the ticket issuing and configuration verification
is mainly done by the TTP, the extensions to the conventional shop system are very
minimal.
The STS is implemented in Java and is able to interpret any website written in
HTML and transferred using HTTP; however, it only provides the full security mecha-
nisms if it accesses a web-server that has been enhanced with our security mechanisms.
It is able to carry out secure transactions between a trading entity and implements our
proposed protocols. The STS runs on a Linux kernel that has been modified to use the
security mechanisms of the underlying security architecture. We removed unnecessary
device drivers and configured the STS and the Linux kernel as a virtual appliance that
is compatible to our security architecture introduced in Chapter 7. Figure 9.4 shows
the bootstrap procedure of a TVM.
The secure transaction software implements those protocols proposed in this chapter
that establish a secure attestation channel and is able to make trust visuable to the user.
After starting the secure transaction software, the stored secret is displayed to the user
as specified in Protocol 9.3.3. This process is shown in Figure 9.5. After validating the
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secret by the user, a secure connection to the trading entity can be established and the
secure transaction software displays the entry page of the e-commerce server (Figure
9.6).
Figure 9.6: Started STS. After successful validation of the platform configuration, the
TVM starts the STS.
Due to the existing shortcomings of password-based authentication methods, we
only implemented smart card-based authentication mechanisms that take place inside
the second cryptographic channel. To ensure that the STS is in possession of a valid
ticket, we adapted steps 2-4 of the protocol shown in Protocol 9.4.2 and performed a
slightly different challenge-response authentication process, namely a process that does
not transfer the password and the user-ID. The user is identified and authentication is
based on the information given on the smart card. For this purpose, we integrated a
smart-card device driver inside the virtual appliance of the Trusted VM and directly
accessed the USB-port of the relevant smart-card reader using pciback scripts [189].
9.7 Related Work
Oppliger et al. [112] identified the problem of man-in-the-middle attacks in TLS sessions
and proposed a solution to this problem. The main idea of their work is to base the user
authentication on the user’s secret and on the state information of the TLS channel. The
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disadvantage of this solution is that it depends on the trust level of the client application
and also requires that the user possess a secure ID-token with a small display.
Another interesting solution to secure e-commerce is proposed in [154]. Like us,
Singarevelu et al. propose reducing the code size and establishing isolated environments
using a microkernel. However, in contrast to our approach, Singarevelu et al. do not
show how attestation techniques could be used to provide assurances that a user is still
acting with a trusted environment. In addition, the approach presented by Singarevelu
et al. does not provide any means of preventing man-in-the-middle attacks on TLS.
There has also been much work done to prevent phishing attacks in electronic com-
merce. The objectives, motivations and attack patterns of phishers have been exten-
sively studied in the literature (e.g., [72, 44, 111]) and many proposals have been made
to prevent these attacks (e.g., [111, 188]).
In this context, one very interesting proposal has been made by Gajek et al. [65].
The authors proposed to augment a web-browser with an additional wallet that is
responsible for performing user authentication and for authenticating websites. The
wallet is strictly isolated from the web-browser and runs in a compartment established
by the PERSEUS security kernel [121]; it is, thus, robust against infection from malware.
However, since the proposal does not support attestation techniques, it does not provide
any means of providing a user with assurances that their used web-browser or the wallet
is still trusted.
Cox et al. [40] propose the Tahoma Web browsing system. This architecture uti-
lizes virtualization techniques to execute multiple isolated compartments on the Xen-
hypervisor. In each compartment, an instance of a full-fledged web-browser runs and
a network proxy running inside the management domain of Xen [14], controls the net-
work connection. While the approach is able to restrict the access rights of one browser
instance based on a specified policy, it is not able to handle and prevent man-in-the-
middle attacks on TLS. In addition, there are no mechanisms present to enable a user
to place trust into a web-browser running in an isolated compartment.
Other work that looks at trusted computing and e-commerce includes [12, 13, 4].
However, these approaches do not show how a secure e-commerce architecture that
supports attestation could be realized. Thus, these approaches are not able to generate
assurances of the trust level of a user’s platform or to transfer these assurances to the
user.
9.8 Summary
Server platforms are relatively robust and, whilst capable of being compromised, are
typically not the easiest target for cyber-criminals. Instead, client platforms are increas-
ingly being subverted since users typically do not have the same financial motivation (as
merchants) to harden their systems. Indeed, many users neither know how to harden
their systems nor how to discover if their system has been subverted. The solution
we have proposed is based on virtualization in combination with attestation techniques
and allows a user to ensure that a particular client configuration has not been tampered
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with and is trusted for the duration of the transaction. In addition, our architecture
ensures that confidential data, such as authentication passwords, are not accidentally
transferred to malicious servers that masquerade as authentic servers.
Chapter 10
Signature Creation with TPMs
In this chapter, we discuss the potential of the TPM and give considerations as to
whether a TPM could be used as a secure signature creation device. We examine
whether the TPM can be used as a secure signature creation device that conforms to
the EU Electronic Signature Directive as well as to the German Electronic Signature
Law. In addition, we argue that if the TPM can be used as secure signature creation
device, a trusted signing software also becomes necessary. This chapter shares some
material with The Creation of Qualified Signatures with Trusted Platform Modules [162]
and Erzeugung elektronischer Signaturen mittels Trusted Platform Modules [163].
10.1 Introduction
Despite the existing shortcomings of password-based user authentication, i.e., their vul-
nerability to phishing attacks [4], these techniques are currently wide spread and most
of the available e-commerce applications are based on these techniques. To overcome
these shortcomings qualified electronic signatures might be used. These signatures are
considered to be a vital component for e-commerce transactions in the future, since they
are capable of linking a particular user to a particular transaction effected over the in-
ternet. In contrast to the password-based user authentication, they can act as a prima
facie evidence in trial since they offer non-repudiation, which is especially relevant in
the realm of e-commerce. Thus, qualified signatures are a very important component
for trust-establishment.
A qualified electronic signature that confirms to article 5(1) of the EU Electronic
Signature Directive (EU Directive) and § 2(3) of the Signature Act 2001 (SigG) is an
advanced signature as specified by article 2(2) of the EU Directive and § 2(2) of SigG,
which is based on a qualified certificate and which is created by a secure signature
creation device.
However, qualified signatures are not widely used, and it is asserted that the failure
to use qualified signatures thereby deprives the market for electronic commerce of an
important source of potential growth [126]. A promising approach to overcome this
shortcoming is to use the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to create a qualified signa-
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tures. The TPM is already available in approximately 200 million personal computers
[178] and this technology is supported by many hardware vendors and is therefore
widespread. One of the properties required of this chip is to perform the necessary
cryptographic functions to create an advanced signature. However, the ability to per-
form the required mathematical operations is not enough to use this device to create
an advanced signature. This is due to the requirements for a compliant device for the
creation of an advanced signature, as set out in article 5(1) and Annex I - III of the EU
Directive and the Signature Act 2001.
Unfortunately, even if we were to assume that the TPM is able to create a qualified
signature, the problem arises that the software that is responsible for communicating
with the TPM might tamper on data delivered to the TPM. As a result, the owner of
the TPM might sign false or malicious transaction data without noticing. This may
result in the fact that the signatory made an unintentional contract which he cannot
deny. As a result, attestation techniques become necessary.
In this chapter, we will firstly validate whether the TPM can be used to create
qualified electronic signatures, and if so, whether such signatures could be used in e-
commerce. Thereafter, this chapter considers whether the TPM fulfills the technological
requirements of article 5(1) of the EU Directive and § 2(3) SigG, together with the
criteria provided for in Annex III of the EU Directive and § 17 Abs. 1 SigG, as well as
§ 15 Signature Decree 2001 (SigVO).
10.2 Testing SigG Conformity of the TPM
In this section, we evaluate whether the TPM can be used as a secure signature creation
device that conforms to the EU Electronic Signature Directive as well as to the Ger-
man Electronic Signature Law. For this purpose, we examine whether the mechanisms
provided by the TPM meet the basic requirements of the signature acts.
10.2.1 SigG Conformity of the TPM
In order to create a qualified electronic signature, the signature must pass the require-
ments specified in article 5(1) of the EU Directive and § 2 No. 3 SigG. According to
these provisions, the signature must be created with a secure signature creation device.
The detailed requirements are defined in annex III of the EU Directive and for Germany
in § 17(1) SigG and § 15(1) and (5) SigVO. According to the provisions of annex 1(I)(1)
of SigVO, the secure signature creation device must fulfill the assurance level EAL 4 and
be tested against an attacker with a high attack potential (strength of function high).
As already shown, this requirement is not covered by the TPM specification, but can
be fulfilled by the TPM products. According to the provisions of annex III(1)(b) of the
EU Directive and to § 17 (1) SigG, the signature creation device must reliably detect
a potential forgery or a modification of the signature. Annex III of the EU Directive
provides as follows:
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Requirements for secure signature-creation devices Secure signature-creation
devices must, by appropriate technical and procedural means, ensure at the least that:
1. the signature-creation-data used for signature generation can practically occur
only once, and that their secrecy is reasonably assured
2. the signature-creation-data used for signature generation cannot, with reason-
able assurance, be derived and the signature is protected against forgery using
currently available technology
3. the signature-creation-data used for signature generation can be reliably protected
by the legitimate signatory against the use of others
A forgery or a modification of a signature is recognizable if the verification mech-
anism of a digital signature cannot be bypassed or deactivated. Forging a signature is
not detectable if an unauthorized person can obtain access to the signature key. This
situation could occur in the following cases:
• The same signature pair is generated multiple times
• The private key used for signature creation can be obtained through the public
key
• The private key can be guessed
• The private key is copied during generation and transferred to another unautho-
rized person
• The private key is accessible or useable in a stolen or found signature creation
device
The TPM uses a physical random number generator for key generation, which causes
the distribution of all keys to have an equal probability. In combination with keys
consisting of 2048 bit, every key is unique with sufficient probability. The key length
used by the TPM is appropriate for signature keys until 2011 [25] with respect to the
implemented hash function, which is, despite the SHA-1 weakness, applicable until 2009.
The key length means it is almost impossible to guess the private key, and the RSA
algorithm provides assurance that the private key cannot be computed based on the
public key. The requirement that the keys must not be revealed according to § 15(1)(2)
SigVO (tamper-resistance) is not fulfilled by the TPM specification. However, it is
suggested that the TPM products meet that requirement. The TPM also protects the
signature key against the use by others through the owner-password, therefore fulfilling
requirement (c) of the EU Directive. The method of generating a secure owner-password
is discussed in the following section.
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10.2.2 Results
The TPM specification meets the basic requirements of annex III of the EU Directive,
but does not meet all formal requirements of the Signature Act 2001. The available
products fulfill all requirements of the German signature law from the technical perspec-
tive. Therefore, these products can be validated according to annex 1 of the SigVO24
and approved as secure signature creation devices.
10.3 Qualified Electronic Signatures
As already described in the preceding section, the TPM provides the functions to create
an advanced signature. Since the TPM was originally designed to carry platform-specific
data and information about the user, it must be determined whether it can also be used
for this purpose.
10.3.1 Identification
The basic difference between the smart card with the ability to create an advanced
signature and the TPM, is that a smart card is directly bound to a certain user, while
the TPM is shipped without personal certificates. In order to use the TPM to carry
information relating to the user, it is therefore necessary that a certification service
provider (CSP) identifies the owner of a TPM and certifies the corresponding public
signature key. The applicant for a qualified certificate must therefore, according to the
provisions of annex II(d) of the EU Directive and § 5 (1)(1) SigG, be clearly identified
by the CSP, for example, by validating their identification card, if such a form of
identification is acceptable. The user can physically visit the CSP for this purpose,
or a third party may, in accordance with the provisions of § 4(5) SigG, validate the
identity of the user. The German PostIdent method run by the German Post AG may
be a useful method to use for this purpose. This method is still used by many on-
line credit institutes to identify their customers according to the provisions of § 154
Tax Law. The identification can therefore be accomplished in the post office or at the
applicant’s home. After the identification process is complete, the applicant receives a
unique secret, which is used to assign the signature key to a person. This secret must
be transferred over secure channels to the applicant. This can be done by certified mail
or physically handed over to the applicant in person.
10.3.2 Issuing Qualified Certificates
In Germany, there are additional requirements to be fulfilled when issuing a qualified
signature, although similar problems exist under the terms of the EU Directive which
are described in article 2(10) of the EU Directive. According to § 5(6) and § 15(7)(2)
SigG, the certification service provider must ensure that the applicant that wishes to
obtain a signature is in possession of a secure signature creation device - in this case,
the TPM. Qualitatively, both requirements of § 5(6) and § 15(7)(2) SigG are identical.
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For this purpose, a protocol is introduced, illustrated in Figure 10.1, that fulfills the
requirement of proving the possession of a secure signature creation device, and also
ensures that the keys are placed into this specific device. One requirement for the suc-
cess of this scheme is that the CSP offers a platform that enables secure communication
between applicant and the CSP, by using the Transport Layer Security. In this con-
text, it is necessary for the CSP to authenticate itself against the applicant. It should
be noted that the applicant must use special software that implements the protocol
described in Figure 10.1. This software should validate the certificate and cancel the
connection if the certificate is not valid. This is essential, because it is possible that a
false person masquerading as the legitimate CSP may present the applicant with what
seems like a legitimate certificate to authenticate themselves. Figure 10.1 shows the
CSP and the platform of A (the applicant). The applicant’s platform A is split into two
components: the TPM, which caries out the cryptographic functions, and a certificate
issuing software, which is provided by the CSP.
Certificate Issuing Software TPM
Generate
KSK ,K
−1
SK (5)
Decrypt
{K−1SK}KSRK (13)
Establish TLS-channel (1)
Transfer Identification Code (2)
Initiate Signature Creation (3)
TPM:CreateWrapKey (4)
KSK , {K−1SK}KSRK (6)
TPM:CertifyKey(KSK) (7)
Cert(SK, KSK) (8)Cert(AIK, KAIK),
Cert(SK, KSK) (9)
Na (11)
TPM:Sign(Na,{K−1SK}KSRK ) (12)
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K−1
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K−1
SK
(15)
Cert(A, KSK) (17)
CSP
Validate:
Cert(AIK,KAIK)
Cert(SK,KSK)(10)
Verify {Na}
K−1
SK
Create
Cert(A,KSK)
Add Cert(A, KSK)
to repository(16)
Platform of A
1
Figure 10.1: Protocol for certificate issuance
After the applicant (A) has entered their personal data, they transfer their identifi-
cation code to the CSP using the certificate issuing software (steps 1 - 3). In the next
step, the TPM of A generates a signature key pair K−1SK and KSK using the physical
random number generator of the TPM. In accordance with the provisions of § 17(1)(3),
this key can be generated on a secure signature creation device - namely the TPM,
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and does not need to be added externally. This also acts as a form of self-protection,
since this guarantees that the key is protected over its lifetime and is not exposed to
third parties. After the private key pair is generated, it is then encrypted with the
SRK (step 6 in Figure 1) of the TPM and returned to the user. The public part of the
signature-key is signed with an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) of the TPM (7). This
certification proves that the corresponding key-pair is held in the protected storage of
a valid TPM and that the signed key is a key that cannot be moved. Identity keys can
only sign data that originates from the TPM. Thus, a valid signature of data proves
that the data was generated on a TPM and is protected by the TPM’s secure storage,
in that it is part of the key-hierarchy of the SRK. The identity key is only valid if
the TPM has not been tampered with and the TPM is authentic. In the next step
(8 and 9), the TPM transfers the certificate of the signature key (Cert(SK, KSK) and
the certificate of the identity key Cert(AIK, KAIK) to the CSP. The CSP then verifies
the authenticity of the signatures and verifies whether the AIK is a valid identity key
(10). If the verification succeeds, the CSP has confirmation that K−1SK is held in the
protected storage of a genuine TPM. The CSP then verifies in steps 11-16 the fresh-
ness of K−1SK and whether the applicant has access to the signature key by requesting
a test signature (proof of possession). To create a successful signature, the TPM must
decrypt the encrypted K−1SK . This is only possible if the correct SRK is stored inside
the protected storage of the TPM, and the owner has delivered the correct password
for decrypting the SRK. This kind of sample signature also fulfills the control duties of
the CSP. Since the applicant must perform a sample signature, it is guaranteed that
the applicant possesses the required knowledge (password) for a signature creation and
that this unit is under the control of the person using the password. Finally, the CSP
signs the public part of the signature key and issues the corresponding certificate, which
it adds to his own directory service. This certificate is then transferred to the applicant
(17).
10.4 Trusted Software
In order to use the TPM as qualified signature creation device, the software that exe-
cutes the initialization protocol and the software that is responsible for communicating
with the TPM need to be trusted. We will discuss this issue in this section.
10.4.1 Trusted Initializing Software
It is necessary to use an initializing software that reliably enforces the protocol set out
above. This software is also responsible for supporting the user during the creation of a
secure password. In contrast to smart cards, which often include the use of a counter to
prevent more than a set number of attempts to correctly guess the password, the TPM
does not provide such a function. The TPM specification requires a mechanism that
prevents dictionary attacks, but the specification is not specific on this point, and leaves
this to the TPM vendor. As a result, different products exist which differ in their imple-
mentation. For example, the STM TPM chip provides a counter to prevent more than
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a set number of attempts to correctly guess the password. In contrast to smart cards,
which prevent further use of the card after several incorrectly entered passwords, the
STM TPM chip only increases the reaction time after 15 false attempts. The generation
of a secure password should take place before a signature-key is generated, to ensure
that the signature-key is protected by a secure password and to prevent the use of a chip
containing an insecure password. The initialization process is important, which means
that the software must be trusted. This could, for example, be performed by a boot
CD that has been extended by the functions set out above. This software is configured
so that it only supports connections to a specific CSP and prevents remote access to
the underlying hardware TPM. The CSP must also validate whether the software used
for the acceptance of the initial signature reliably enforces this requirement, because it
is possible for the applicant to place their signature key into a TPM, which they can
only obtain access to remotely. To ensure that a human being has physical access to
the TPM, the CSP uses the integrity measurement and reporting functionality provided
by the TPM. The initialization software is pre-configured in such a way that the TPM
measures all running software components and attests this system state to the CSP.
The CSP can then decide via a secure attestation channel, for example Protocol 3.7.2,
whether a trusted initialization software is used. If this verification is successful and
the protocol shown in Figure 10.1 has been executed, the CSP issues the corresponding
certificate and signs the applicant’s public key.
10.4.2 Trusted Signing Software
Besides the trusted initialization software, a trusted signing software is necessary that
prevents that the transaction data that is to be signed is maliciously modified before
the data is passed to the TPM. A trusted signing software displays the data that is to
be signed to the user and passes the data to the TPM.
Both trusted initialization software and trusted signing software should be realized
as a virtual appliance which is executed in a Trusted VM. These software components
then run upon the security architecture proposed by us in Chapter 7 where the integrity
and the trust level of this initialization software is assured. The trust level of these
software components can be ensured by using the protocols introduced in Section 9.3.1.
However, it should be noted that in that case the TPM architecture of Chapter 8
must be used in order to satisfy the requirement of providing lifetime protection of
cryptographic secrets. This requirement is for example not satisfied by software TPMs
which cannot act as a secure signature creation device.
10.4.3 Knowledge and possession
As described in the preceding sections, the TPM offers the possibility to store and use
personal certificates. But it must still be determined whether the signatory is also in
in direct possession of a secure signature creation device, and how this fact can be
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proven to the CSP 1. The EU Directive requires, pursuant to annex III (1)(c), that the
signature key can be reliably protected by the legitimate signatory against the use of
others. The provisions of § 15(1) SigVO state, in more detail, that it should only be
possible to obtain access to signature keys after the identification of the applicant on
the basis of knowledge and possession, or by means of a measurement of a biometric
attribute. Since biometric attributes do not provide the same level regarding security,
knowledge and possession must be used as the means of identification. The requirement
that it should only be possible to obtain access to the signature key if the applicant is
successfully identified on the basis of knowledge and possession, provides a reasonable
level of assurance that the signature was created by a specific person. Since neither
knowledge nor possession on its own are reliable attributes to identify somebody fully,
both attributes must exist simultaneously. Only when both attributes are used together,
it is argued, can an electronic signature replace a manuscript signature and therefore
act as prima facie evidence in trial.
One issue is the meaning of possession in the context of a TPM. The legislation
covers smart cards as secure signature creation devices [134]. However, the official
statement also mentions special components as secure signature creation devices to
be used in mainframe architectures [26]. Since the definition of a secure signature
creation device is not very specific, it is not necessary for the secure signature creation
device to be portable, as provided for by the provisions of § 15(1) SigVO. The aim of
the regulation is to ensure the signatory has the secure signature creation device in
their custody, and is capable of preventing unauthorized access to the device. In the
case of mobile devices, this custody can be adduced by physically inspecting the device.
Unfortunately, it is more difficult to prove that the signatory has sole access to the device
and can prevent unauthorized access. In this context, the TPM could be situated in an
external environment, and the signatory could obtain access to this device remotely, and
protect it with the password. This fact would neither fulfill the requirement of §§ 5(6)
and 15(7) SigG nor the protection purpose of § 15(1) SigVO. Therefore, the CSP must
verify whether the applicant of an electronic signature has the secure signature creation
device in their custody and is capable of preventing unauthorized access. To achieve
these properties, it might be necessary for an employee of the CSP to physically attend
the applicant’s premises to confirm possession. The use of a password implies that the
signatory has control of the secure signature creation device. This does not exclude
the creation of signatures on remote devices, if the signatory can prevent unauthorized
access to the signature creation device by protecting it physically.
10.5 Summary
The Trusted Platform Module offers, from the technological point of view, the possibility
to use and store personal certificates and their corresponding keys. In the realm of the
1It should be noted that the protocol described in this article only proves that the generated keys
are generated on a secure signature creation device, and not whether the applicant is really the one
who initiates the protocol.
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EU Directive, it can serve as a secure signature creation device. In Germany, to create
qualified signatures with the TPM, the TPM must be approved as a secure signature
creation device according to § 17(4) SigG. Furthermore, the TPM must be protected
against unauthorized access and be in the signatory’s direct possession and secured with
an additional method of proving possession. If the TPM is to be used as a signature
creation device, it is necessary that the TPM implements the protocol set out in this
chapter, which enables a qualified certificate to be issued to a specific TPM signing key.
In addition, it is required that the initialization and signature software is protected
from tampering which can be ensured using attestation techniques. Based on the high
availability and low cost of a TPM, it can reduce the costs involved in creating signatures
and possibly act to increase the use of secure signature creation devices.
182 CHAPTER 10. SIGNATURE CREATION WITH TPMS
Part V
Summary
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Chapter 11
Conclusions
In this thesis, we developed concepts and methods to leverage attestation techniques
for trust establishment in distributed systems. To achieve this goal, we first analyzed
the challenges that need to be solved in order to use attestation techniques for trust-
establishment. We identified building-blocks which need to be used to overcome the
existing challenges. Our identified building-blocks can be used to establish trust between
distributed systems that communicate over an insecure communication channel. The
identified three building blocks are as follows:
Attestation Protocols Attestation protocols enable a remote entity to validate the
trust level of another entity by verifying that the software loaded on a system corre-
sponds to the expectations. Since attestation protocols are a key-mechanism for securing
a system, they have to be secure. We have extracted three requirements which must be
satisfied in order to design secure attestation protocols:
1. Attestation techniques must always ensure freshness and authenticity of integrity
information.
2. The explicit attestation must be performed over secure channels.
3. Attestation protocols must integrate a key-establishment component that ensures
that the established attestation channel is authentic.
We have shown that the TCG-defined attestation protocol does not satisfy all our
extracted requirements and is, thus, vulnerable to a masquerading attack. We also
proposed a secure attestation protocol that satisfies all our extracted requirements and
can, therefore, be used to securely validate the trust level of a remote entity. The
resulting channel that is established by a secure attestation protocol is referred to as
secure attestation channel. We formally verified the secure attestation protocol to
validate whether our pre-defined security goals are satisfied. We also implemented our
attestation protocol and analyzed its performance to show that our proposed secure
attestation protocol is efficient.
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In scenarios where an entity is frequently requested to deliver integrity informa-
tion, existing attestation protocols scale badly. Such a scenario is, for example, a
classical client-server architecture, where a large number of clients frequently request
integrity information of a particular server. This bad scalability is caused by the fact
that a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) possesses very limited computation power and
is highly involved in the process of platform attestation. To solve this problem, we
presented solutions to overcome the bottleneck of a TPM and therefore improve the
scalability of attestation protocols. All our proposed protocols satisfy our identified re-
quirements of a secure attestation channel and, thus, allow a remote entity to securely
validate the trust level of another entity. We also presented a performance evaluation as
well as a security analysis of our proposed protocol; the results clearly indicate that the
protocols can considerably reduce the performance overhead of the attestation process.
One critical component to verify the integrity of a remote platform configuration is
the Stored Measurement Log (SML). The SML is a data structure in which all events
that were measured by the TPM are reported. The SML is needed for the verifying
entity to make a trust decision about the requesting system’s platform configuration.
However, since this approach reveals the platform configuration of the requesting sys-
tem, it is not always a desirable feature. To overcome this limitation, we proposed
a distributed integrity validation architecture that allows outsourcing the attestation
process. The architecture enables dividing a whole platform configuration into self-
contained, independent parts. This approach allows to make a statement of the trust
level of a platform even though the real platform configuration system is camouflaged.
We also presented a security protocol which realizes this concept and satisfies our iden-
tified requirements of a secure attestation channel.
Attestation protocols typically require asymmetric cryptography and a relative high
computation power to compute and establish cryptographic keys that subsequently real-
ize a secure attestation channel. These protocols are of intrinsic complexity as a valida-
tion entity has to determine the trust level of a particular communication partner based
on the complex SML and the received PCR values. However, in resource-constrained
systems, such as wireless sensor networks or embedded systems, a complex attesta-
tion process which is based on asymmetric cryptography is impractical. To solve this
problem, we proposed two lightweight TPM-based attestation protocols for resources
constraint systems. These protocols allow performing an implicit attestation by uti-
lizing the fact that the software configuration of resources constraint systems often do
not change during their whole lifetime. Our proposed protocols enable a low-cost node
to verify the trust level of another node that possesses more computation power and
is equipped with a Trusted Platform Module. Our proposed protocols do not require
expensive public key cryptography and the exchanged messages are very short. We
evaluated the performance of our proposed protocols showing that both the overhead
for storage and the energy consumption are negligible.
Security Architecture We analyzed the requirements and challenges that need to
be solved to integrate attestation techniques into current available operating systems.
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In this context, we identified three main problems that prevent a successful usage of
this technology (time discrepancies, incomplete measurements, and inefficiency). The
time discrepancy problem indicates that the TPM-based load-time measurement does
not correctly reflect the runtime-behavior. The problem of incomplete measurements
indicates that not all executed system components that affect the platform integrity
are measured. The third problem occurs because the approach is basically inefficient,
since it requires all measurements to be known and fully trusted, even if they do not
have a direct impact on a specific target application. To overcome these problems, we
presented the design and implementation of a security architecture that is based on vir-
tualization. Using this approach, we can establish isolated trusted environments which
allow overcoming the inefficiency and time discrepancy problem. We also presented a
new approach for measuring execution environments which solves the problem of in-
complete measurements. The security architecture enables (1) leveraging attestation
techniques for trust-establishment by achieving a meaningful attestation process and
(2) containing security breaches to an isolated compartment. This security architecture
can be used as a foundation to build more secure and reliable operating systems.
In our proposed security architecture, we used virtual TPMs to make the function-
ality of a hardware TPM available inside an isolated trusted execution environment.
Virtual TPMs possess the full functionalities of a hardware TPM, however, they do
not possess the same security mechanism. As a matter of these facts, we presented
the concept and design of a virtualization-enhanced hardware TPM that is able to be
used inside an isolated trusted execution environment and possesses the same security
mechanisms as a hardware TPM. Using our proposed hardware TPM, it is possible
to relinquish our security architecture from the need of using virtual TPMs. The
virtualization-enhanced TPM utilizes recent developments in the virtualization tech-
nology of processor architectures and can, thus, easily be adapted to integrate trusted
computing technology in next-generation processor architectures. In that case, highly-
efficient and secure trusted computing technology would be available to next-generation
operating systems that are based on virtualization.
Secure Transaction Software A secure transaction software is our third building-
block to establish trust into a remote or a local system. This software typically im-
plements the attestation protocols and runs on our attestation-supporting security ar-
chitecture. In combination with the first two building-blocks, the secure transaction
software is robust against infections from malware and provides basic primitives to
establish trust into a remote or a local system. The purpose of a secure transaction
software is to transfer trust to the user by making trust visible. To this end, we have
adapted and extended one of our proposed attestation protocol to provide the user of
a specific platform and a remote platform with assurances that a specific platform has
not been tampered with and is trusted for the duration of a sensitive transaction.
Qualified signatures are a vital component for trust establishment since they offer
non-repudiation, which is especially relevant in the realm of e-commerce. However,
qualified signatures are not widely used, and it is asserted that the failure to use qual-
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ified signatures deprives the market for electronic commerce of an important source
of potential growth. To resolve this problem, the Trusted Platform Module which is
already integrated in many systems could be used. We discussed the potential of the
TPM and gave considerations as to whether a TPM could be used as a secure signature
creation device. We have shown that, from the technological point of view, the TPM
is able to use and protect personal certificates and their corresponding keys. In the
realm of the EU, it can, thus, serve as a secure signature creation device. Based on the
high availability and low cost of a TPM, it can reduce the costs involved in creating
signatures and possibly act to increase the use of secure signature creation devices.
Drawn conclusions In short, based on our building-blocks, the following conclusions
can be drawn:
• Using attestation techniques for trust establishment requires that some sort of
secure attestation channel is established.
• In order to use the TCG-defined platform attestation in highly-frequented scenar-
ios, the protocols to perform platform attestation must be adapted.
• To satisfy privacy issues of the TCG-defined platform attestation, a privacy-
protecting mechanism must be in place that camouflages the real platform con-
figuration.
• A secure attestation channel can also be established in systems with very low
computational power. This enables providing trust assurances in these systems.
• The TCG-defined platform attestation possesses intrinsic problems causing the at-
testation not to be usable in system with high computation power. Virtualization
techniques are a sound way for overcoming these intrinsic challenges.
• To securely use platform attestation in virtualization-enhanced operating system
environments, a virtualization-enhanced hardware TPM is required.
• If attestation techniques are used to provide the user of a platform with trust
assurances, a secure transaction software is necessary which is able to make trust
visible.
• The TPM can be used to create qualified signatures, making the creation of
qualified signatures highly available.
Part VI
Appendix
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Appendix A
AVISPA Sources
In this chapter, we present the AVISPA source code for a number of selected protocols
which we modelled.
A.1 Protocol 3.6.3
PROTOCOL: Enhanced Robust Integrity Reporting Protocol
PURPOSE: Enhanced-IRP is intended to provide secure integrity reporting.
The protocol proceeds between a verifier (role Alice) and a TPM-enhanced client (role
Bob). The verifier wants to securely validate the platform configuration of the client. We
assume the existence of one certification authority with public key Ks. This certification
authority also created the AIK-Credential. In essence, Ks also acts as privacy CA. The
agents possess certificates of the form {X,Kx}\_inv(Ks).
role alice (A, B: agent,
Ka, Ks: public key,
H: function,
G: text,
SND, RCV: channel (dy))
played by A def=
local State : nat,
Na, Nb: text,
X:text,
Kb: public key,
SML: text,
PCR:text,
SK:message,
KEr:message
init State := 0
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transition
0. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
State’:= 2 /\ Na’ := new()
/\ X’ := new()
/\ SND(Na’.exp(G,X’))
2. State = 2 /\ RCV({B.AIK} inv(Ks).{Na.KEr’.PCR} inv(AIK)) =|>
State’:= 4 /\ SK’:=H(exp(KEr’,X))
/\ Nb’ := new()
/\ SND({Nb’.exp(G,X)} SK’)
4. State = 4 /\ RCV({Na.Nb’.KEr’.SML’} SK) =|>
State’:= 6 /\ secret(SK,sk1,{A,B})
/\ request(A,B,alice bob na,Na)
/\ request(A,B,alice bob nb,Nb’)
/\ request(A,B,sk1,SK)
end role
Listing A.1: AVISPA source of the verifier’s role
The prover receives the send package in state one and generates an own secret part of
his Diffie-Helman key by assigning Y’:=new(). He also obtains the current PCR values,
which is abstracted, since HLPSL does not provide any means of directly modelling
TPMs. The generated public key is then signed with the AIK together with the nonce
and the PCRs. The AIK is represented by inv(AIK). After sending the attestion
response, the prover also computes the secret key SK and witnesses the verifier that he
is able to compute a valid signature on the challenge.
role bob(A, B: agent,
AIK, Ks: public key,
H: function,
G: text,
SND, RCV: channel (dy))
played by B def=
local State : nat,
Na, Nb: text,
Y:text,
PCR:text,
SK:message,
KEi:message,
SML:text
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init State := 1
transition
1. State = 1 /\ RCV(Na’.KEi’) =|>
State’:= 3 /\ Y’ :=new()
/\ PCR’ :=new()
/\ SML’ :=new()
/\ SND({B.AIK} inv(Ks).{Na’.exp(G,Y’).PCR’} inv(AIK)
)
/\ SK’ := H(exp(KEi,Y’))
/\ witness(B,A,alice bob na,Na’)
3. State = 3 /\ RCV({Nb’.KEi} SK) =|>
State’:= 5 /\ SND({Na.Nb’.exp(G,Y).SML’} SK)
/\ secret(SML,sml,{A,B})
/\ secret(SK,sk1,{A,B})
/\ witness(B,A,sk1,SK)
/\ witness(B,A,alice bob nb,Nb’)
end role
Listing A.2: AVISPA source of the TPM’s role
We use the Dolev-Yao intruder model [50] to model the attacker and the environment.
In this intruder model the attacker has full control over all messages that are sent over
the network. The attacker can therefore intercept, analyze or modify messages, as well
as compose new messages and sent the messages to whoever he pleases. The channels
are named SA, RA, SB, RB, which stands for send/receive alice and send/receive bob
respectively. To abstract away the negoitation of a common generator g and a common
group m, we assume that these are global parameters. These parameters are modelled
with the variable G and also known to an potential attacker.
role session(A, B: agent, Ka, AIK, Ks: public key, H: function, G:
text) def=
local SA, RA, SB, RB: channel (dy)
composition
alice(A,B,Ka,Ks,H,G,SA,RA)
/\ bob (A,B,AIK,Ks,H,G,SB,RB)
end role
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role environment() def=
const a, b : agent,
aik, ka, ks, ki : public key,
h : function,
g: text,
na, nb,
alice bob nb,
bob alice na, sec a SK, sk1,nb1 : protocol id
intruder knowledge = {a, b, aik, ka, ks, ki, inv(ki),{i.ki} (inv
(ks)),g,h}
composition
session(a,b,ka,aik,ks,h,g)
/\ session(a,i,ka,ki,ks,h,g)
/\ session(i,b,ki,aik,ks,h,g)
end role
goal
secrecy of sk1
secrecy of sml
authentication on sk1
authentication on alice bob na
authentication on alice bob nb
end goal
environment()
Listing A.3: AVISPA source of environment and security goals
A.2 Protocol 3.7.4
PROTOCOL: Trusted-DHE TLS: Trusted Transport Layer Security
PURPOSE: Trusted-TLS is intended to provide integrity reporting, privacy and data
integrity of communication over the Internet.
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The protocol proceeds between a server (role Alice) and a client (role Bob) with re-
spective public keys Ka and Kb. The server wants to securely validate the platform
configuration of the client. We assume the existence of one certification authority with
public key Ks. This certification authority also created the AIK-Credential. In essence,
Ks also acts as privacy CA. The agents possess certificates of the form {X,Kx}inv(Ks).
Each session is identified by a unique ID Sid. The protocol also makes use of a pseudo-
random number generator PRF which we model as a hash function.
role bob(A, B : agent,
H, PRF, KeyGen: function,
G:text,
Kb, Ks, Kaik : public key,
SND, RCV: channel (dy))
played by B def=
local Na, Nb, Sid, Pb: text,
State: nat,
Y:text,
AIK:text,
Ka: public key,
PCR:text,
SML:text,
DHa, DHb, ClientK, ServerK, SK:message
init State := 0
transition
1. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
State’ := 2
/\ Nb’ := new()
/\ Pb’ := new()
/\ Sid’ := new()
/\ SND(B.Nb’.Sid’.Pb’)
2. State = 2 /\ RCV(A.Na’.Sid’.Pb’.{A.Ka’}\ inv(Ks).{DHa’.Na’.Nb
’}\ inv(Ka’)) =|>
State’ := 4
/\ Y’ := new()
/\ PCR’ := new()
/\ SML’ := new()
/\ SK’ := H(exp(DHa’,Y’))
%% Compute Master Secret
/\ ClientK’ := PRF(SK’.Na’.Nb’)
%% client certificate exchange
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/\ SND({B.Kb}\ inv(Ks).{AIK.Kaik}\ inv(ks).
%% client key exchange
exp(G,Y’).
%% client certificate verify
{H(exp(G,Y’).Na’.Nb’)}\ inv(Kb).
%% client certificate verify
{H(exp(G,Y’).Na’.Nb’.PCR’)}\ inv(Kaik)
)
/\ witness(B,A,na\ nb1,Na’.Nb)
3. State = 4 /\ RCV({DHb’.DHa’.Na’.Nb’.A.B.Na’.Pb’.Sid}\ ClientK)
=|>
%% Send client Finished messages
State’ := 6 /\
SND({SML.DHa’.exp(G,Y’).Na’.Nb.
B.A.Na’.Pb’.Sid’}\ ClientK)
/\ witness(B,A,sk1,ServerK’)
/\ secret(ClientK,sec\ clientk,{A,B})
/\ secret(SML,sml,{A,B})
end role
Listing A.4: AVISPA source of the client’s role
role alice(A, B : agent,
H, PRF, KeyGen: function,
G: text,
Ka, Ks : public key,
SND, RCV: channel (dy))
played by A def=
local Na, Sid, Pb, PMS: text,
Nb: text,
State: nat,
AIK:text,
Kb: public key,
Kaik: public key,
PCR:text,
X: text,
SML: text,
DHa,DHb,ClientK, ServerK,SK:message
init State := 1
transition
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1. State = 1 /\ RCV(B.Nb’.Sid’.Pb’) =|>
State’ := 3
/\ Na’ := new()
/\ X’ := new()
/\ SND(A.Na’.Sid’.Pb’.{A.Ka}\ inv(Ks).{exp(G,X’).Na
’.Nb’}\ inv(Ka)) %% server hello / certificate
exchange / server key exchange
/\ witness(A,B,na\ nb2,Na’.Nb’)
% We simply assume that the server must send back
Pa. (Essentially
% modelling that the client makes only one offer.)
2. State = 3 /\ RCV({B.Kb’}\ (inv(Ks)).{AIK.Kaik’}\ inv(ks). %%
receive client certificate exchange
%% receive client key exchange
DHb’.
%% receive client certificate verify
{H(DHb’.Na.Nb’)}\ inv(Kb’).
%% receive client certificate verify
{H(DHb’.Na.Nb’.PCR’)}\ inv(Kaik’)
) =|>
State’ := 5
/\ SK’ := H(exp(DHb’,X’))
%% Compute Pre\ Master Secret
/\ ServerK’ := PRF(SK’.Na’.Nb’)
%% Compute Master Secret
/\ SND({DHb’.exp(G,X’).Na’.Nb’.
%% Send Finished messages
A.B.Na’.Pb’.Sid’}\ ServerK’)
/\ witness(B,A,sk1,ServerK’)
3. State = 5 /\ RCV({SML’.DHa’.DHb’.Na.Nb.B.A.Na.Pb’.Sid’}\
ServerK) =|> %% Receive client finished message
State’ := 7 /\ request(A,B,na\ nb1,Na.Nb)
/\ secret(ClientK,sec\ clientk,{A,B})
/\ secret(ServerK,sec\ serverk,{A,B})
end role
Listing A.5: AVISPA source of the Server’s role
We again use the Dolev-Yao intruder model [50] to model the attacker and the environ-
ment. The channels are again named SA, RA, SB, RB, which stands for send/receive
alice and send/receive bob respectively.
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role session(B,A: agent, Ka, Kb, Ks, Kaik: public\ key, H, PRF,
KeyGen: function, G: text) def=
local SB, SA, RB, RA: channel (dy)
composition
bob(A,B,H,PRF,KeyGen,G,Kb,Ks,Kaik,SB,RB)
/\ alice(A,B,H,PRF,KeyGen,G,Ka,Ks,SA,RA)
end role
role environment()
def=
const na\ nb1, na\ nb2, sec\ clientk, sec\ serverk, sml : protocol
\ id,
h, prf, keygen : function,
a, b : agent,
ka, kb, ki, ks,kaik : public\ key,
g : text
intruder\ knowledge = { a, b, ka, kb, ks, ki, inv(ki),
{i.ki}\ (inv(ks)),g}
composition
session(b,a,ka,kb,ks,kaik,h,prf,keygen,g)
/\ session(b,i,kb,ki,ks,kaik,h,prf,keygen,g)
/\ session(i,a,ki,ka,ks,kaik,h,prf,keygen,g)
end role
goal
secrecy\ of sec\ clientk,sec\ serverk
%Alice authenticates Bob on na\ nb1
authentication on na nb1
%Bob authenticates Alice on na\ nb2
authentication on na nb2
%Alice verifies that Bob’s TPM was involved in establishing
the secret communication channel
authentication on sk1
secrecy of sml
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end goal
environment()
Listing A.6: AVISPA source of the environment and security goals
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